From kosova at jps.net Tue May 7 20:00:29 2002 From: kosova at jps.net (kosova at jps.net) Date: Tue, 7 May 2002 17:00:29 -0700 Subject: [Prishtina-E] FW: [balkanhr] Book Review: Takis Michas "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties" Message-ID: FYI: -----Original Message----- From: Greek Helsinki Monitor [mailto:office at greekhelsinki.gr] Sent: Tuesday, May 07, 2002 5:56 AM To: balkanhr at yahoogroups.com Subject: [balkanhr] Book Review: Takis Michas "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties" Book Review: Takis Michas "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties" Texas A&M University Press: Eastern European Studies (College Station, Tex.), No. 15; ISBN: 158544183X Hardcover - 200 pages (May 2002) UK List Price: ?24.95, US List Price: $29.95, Amazon.co.uk price: ?18.54 Can be ordered at http://www.amazon.co.uk/exec/obidos/ASIN/158544183X/qid=1020761780/sr=1-1/re f=sr_1_0_1/026-5717662-4778065 Reviewed by Panayote Dimitras (Greek Helsinki Monitor, Greece; and Central European University, Hungary), Email: panayote at greekhelsinki.gr --------------------------------------------------- Takis Michas' "Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic's Serbia in the Nineties" is a "book combining personal observation, exhaustive investigation, humanitarian concerns and political analysis" (Samuel Huntington), "a courageous work" (Roy Gutman), a "devastating critique of Greece's reactive ethnonationalism" (Nicos Mouzelis) that "should be read not only by Balkan specialists but by all those interested in issues of nationalism and human rights" (Adamantia Pollis). This review fully subscribes to these back jacket comments. Michas' book provides indeed compelling, irrefutable evidence that help explain the frustration of Zoran Mutic, an anti-nationalist Serb intellectual and translator of Greek literature in Serb-Croat. In September 1995, Mutic exclaimed: "When I hear so many Greeks -journalists, academics, politicians, intellectuals- expressing their admiration for Karadzic, what can I say? How can they consider as a hero a criminal, somebody who bombed hospitals, who placed snipers to kill kids on the streets?" Karadzic was honored in an open-air mass meeting in Piraeus, in the summer of 1993, attended or supported by all political parties, trade unions, media and the Orthodox Church: the handful of demonstrators who opposed the meeting were even arrested... The convincing answers provided by Michas will make this book hard to swallow by the mainstream Greek political, media and intellectual establishment, notorious for its refusal to accept criticism and engage in self-criticism (as former socialist Minister of Justice Professor Michalis Stathopoulos has repeatedly said). It is expected that, if they decided not to ignore it, most of them will find harsher words for it than those of the former conservative foreign minister Michalis Papakonstantinou in the book's odd foreword: "Michas ... wrote the book ... more from the viewpoint of a human rights activist and critic trying to bring justice to the side he supports than that of an objective observer" (p. xi). Because indeed, in Greece, advocating for human rights, civil society, and, in the end, an open democratic society is perceived as a biased enterprise even by the most moderate members of the establishment, like M. Papakonstantinou. It is no accident that the book's author -like a few others with similar views- has more than once lost journalistic jobs for having expressed views that in most traditional democracies would not even be considered radical. Michas indeed starts the book with one such experience: losing his column in a financial daily, yet owned by a typical "globalization" entrepreneur, for having printed in April 1993 the bank account for support to the then hard-hit Sarajevo daily "Oslobodjenje" (pp. 3-4)... Michas substantiates clearly at the outset the second part of the book's title: "what seemed incomprehensible during the Bosnia and Kosovo wars was not so much that Greece sided with Serbia, but that it sided with Serbia's darkest side" (p. 4). Indeed, the book provides a detailed documentation of how Greece sided with Milosevic and scorned the Serbian opposition even through 2000. It helps explain therefore how Greece also sided with Karadzic when the latter disagreed with Milosevic, and with the Pale Serbian-Bosnian self-proclaimed parliament when it rebuffed pleas by Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis, Milosevic and Karadzic during the ill-fated effort to settle the Bosnian crisis early on in 1992. He is correct, moreover, to point out that this attitude was not inspired by politicians and/or media but was a bottom-up event. "Media people and politicians simply gave in to this overpowering popular demand" (p. 5). Michas correctly explains this attitude by the weakness of Greek civil society and the prevailing intolerance in the society at large, which is indeed a much worse situation than that of a "merely" intolerant state. He attributes this characteristic to the prevalence to this very day of a militant and rather primitive form of ethnonationalism in Greece. In the end of the book, he develops this theoretical argument, and also explains the role of the Orthodox Church as a component of Greek nationalism; he looks for the roots of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism of the left and of the right, a major element in Greek society's "irrational" attitude; and he recalls the consequent and continued persecution of dissident voices and refusal to recognize minorities, that go hand-in-hand with the prevailing intolerance. Many nationalism theorists may disagree with the author, or find some of his arguments rather weak: however, even here, it is the evidence he provides that is essential to the understanding of modern Greece, in this investigative piece that is not a rigorous academic study. The book comes out at a time when the publication of the Dutch report on the events of Srebrenica has caused serious waves in the Netherlands and beyond. These waves have not reached Greece, though, a country that was rejoicing after the "fall" of Srebrenica in July 1995 at the hands of Bosnian Serbs and their allies, Greek paramilitaries. The latter in fact raised the Greek flag in Srebrenica after its capture: for those who may try to contest this fact, a photo is provided (p. 22), alongside another immortalizing the ensuing award of medals to the paramilitaries by Karadzic (p. 23). The other major indicted war crimes suspect, then General Ratko Mladic, was equally popular in Greece. So, when the Hague Tribunal indicted both of them, two million signatures were reportedly collected by the Greek-Serbian Friendship Association to oppose their prosecution. Another revealing part of the Dutch report on Srebrenica is the reference to the support of the Bosnian Serb army by the Greek (alongside Israeli and Ukrainian) secret services which provided them with arms and ammunition. Michas' book makes this look even more credible when it reveals that NATO military secrets on the August 1995 air strikes were passed on to Mladic on direct orders of then socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou: the author's source is none other than Papandreou's personal intermediary with Karadzic and Milosevic, the -then and now-President of Greek-Serbian Friendship Association, who was carrying out the mission (pp. 38-39). One would therefore not be surprised that Michas recalls also the refusal in Greece to condemn Serb atrocities in all recent wars and to accept that rapes were used as an ethnic cleansing weapon by Serbs; as well as the eagerness to refute any such allegations, and challenge the credibility of the Hague Tribunal or other international expert commissions, even by Greece's top human rights official. Besides, the book provides information on many business activities involving Greeks and Serbs to break the embargo against Serbia, acquire companies in Kosovo, launder Milosevic money, all that with full state support. This phenomenon of "fundamental irrationalism," as Salonica-born leading French sociologist Edgar Morin called it, had its culmination in 1999 with the Kosovo bombings. A near unanimity of Greeks opposed them; almost all Greek media reported events along the official Serb government line; and anti-Americanism reached a new high during the same year's US President Bill Clinton state visit, which triggered unparalleled street demonstrations, quite unlike previous or later visits by a long list of communist or other authoritarian leaders. In the end, Michas recalls how even the supposed pro-European Costas Simitis socialist government, and its foreign minister George Papandreou, tried to help Milosevic when, in October 2000, the Serbian masses and the international community demanded that he recognized his defeat by Vojislav Kostunica and stepped down: Milosevic's insistence that a run-off be held had one supporter, Greece -and personally even its foreign minister. Another important contribution of the book is the account of the sustained efforts throughout the 1990s by Greek diplomacy to destabilize or at least to prevent the international recognition of the Republic of Macedonia at all, or, later on, under its constitutional name. Afraid -correctly- that such a development would only make inevitable the acknowledgment that a Macedonian minority exists in Greece -which it does, but that is Greek society's major taboo-, these efforts included even exchange of views with Milosevic to "swallow up" Macedonia, perhaps within the context of a Greek-Serb Confederation. Michas concludes the investigative part of the book with a related sarcasm: "Surely Milosevic feels sorry that he did not pursue this matter further. Had his plan for a Greek-Serb federation materialized, he might well have won the 2000 election. The majority of Greeks would have voted for him at any rate" (p. 106). How can one contest it, when his popularity rating in Greece, to the very end of his rule, was many times higher than that of all Western leaders and even than his popularity among Serbs? Or when a few hours after his extradition to the Hague, in June 2001, 79 of the some 100 Greek deputies present in Athens signed a petition opposing it and all other extraditions of Serbs to the Hague Tribunal? -------------- next part -------------- HTML attachment scrubbed and removed From kosova at jps.net Fri May 10 20:06:32 2002 From: kosova at jps.net (kosova at jps.net) Date: Fri, 10 May 2002 17:06:32 -0700 Subject: [Prishtina-E] Steiner is Wrong - Freedom is Not Destabilizing, by Alice Mead Message-ID: Steiner is Wrong - Freedom is Not Destabilizing By Alice Mead (Special to Zeri, Prishtine, May 10, 2002) The immediate conflict between the new head of UNMIK and the new Parliament, is not surprising. After three years of heavy-handed, top-down administration, UNMIK has strayed far afield of its original mandate, which should have reflected the principles for empowerment of populations, specifically those who, perhaps for centuries, have been under various forms of totalitarian or apartheid rule as Kosova has. The question is now becoming-- how does UNMIK and UN 1244, together with newly devised institutions created by Belgrade and UNMIK match the clearly stated goals in the 1960 UN Declaration of Independence for Colonial Peoples, stating that, "Recognizing the passionate yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples and the decisive role of such peoples in the attainment of their independence, Aware of the increasing conflicts resulting from the denial of or impediments in the way of the freedom of such peoples, which constitute a serious threat to world peace, Considering the important role of the United Nations in assisting the movement for independence in Trust and Non- Self- Governing Territories, Recognizing that the peoples of the world ardently desire the end of colonialism in all its manifestations, . . . Believing that the process of liberation is irresistible and irreversible and that, in order to avoid serious crises, an end must be put to colonialism and all practices of segregation and discrimination associated therewith, Welcoming the emergence in recent years of a large number of dependent territories into freedom and independence, and recognizing the increasingly powerful trends towards freedom in such territories which have not yet attained independence, Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,. . . And to this end declares that: 2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. 5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour. For decades, Serbia treated Kosova as a colony, failing to develop the area, driving out various unwanted populations, robbing the local population of land, savings, property, resources by the dreaded Fiscal Police, and eventually completely suspending their autonomous government, instituting a brutal, apartheid regime. The effort to restore basic human and civil rights ended not in Serb apologies, cooperation and reparations, but in diplomatic failure and the NATO war. During the war, again, soldiers looted homes, robbed displaced peoples, demanded huge bribes, burned property, destroyed livestock, and took materials from the area. Serbia relied on a constant flow of money from Kosova into Serbia through this period. Sadly, the NATO war ended without a peace agreement. The status of Kosova remained undecided. No historian could argue with the fact that since the end of World War II and the birth of the United Nations, a beleaguered organization in desperate need of accountability, transparency, and reform, that the end of the age of colonial empires has dominated international politics as much as has the end of Communism. Since the 1950's, more than fifty five former dependent colonies have undergone painful transitions into becoming independent states, often through protracted guerilla-type violence, factionalism, and destabilizing civil wars. Following -- ironically enough -- one of the few organizations involved in this process is the United Nations Security Council, heavily weighted towards permanent empowerment of former empires- Britain, France, Germany, Russia, United States, and China. While newer nations who may at long last have been released from colonial domination, for example Bangladesh, Singapore, or Ghana, do not have nearly the same power. Similarly, the G8 group has no representation from newer states either. Even today, states that were part of the British empire--Sudan, Palestine, India, Ireland, Afghanistan-are some of the most intractably violent and volatile places in the world because of unresolved territorial issues that are of vital importance to local populations. What cost are we now paying for not having respected the full and equal rights of these local populations, for allowing centuries of economic exploitation to flow into the coffers of Europe, for the overt and covert racism inherent in the tendency to ignore the rights and freedoms of the Sudanese, the Palestinians, or the citizens of East Timor and Kosova? Territorial issues in the Balkans remain unresolved since 1913. After World War II, Russia emerged as a federated republic under Communism. And Yugoslavia was formed in the same mold--created from a series of ethnically based republics, with two lesser provinces, supposedly united under a central communist dictatorship. Serbia seeks very successfully to maintain this now-outdated concept which will continue to give Serbia economic dominance in the region and will keep Kosova underdeveloped and dependent. The political status given to an impoverished minority population in a 1945 communist dictatorship determines now its future and prevents its citizens of self-determination and freedom? It appears so. This, in effect, is the first cause in the misguided policies being applied in Kosova. Given the important historic shift internationally from overt racism, apartheid regimes, colonial domination, resource exploitation, and centralized dictatorships, what independent organizations are there now who have oversight of this still-evolving shift towards local empowerment, universal human rights, and regional/global economies? Only the United Nations. The EU, in the high-handed, closed-door creation of the new country of Serbia/ Montenegro (who knows where Kosova fits into this abomination of a plan and isn't the EU an economic organization which, until now anyway, didn't have the power to create new nations?) that point of view, of a centralized communist federation of South Slavs, now diluted by time, chaos, civil war, corruption, nationalism, hundreds of thousands of refugees, and the demise of communism and totalitarianism, supports this unprincipled hodge-podge of policies that seek to preserve Serb dominance and economic centrality. The plan is to make Belgrade the economic center of the region. But that's not a UN universal human rights plan. It's an EU economic plan. There is no plan to develop Kosova economically, but to continue to allow hundreds of thousands of unemployed to work outside the region and to send money home. Kosova ended up with an interim UN administration, governed by 15 rotating foreign countries in New York City. Contrast this with another bid for independence, the island of East Timor with a population of 800,000, which was given an interim UN government. However, at the same time, they were also given the rapid transfer of powers due to them as described in the 1960 UN declaration on independence. Could the difference be that East Timor has a Nobel Laureate leader, while the Albanians are without political, civic, or moral leadership? The Albanian power vacuum has opened the door for opportunistic policies to flourish in Kosova. Instead of a rapid transfer of power, UNMIK administrators and Nebosja Covic have created various adhoc blocks to direct, representative power. First there was the November 2001 agreement, which set the precedent for settling decisions about Kosova in Belgrade, and created the so-called High Group, then there was the Serbia/Montenegro agreement in which Kosova was not included. Covic speaks about Kosova at the UNSC. Albanians are not allowed a voice at the UN. Media is under orders not to air or publish controversial points of view. Steiner recently told Bajram Rexhepi he could not travel to the USA to meet with Albanian Americans. The UNMIK director maintains veto power over all legislation. The topic of final status officially cannot be discussed and there are no known plans for beginning that discussion. The defacto partitioning of Mitrovica has not been studied or resolved. When university students asked questions about this issue at a press conference, Steiner screamed and swore at them. The border change in Viti which gives several Albanian villages to Macedonia is similarly taboo. Meanwhile, Covic has altered the number of Serb returnees from 100,000 to 200,000. That is not up for discussion either. The outrageous salaries--between $100,000 to $200,000- paid to internationals while pensions for the elderly are $25 per month is not up for review or discussion either. UNMIK is simply not accountable. No one will review this situation and put it back on track. If the local population becomes poor enough, and it seems they might, or frustrated with the Mitrovica situation, and it seems they might, or furious about the impervious bureaucracy that UNMIK is rapidly becoming, their recourse --since they have no political power at all-- will probably be violence. Do we want a Palestine or Northern Ireland in the center of the Balkans? By inattention--and this means American inattention - it seems that we might be creating one. In direct violation of the 1960 UN declaration on creating freedom for disenfranchised peoples, the UN has told the citizens of Kosova that they "are not ready" for independence or self-determination. And they aren't. But the path to that freedom should be clearly visible. At the moment it is obscured with a tangle of ill-conceived policies and procedures as UNMIK administrators lurch from crisis to crisis. Alice Mead is an American author and human rights activist. Ky shkrim mund te ribotohet me kusht qe te theksohet autori dhe gazeta Zeri, Prishtine. From jeton at hotmail.com Sat May 18 12:09:56 2002 From: jeton at hotmail.com (Jeton Ademaj) Date: Sat, 18 May 2002 12:09:56 -0400 Subject: [Prishtina-E] God is Great! Mac Minister in Deep doo Message-ID: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1989000/1989547.stm _________________________________________________________________ Join the world?s largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. http://www.hotmail.com From kosova at jps.net Wed May 22 23:32:22 2002 From: kosova at jps.net (kosova at jps.net) Date: Wed, 22 May 2002 20:32:22 -0700 Subject: [Prishtina-E] The Truth Shall Set You Free - by Alice Mead Message-ID: THE TRUTH SHALL SET YOU FREE (Special to the Zeri newspaper, Prishtine) By Alice Mead May 22, 2002 This past weekend, the tiny island nation of East Timor became independent. For three years, since 1999, they had a UN interim government much like Kosova's. Unlike UNMIK, though, their interim administration was designed to transfer power to the citizens of East Timor as rapidly as possible in large part because the president of Indonesia was willing to negotiate a settlement. Now these 800,000 people have their own country. The basis of this was that Indonesia had forcibly overtaken East Timor and internationals did not recognize this effort at annexation of a territory by force. The second step was an agreement by both sides. International law expert, Hurst Hannum of Tufts University, has written extensively on sovereignty and self-determination. In an article in Foreign Affairs, March/April 1998, he states that regions taken by force do not simply become annexed. Instead, international recognition of border changes requires a co-signing of treaties by both states involved, votes to ratify these border changes by the local parliaments, and other ratifications by transnational organizations. There are several important questions to ask, while contemplating the comparison of East Timor to Kosova: 1. How did Kosova become "part" of Serbia to begin with? 2. Were any laws, standards, and treaties violated to make this happen? 3. Was Kosova in fact treated as a colony from the point of annexation? Fortunately, the answers to these questions can be found in the impeccably researched Kosovo, A Short History by Noel Malcolm. The year is 1912 and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is at hand. The Serb Third army entered Kosova to fight and defeat the Ottoman army. Prizren and Gjakova surrendered on November 3, 1912. In Ferizaj the Serb army encountered fierce resistance. Peje fell to the Montenegrin army. A Russian journalist named Leon Trotsky cited widespread massacres and atrocities committed against the Albanians, saying in effect, Quite simply, the Serb Army is engaged in systematic extermination of the Muslim population. (Malcolm, page 252) In Ferizaj, only three Albanian men were left alive. In 1914, the Carnegie Endowment report again cited this systematic effort at expunging the Albanian population. "Houses and whole villages were reduced to ashes, the unarmed population was massacred ... with a view to transforming the ethnic character of regions populated by Albanians." (page 254, Malcolm). The region was then placed under military rule. In order to legally annex Kosova, Serbia would have had to internally ratify these border changes in its parliament, called the Grand National Assembly. This never happened. Kosova was not annexed under international law either. "But the strange truth is that Kosovo was not legally incorporated into Serbia" (Malcolm, page 265) either internally or internationally! "All commentators at the time, and all subsequent historians, seem to have accepted the fact that Kosova was an integral part of Serbian kingdom." (Malcolm, page 264). But that is untrue. Furthermore, there was no attempt to make the Albanians citizens of Serbia. >From the outset, Serbia saw Kosova as a colony and its populations were treated as inferior, without equal rights, hopefully to be driven out. Why bother with citizenship for those you hope to expel? The purpose of the colonization program in Kosova was to alter the composition of the population. Serbs and Montenegrins were offered for free nine hectares of land taken from Albanian property owners. Over 100,000 Albanians fled Kosova between 1913-1915. (Malcolm, page 258). While Albanians did not become Serbian citizens, eventually in 1928, they became Yugoslav citizens. But from the beginning, their rights were openly disregarded by authorities. in 1930, there were no Albanian schools or newspapers. The Serbs even denied their existence as a minority. In 1935, another wave of colonization and discrimination was initiated by Serbia. The infamous 1937 Belgrade University policy paper urged the persecution of Albanians through burning homes and harassing them legally. Thousands were deported to Turkey. In 1964, there were no paved roads in Kosova. In 1995, efforts at repopulation were renewed. Milosevic began the transfer of 225,000 Croatian Serbs to Kosova. After 25,000 were sent by train, the UN stopped the forced transfer of the other 200,000 displaced people. Throughout the period from 1918-1999, the region remained economically undeveloped. Serbia and Yugoslavia did not invest in Kosova as they did in the republics. This history of privation and hardship was the basis of the Milosevic's renewed efforts at driving out the Albanians through economic privation and brutality from 1989-1999. It was the basis of Operation Horseshoe during the NATO war, in which the goal was to reduce the Albanian population to 800,000 through ethnic cleansing. And it has always been part of Serbian policy from 1913 to 1999. The point is throughout the twentieth century, Kosova was a colony, brutally overrun numerous times since 1912/1913. Like the other 55 colonies in the world, who achieved independence since 1960, the Albanians want real freedom, representative government, and equality. Serb claims that Kosova is an intrinsic part of Serbia are false. They intentionally kept Kosova as a colony, disregarded the norms of international law from 1912 on, and every regime since then regarded Kosova as a source of financial exploitation. Serbs did not protest when the Kosova parliament was suspended in 1989. They celebrated. They didn't protest the 10 years of brutal apartheid in Kosova from 1989-1999. Most Serbs today still don't consider Milosevic as having committed war crimes in Kosova. Instead, they believe he embezzled money from the Serb government. In such situations where there has been grave and continuous rights abuse, the central concern of internationals, according to Hannum, should be with the rights of the people not the facade of sovereignty. Internationals took over Kosova without a peace plan or treaty to be ratified by the people. UNMIK inherited without question Serb attitudes and policy and believed Serb statements that Kosova was the "Jerusalem" of Orthodoxy. They have not taken the time to research the sad history of this place. Nor do they understand the yearning for freedom of the Albanians. Since 1912, the history and destiny of Kosova has been one of nearly continuous genocide. Genocide is properly defined by Raphael Lemkin: "Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and colonization of the area by the oppressor's own nationals." (Samantha Power, page 43, A Problem from Hell.) Denying the Albanians the due process for liberation that is spelled out in the 1960 UN Declaration of Independence for colonies by imposing both a heavy-handed interim government without representation to be followed by continued forced association with Serbia that the Albanians will never ratify, and to which Kosova is not legally bound in the first place, is a very grave error of historic proportions in diplomacy, foreign policy, and human rights. The era of colonization, wherever it lingers in the world, needs to be left firmly behind as it was this week in East Timor. - Alice Mead is an American writer and human rights activist. All rights reserved. Republication or redissemination of this article are expressly prohibited without the written consent of Zeri, Prishtine. From mentor at alb-net.com Fri May 24 11:59:10 2002 From: mentor at alb-net.com (Mentor Cana) Date: Fri, 24 May 2002 11:59:10 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Prishtina-E] UN vetoes Kosovo border resolution Message-ID: Thursday, 23 May, 2002, 15:16 GMT 16:16 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_2004000/2004509.stm UN vetoes Kosovo border resolution - Ethnic Albanian MPs want Kosovo's full independence - The United Nations mission in Kosovo has taken the unprecendented step of invalidating a resolution taken by the province's local assembly, which was seeking to challenge a territorial settlement. - Steiner struck the motion down within minutes of its adoption - The UN administrator in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, within minutes declared "null and void" the resolution adopted by the ethnic Albanian-dominated assembly which rejected a border agreement between Yugoslavia and Macedonia. Kosovo, which borders Macedonia, legally remains part of Yugoslavia. The unanimously passed resolution is being viewed as an attempt by the province to act as an independent state. The incident is also seen as the most serious rift in relations between the province's ethnic Albanian leadership and the UN since the world body took charge of the province in June 1999. The vote is also likely to earn strong criticism from Belgrade - and has already prompted a walkout from the assembly by the Serb deputies. Warnings Ethnic Albanian MPs - who press for Kosovo's outright independence - have been unhappy with the border agreement between Yugoslavia and Macedonia since it was signed last year. They say that over 4,000 hectares of land were removed from Kosovo without any consultation with the local population. The BBC's Nicholas Wood in Pristina says that while some UN officials have sympathised with the MP's grievances, the UN Security Council and the European Union, have warned that the assembly has no rights to discuss issues affecting the region's borders or internal security. Letters from the Security Council and the EU not to go ahead with the vote were presented to the assembly before the session. They warned that Kosovo's reputation would be damaged if the motion was adopted. Walkout Nevertheless, the assembly went ahead with the resolution. - Rugova leads the independence-seeking assembly - This in turn prompted the Serbian deputies to leave the parliament, saying they would no longer take part in the assembly or the province's government unless the motion was rejected. The 120-strong Kosovo's first multi-ethnic assembly opened its inaugural session in December 2001, following elections the month before. But the UN retained the final say on the most contentious policy issues, banning the assembly to vote for the province's independence. From kosova at jps.net Thu May 30 10:51:29 2002 From: kosova at jps.net (kosova at jps.net) Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 07:51:29 -0700 Subject: [Prishtina-E] FW: [AKI-News] Why are U.S. Officials turning a deaf ear to Kosova's final status? Message-ID: FYI: -----Original Message----- From: aki-news-bounces at alb-net.com [mailto:aki-news-bounces at alb-net.com]On Behalf Of aki at alb-net.com Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2002 7:33 AM To: AKI Newsletter Subject: [AKI-News] Why are U.S. Officials turning a deaf ear to Kosova'sfinal status? --------------------------------------------------------------------- Advocates for Kosova Independence (AKI) News & Information Network: http://www.alb-net.com/aki --------------------------------------------------------------------- Advocates for Kosova's Independence (AKI) May 30, 2002 ================================== ** AKI Newsletter, Issue 11 ** ================================== AKI Statement: This past week, Kosova's new Prime Minister traveled to Washington. But no matter where he went or whom he met with, American officials turned a deaf ear to his requests for a timeline regarding a settlement on the final status of Kosova. With the first three years of UN administration now up in Kosova, the current U.S. policy is one of do-nothingism. The thinking both here and in Europe seems to be that by refusing to acknowledge the overwhelming reality of the dwindling Albanian patience, the demand for a diplomatic process to settle the fate of the troubled province, they will create some kind of stability instead of a divisive, mistrustful stalemate. Meanwhile, Serb leaders seem to be aligning themselves for the partitioning of Kosova in exchange for independence. UNMIK sits in the middle, increasingly relying on its extensive veto powers as a governing style. Everyone should recognize that despite the NATO war, no one has yet begun talks for a peace plan in Kosova. Insisting that politicians and media remain silent on the one issue that is crucial to all ethnic groups in Kosova, that of final status, will sooner or later push the resolution of this conflict into the streets, as the Prime Minister tried to point out. ================================== Recent Headlines ================================== "Radical ethnic Albanian groups will turn to violence if the international community does not deal quickly with Kosovo's desire for independence from Serbia, the province's prime minister warned yesterday." "Ethnic Albanian MPs want Kosovo's full independence -" "Belgrade has sent its minority mixed signals, which encourage division rather than a united Serb strategy. The official policy has been to exercise influence through Kosovo's institutions with the aim of keeping the province "de jure" part of Serbia and forestalling its independence. At the same time, Belgrade continues to hint that it may accept Kosovo's partition, despite official denials of such strategy. Indeed, Covic recently spoke of his preference for Kosovo's division into Bosnia-style entities, at the UN in New York." ___________________________________________________________ Professor Hurst Hannum of Tufts University has a book called Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-determination: The Accommodation of Conflicting Rights. The following points are taken from an article by Professor Hannum, a international law expert, on independence movements. The article appeared in Foreign Affairs Journal, March/April 1998. I. International Opinion regarding Independence 1. Post cold war conflicts for secession are a substantial and ongoing threat to international peace 2. Therefore internationals must have an objective process for both intervention and settling these disputes, but they don't. This vagueness is in itself destabilizing 3. There is an inherent conflict in decolonization situations- between the concepts of self-determination and sovereignty 4. The right to secession has no defined steps or conditions even though 55 colonies have become states since 1960--Simple military force does not create legitimacy 5. Neither sovereignty or self-determination is an absolute right but is moderated and limited by other rights and obligations that must be recognized at the same time 6. Such conflicts cannot be solved by internationals' simple political preference for one side over the other 7. Much of the time, exercising self-determination has been limited and defined by great power rivalries. II. What is the Appropriate Level of Foreign Involvement in Demands for Self-Determination? 1. Separation cannot create a disturbance in international peace 2. New state must protect individual rights and group identities and facilitate participation in government by all (ie human rights standards are respected and protected, and multiethnicity promoted) 3. Scotland and Quebec have no valid claim for secession because the rights and cultural identity of those citizens are democratically protected 4. Self-determination movements cannot be called terrorist movements by outsiders III. When Secession Demands Are Valid 1. when massive discrimination and human rights violations have occurred, esp if the majority population supported this approach 2. when local self-government has been rejected by the central authority, 3. when even the most minimal demands for change have been rejected IV. Liberation Movements and Their Recognition 1. Both sides must finally agree to the separation before international recognition can take place 2. New boundaries should be defined by a series of votes by citizens 3. the creation of non-viable ethnic enclaves is wrong 4. no ready-made use of force(based on partisani mentality) instead of diplomacy in separation movements should be encouraged 5. Those who claim to speak for the nation must elected in free and fair elections ============================================= Prime Minister Rexhepi's Visit to Washington ============================================= David R. Sands THE WASHINGTON TIMES Radical ethnic Albanian groups will turn to violence if the international community does not deal quickly with Kosovo's desire for independence from Serbia, the province's prime minister warned yesterday. Saying that close to 100 percent of the province's majority ethnic Albanians favor independence, newly installed Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi told a Washington audience that prolonging Kosovo's uncertain status was a recipe for disaster. "There are radical groups ready to start a new conflict if we do not see action in the next few years," said Mr. Rexhepi, a surgeon who served in the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the NATO campaign against the government of former Yugoslav strongman Slobodan Milosevic. Kosovo has enjoyed limited autonomy under a U.N. protectorate since the end of the war, with troops from the United States and other Western powers still providing the bulk of the security for the province. Kosovo's new government, headed by President Ibrahim Rugova and Mr. Rexhepi, came to power in March after elections late last year. The major powers have purposely left Kosovo's ultimate political fate unclear, with many Western European leaders in particular worried that independence for Kosovo could undermine the fragile democratic government in Belgrade and inflame ethnic tensions across the Balkans. The fledgling Kosovo government faces a host of problems, from the status of tens of thousands of Kosovo Serbian refugees looking to return home, to rebuilding the shattered economy, to dealing with corruption and organized crime, much of it linked to former KLA operatives. A report issued yesterday by the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe found that the plight of minorities in Kosovo is "unacceptable," despite a decline in lethal attacks. Walter Irvine, head of the U.N. refugee operation in Kosovo, said at a press conference in Pristina, the provincial capital: "Aggression against minorities has taken a softer style that we call harassment. But such continuous harassment has strong psychological consequences, which in combination make people not want to move." But Mr. Rexhepi said demanding an answer to Kosovo's final status was "neither an extreme position or an irrational luxury," despite the interim government's massive challenges at home. He said the new administration's ability to promote the economy, the rule of law and democratic reforms depended on its ability to extend its authority throughout the province and to deal with the desire of an overwhelming majority for independence. Although prone to squabbling among themselves, all of Kosovo's major ethnic Albanian political parties favor independence. Mr. Rexhepi also said that NATO, and, especially, U.S. troops, should remain in the province, even if independence from Serbia is achieved. Camp Bondsteel, a major U.S. base in southeastern Kosovo, has been operating there since the 1999 war. ================================== UN vetoes Kosovo border resolution Thursday, 23 May, 2002, 15:16 GMT 16:16 UK http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_2004000/2004509.stm - Ethnic Albanian MPs want Kosovo's full independence - The United Nations mission in Kosovo has taken the unprecendented step of invalidating a resolution taken by the province's local assembly, which was seeking to challenge a territorial settlement. - Steiner struck the motion down within minutes of its adoption - The UN administrator in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, within minutes declared "null and void" the resolution adopted by the ethnic Albanian-dominated assembly which rejected a border agreement between Yugoslavia and Macedonia. Kosovo, which borders Macedonia, legally remains part of Yugoslavia. The unanimously passed resolution is being viewed as an attempt by the province to act as an independent state. The incident is also seen as the most serious rift in relations between the province's ethnic Albanian leadership and the UN since the world body took charge of the province in June 1999. The vote is also likely to earn strong criticism from Belgrade - and has already prompted a walkout from the assembly by the Serb deputies. Warnings Ethnic Albanian MPs - who press for Kosovo's outright independence - have been unhappy with the border agreement between Yugoslavia and Macedonia since it was signed last year. They say that over 4,000 hectares of land were removed from Kosovo without any consultation with the local population. The BBC's Nicholas Wood in Pristina says that while some UN officials have sympathised with the MP's grievances, the UN Security Council and the European Union, have warned that the assembly has no rights to discuss issues affecting the region's borders or internal security. Letters from the Security Council and the EU not to go ahead with the vote were presented to the assembly before the session. They warned that Kosovo's reputation would be damaged if the motion was adopted. ================================== COMMENT: BELGRADE'S KOSOVO POLICY ENDANGERS LOCAL SERBS Balkan Crisis Report Serbia has improved its relations with the UN but does not disguise its attempts to control Kosovo through local Serbs By Denisa Kostovicova in Cambridge Since the fall of Slobodan Milosevic, Belgrade has improved its relationship with the UN Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK. But it still tries to control the Kosovo Serbs, even though this policy may ultimately endanger the latter's position. Recent statements by the Serbian prime minister, Zoran Djindjic, have stoked fears that Serbia aims to regain control of Kosovo affairs. In February, he called for moves to bolster Serbian influence over the judiciary, education, health and security in those enclaves in the region where Serbs remain. A subsequent crisis in Kosovo drew criticism of this policy. It blew up after the Kosovo Serbs, following Belgrade's recommendation, refused to take part in the region's government unless they received an extra ministerial post. The UN chief administrator, Michael Steiner, defused tensions by offering the Serbs a government post and a position in the UNMIK office dealing with the return of more than 200,000 displaced members of their community. No sooner was that crisis solved than the older crisis in Mitrovica, close to the border with Serbia proper, flared up again. Unrest in the Serb-controlled north of the divided town has raised the question of whether Belgrade still accepts Kosovo's territorial integrity. Serbs in northern Mitrovica refuse to cooperate with UNMIK. Belgrade's reluctance to cut off support for their local institutions, such as the municipal council and the judiciary, hints at a carve-up strategy that would see the far north of Kosovo join Serbia proper. These developments have disappointed hopes raised after the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, DOS, took over in autumn 2000. Although DOS overturned Milosevic's policy of total obstruction in Kosovo, progress has not been as straightforward as the international community expected. At first, Belgrade signaled goodwill by endorsing Serbian participation in Kosovo parliamentary elections in November 2001. This was after protracted negotiations with the UN administrator resulted in the signing of the Common Document, which affirmed both sides' "determination to address actively the justified concerns of the Kosovo Serbs". But Belgrade has continued to try to direct the Kosovo Serb's policy, not least because they expect nothing else. Belgrade's dealings are conducted largely by deputy premier Nebojsa Covic who backed Serb participation in the protectorate's elections. However, Belgrade has sent its minority mixed signals, which encourage division rather than a united Serb strategy. The official policy has been to exercise influence through Kosovo's institutions with the aim of keeping the province "de jure" part of Serbia and forestalling its independence. At the same time, Belgrade continues to hint that it may accept Kosovo's partition, despite official denials of such strategy. Indeed, Covic recently spoke of his preference for Kosovo's division into Bosnia-style entities, at the UN in New York. In fact, Belgrade appears to be playing to both Serbian camps in Kosovo, the one in Mitrovica that seeks union with Serbia and the second in enclaves such as Gracanica, near Pristina, which fears the consequences of partition. Rada Trajkovic, the head of the Return Coalition in the Kosovo parliament, belongs to the second camp and supports cooperation with Kosovo institutions. But she is battling against the northern Mitrovica faction under Marko Jaksic, vice-president of the Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS. While Belgrade tries to exert influence through the Return Coalition, its failure to rein in the northern Mitrovica Serbs threatens the alliance's very survival. Belgrade's failure to control the Serbs of northern Mitrovica has fed suspicions in the international community that it wants to split Kosovo along the line of the Ibar river, which flows through the town. This policy is undermining Serbia's relations with UNMIK and may diminish its influence over Kosovo affairs in the long term. But it is UNMIK that controls the fate of the Serbs in Kosovo: they only receive token material support from Belgrade. The most vital matter - security - is entirely in international hands. Steiner has set his face firmly against partition. "We have managed to unite Germany and we will achieve the same thing in Kosovo," he said. Belgrade must, in short, dispel any illusion about a restoration of Serbian domination over the whole of the region and encourage community leaders in northern Mitrovica to cooperate with UNMIK. Any alternative policy may isolate Belgrade and leave the Kosovo Serbs out on a limb. - Denisa Kostovicova is a junior research fellow at Wolfson College, Cambridge. ### Questions/Comments, email AKI-NEWS at aki at alb-net.com AKI Website: www.alb-net.com/aki/ ______________________________________________________________ If you wish to unsubscribe, send a blank message to: aki-news-unsubscribe at alb-net.com , or visit AKI-NEWS's page at: http://www.alb-net.com/mailman/listinfo/aki-news From mentor at alb-net.com Fri May 31 21:48:22 2002 From: mentor at alb-net.com (Mentor Cana) Date: Fri, 31 May 2002 21:48:22 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Prishtina-E] therapist working with kosovo albanian boy (fwd) Message-ID: If you can help please contact Chris directly at chris at keeleyfermor.fsnet.co.uk -- Mentor ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Thu, 30 May 2002 12:11:21 +0100 From: chris Subject: therapist working with kosovo albanian boy I am hoping that you can send me some pictures of Serbian Policemen. I am working in the UK, with a boy who was vicariously traumatised by his experiences in Kosovo, and some pictures of Serbian Policeman would be very helpful in assisting him to process the trauma information.