[Prishtina-E] Interview: General Wesley Clark

[kosova at jps.net]

Interview: General Wesley Clark
By Isuf Hajrizi (New York, July 2, 2001)
Last week Albanian-Americans from the New York area came together at Royal
Regency Hotel in Yonkers to honor General Wesley Clark on the occasion of
the publication of his book Waging Modern War. 
"General Wesley Clark is a hero to Albanians throughout the world, because
of the critical role he played as NATO's supreme commander in Europe in
finally putting a stop to ten years of Slobodan Milosevic's genocidal march
across Southeast Europe", said Shirley Cloyes-DioGuardi.  Ms. Cloyes and her
husband Joseph DioGuardi, who head the Albanian American Civic League,
sponsored the event. 
General Clark just completed one year as a retired army officer. He said he
has spent much of his time completing his book, which he said, was an effort
to "Promote greater public understanding of the dangers, the importance, the
significance of what NATO and the United States were attempting to achieve
in the Balkans".
After a brief press conference he signed hundreds of books before taking
questions from the audience (some of the questions from the press conference
were inaudible, and thus are paraphrased). Below is a transcript of General
Clark's answers and remarks.
<<begin transcript>>
Q: Slobodan Milosevic was arrested recently. Were you convinced that he
would eventually end up in the Hague?
Clark: I think it started with some ambivalence because he was a factor in
helping us secure an end to the fighting in Bosnia. And so there were some
people who believed that he could be dealt with and even relied upon . It
was known that he was an unsavory character, that he may have been behind
some of the Serb activity but on the other hand that he wanted peace and it
seemed that that was the expeditious path to take at the time. I had
reservations at the time even then in dealing with Milosevic as I explained
to Ambassador (Richard) Holbrooke because it seemed to me that we were still
dealing with a man who was essentially an evil force in the region. I went
to the region in 1997 and discovered the status of implementation of the
Dayton Accord and recognized again the aligned influence of Slobodan
Milosevic.
I've had many meetings with him, I would occasionally talk to him on the
telephone and ultimately when I saw the design that he had in mind for
Kosova I had to take measures to alert western leaders of the dangers and
his own actions in the face of NATO warnings are what brought him down.
Q: You've had several discussions with Milosevic -- what kind of a person is
he?
Clark: He's very bright, he speaks English. He considers himself a wise,
worldly, crafty leader. He believes he is acting with the best interest of
the Serb people. He doesn't consider himself personally prejudiced against
other ethnic groups. As he told me on two occasions, many of his best
friends were Moslems. On the other hand he is a man who would stop at
nothing to achieve his aims and that included murder -- I believe the
actions directed against whole groups of populations which the United
Nations has branded "crimes against humanity."
Q: Gen. Clark, in a recent Congressional hearing you said that Albanians in
Kosova would not feel secure unless they are independent. Although this is
more of a political question, what do you thing are the chances for Kosova
to be recognized as an independent country?
Clark: That's a slight misstatement of what I said. What I said is that they
(Albanians) have feelings that they would need independence to be secured. I
think it's up to the international community to undertake a process that
let's the Albanian community in Kosova educate itself and make an informed
decision as to the best course of events to follow - whether it's
independence or some form of autonomy within a broader Yugoslavia. Those
decisions remain to be made, but I acknowledge the strong preference of all
Kosovar Albanians for independence right now, which I think it's a natural
thing. 
Q: It was quite surprising to many people to find out from your book that
the Pentagon had agreed to take the issue of the prisoners from the
negotiating list. Was it necessary for the prisoners to be taken out of the
agenda - was it possible to reach an agreement with the Serbs that included
the release of all prisoners?
Clark: I believe it was a mistake to take it out. I told them at the time it
was a mistake, but I was overruled. The prisoner issue was a very important
issue and remains an important issue. Whether they were prisoners or whether
they were missing remains to be determined, but I think every one of these
people should be accounted for - on all sides, not only Albanians but also
all the Serbs. All the information about all these tragedies should be
opened up in this region so the public understanding can be informed by the
truth. 
Q: Can you elaborate on Gen. Mike Jackson's motives not to take action
against the Russians who dashed to occupy the Prishtina Airport at the end
of the war?
Clark: It's very difficult for me to elaborate on Gen. Jackson's motives
other than what I've said in the book. I know what he said, what was behind
him and how he implemented that, I don't know. We probably have to wait for
Gen. Jackson's book. I believe that it was necessary to take strong action
so that NATO and NATO only would have the deciding voice in which forces
went where. Ultimately, NATO did have a deciding voice in that. And we
prevented the Russians from having their own independent sector and I think
that was the right thing to do under the circumstances. As you know, for a
long time a confrontation in the region southwest of Prishtina where the
Russians wanted to occupy an area and never quite got into the area due to
the strong objections of the local populous who felt that Russian
mercenaries have been fighting with the Serbs and have been participating in
ethnic cleansing in the area. I drove through that region many times as I
looked at the UN investigators as they were finding mass grave sites. I
understood the feelings of the local populous. So I think that ultimately
NATO did the right thing at the operational level. There are some in Eastern
Europe who suggest that Russia took the measure of NATO in this action and
this is one of the considerations that later gave them the idea that they
could later go into Chechnya and take action there with impunity. 
Q: What were some of your greatest difficulties during the air campaign?
Clark: The greatest difficulties I had were with the Pentagon. The reason
was that those in the Pentagon who didn't want to attack the Serb forces on
the ground, the way I wanted to attack them. I believe that Milosevic's
forces that were doing the ethnic cleansing in Kosova were actually a center
of gravity, so to speak. We call it a center of gravity because it was so
important to Milosevic, that I believe if you destroyed these forces, you
would have ended his campaign. Even if you had seriously attacked these
forces, but as it turned out, this was very difficult to do. The airmen
weren't quite trained and ready to do it. The Pentagon did not want to
approve the use of the Apaches to augment the jets and so I was never
satisfied that we've done enough to strike and take out the Serb ground
forces. That was really the greatest problem I had during the campaign. It
was not the European nations.
Q: There are those who are saying it will be difficult to convict Milosevic
since he did not participate directly in the killings?
Clark: Three points. I do believe that the precedence in war crimes trials
is that the person who is in command and is presumed to be knowledgeable,
even if it cannot be explicitly proven, and this was a standard that was
used against the Japanese General who was found guilty after WW II, in a War
Crimes Tribunal. He was found guilty for allowing his subordinates to take
action, even though it was never proved that he had ordered such an action.
So the only question here will be did Milosevic have any authority over the
armed forces? I think there is adequate information available to indicate
that he did. Milosevic was serving as a lieutenant in the Serb military, an
artillery officer. Later he told me he reached the rank of major in the Serb
military reserve. He [entered] a staff college, he knew how the military was
organized and so he had specific military knowledge. He had commanders at
his fingertips. I recall one point the Dayton negotiations and shuttle
diplomacy when Ambassador Holbrooke asked for us to receive guaranteed safe
passage into Sarajevo. Milosevic said get me Mladic on the phone and within
two minutes he was talking to Mladic . So I think he was very much inside
the chain of command and I think there is adequate information beyond what
I've already discussed to show that. I think nations will have to cooperate
in making such information available.
Q: Do you think the National Liberation Army (NLA) of Macedonia should be
included in the peace talks?
Clark: I think the Albanian politicians, not the NLA, but the Albanian
politicians well represent now the sentiments of the Albanian community. As
I have read the figures over 100,000 Albanians, Macedonian Albanians now
left Macedonia, and 70,000 apparently are now living in Kosova with family
and friends. So it is a very difficult and dangerous situation. I think what
we have to do is that we have to maintain territorial integrity of the
government of the country of Macedonia. No divisions, no zones, no breakups,
no ethnic separations in there and we have to establish a condition in which
the rights of the Albanians as a minority are fully and totally accepted and
supported within the framework; and that means Albanian participation in all
the institutions of government-Albanians in the police force and the
military and so forth. It probably can't be done overnight. It is a program
which it has to achieve success. Macedonia was the model country of the
Balkans.  It's the only country of the five that came out of Yugoslavia this
breakup thus far that has gotten its independence without a fight. It was a
remarkable democracy. The U.S. had its troops there from 1993 on. We
strongly supported the government as a multi-ethnic democracy and that's the
way we would like to see it. We also don't believe the conditions there
warranted the initiation of conflict. We believe the rights of the Albanians
could have been achieved by other means, so we don't support fighting. 
Q: Gen. Clark can we go back to the NLA one more time. During the war in
Kosova you either directly or through intermediaries talked to the Kosova
Liberation Army (KLA). Do you think the international community is correct
in refusing to the NLA?
Clark: I believe that people have talked to the NLA. In fact, isn't that
what Robert Frowick did?   He did talk to the NLA. But I think as a matter
of principal, just as during the war, we stayed away from the KLA.  I had no
direct contact with the KLA on a routine basis. I did meet Hashim Thaci one
time and that was it and I also talked to him before the war. 
He asked me about three or four days before the bombing began, he says,
"What do you expect from us?"
And I said only one thing, "Just get out of the way and stay alive". Because
I think in that case it wasn't appropriate to work with the KLA and we
didn't. I think in this case what's important is that the fighting stop as
rapidly as right now turn that fighting off, lets get NATO in there.  NATO
has agreed to go in on the ground and then I think the Albanian community
can rightly insist on a full and effective program for implementation of
broader rights for Albanian mass dominance. 
Q: So what was in fact your relationship with the KLA during the war?
Clark: Well in fact, what I did was take advantage of the KLA efforts. We
knew for example early on -- we heard that the KLA was going to be destroyed
in the first few days. Milosevic believed that he was going to destroy the
KLA in five to seven days. He said five days, but his military said, well
seven days just to be sure. Of course they didn't. But then a week or two
weeks into the campaign, we began to receive information that the KLA was
about to be destroyed.  Its large units were breaking up and was unable to
offer effective resistance. But in fact, as is so often the case, when there
are determined people fighting, it is very difficult to destroy a group like
that. I noticed that the KLA held a corridor open towards northeast Albania,
toward the town of Junik. We continued to watch that area because as the
Serbs reacted against the corridor, we were able to bring in aircraft to
attack the Serb positions. There is a small village called Koshare, where
unfortunately we struck a number of the KLA people who were in there on the
ground as we were trying to hit the Serbs. A terrible misfortune of fighting
that those things happen. We did try to take advantage of the courage and
determination the KLA showed. There was no direct coordination between the
KLA, at least certainly not by my headquarters. I got reports of what they
were intending to do and I worried about it everyday, because I knew that
they were not trained and equipped to really stand up and fight head to head
against Serb forces. 
Q: Did you always feel that your were handling things appropriately?
Clark: I never had any second thoughts. I knew what we were doing was the
right thing to do.
Q: Gen. Clark, what brings you in the Westchester area?
Clark: I was invited. It's a wonderful area. When people are interested in
the book, I am happy to come and talk about it because I think what NATO did
was historic and people need to recognize and appreciate it. In this case
the NATO operation was a success. We achieved all of our conditions. There
was a cease-fire. The Serb police, military and paramilitary forces were
pulled back and NATO led forces entered and the largest spontaneous return
of refugees and displaced people, as the Kosovar Albanians, almost 900,000
who were in Albania and Macedonia, returned home. Another 500,000 that had
been living in the forest, came back to their homes and villages - all in a
space of three to four weeks. It was a remarkable testimony to NATO success.
We should have celebrated that success but because we couldn't call it a war
- we could not call it a victory. There was no victory parade on 5th Avenue
as in the case of Desert Storm. The pilots, those brave men and women who
flew those aircrafts, weren't called in and publicly idolized. We went about
the next task which was to put KFOR on the ground and try to establish order
and build a foundation for democracy in Kosova. 
Q: Do you think the NLA will be included in the talks at the end since they
are realistically the ones who can make or break an agreement?
Clark: I don't think that's going to happen in this case. Although the
government of Macedonia didn't go as far as we would have liked in assuring
the rights of its Albanian minority.  Nevertheless, they were a legally
constituted, democratically elected government with an Albanian
participation government. So, we can't justify the use of force which was
initiated by the NLA. I don't think anything is going to change that. I
think it's regrettable; we've done hundreds and thousands of millions of
dollars worth of damage to homes and communities, mostly Albanians homes,
and communities in Macedonia. I don't know who is going to repair that. I
worry about the future. I wish it hadn't happened. I wish we could have
gotten a sense of the issue that had more international recognition before
the fighting began. So I think there will be a concerted effort on the part
of most nations not to recognize the NLA. In the case of the KLA - we
transformed it, not recognized it. Of course I met with Thaci and (Ramush)
Haradinaj and many others. We basically said that it could not remain as
that kind of organization that became the Kosova protective force. A
demilitarized organization at that.
Q: Were you surprised when you were asked to vacate your position as an
Allied Commander three months early?
Clark: Yes I was. I explained in my book. I can't go beyond that. I have no
idea what people might have had in mind. I know there were frictions with
the Pentagon. There are always frictions in warfare. The myth of a
monolithic command structure.  It's never like that. In any operation, when
lives are at stake, the future of nations are at stake.  Small issues become
extraordinarily important and the issues are fought out in internal
confrontations-always.  But I was surprised that it became personal the way
it did.
General Clark's speech:
Our nation is a nation that came from every where else. People came to
America because they wanted to be here. They left behind their families,
their friends. My grandfather came from a place in Belorus called Minsk over
a hundred years ago. He came to Chicago with his brother. He brought his
fiancee and her younger sister. And so today I have a hundred cousins. All
of us came from abroad and I fell a special kinship with you all who have
recently become Americans, a part of this country, and who are still
reaching out your hands and support to people in your homeland. Thank you
for being great Americans and great human beings.
My first trip to Albania was the summer of 1998, but I had studied about
Albania and I had learned about the problem of Kosova. We talked about it
many times during the Dayton negotiations. In 1995, we knew that Milosevic
had to release his iron grip on Kosova. But he wouldn't discuss it. The most
we could get was an American Embassy Information Center in Prishtina. No
more. In early March of 1998, I went down to Macedonia to visit the 350
American soldiers who were a part of the US Preventive Deployment Force.
When I landed, the American ambassador said, "You have to go see President
(Kiro) Gligorov right away." 
I went in to see the president, it was on a late Saturday afternoon and he
was there with two of his ministers.  The American ambassador and I joined
the conversation. President Gligorov told me that he was worried about what
was happening in Kosova. He said the Serb police just massacred the Jashari
family -- 60 people. He said, "You can't treat people that way", he said,
"especially Albanian people". He also said, "There will be war and Milosevic
will pretend to negotiate.  But really, he only understands the threat of
military force."
I carried that message back to Washington. But some people in Washington did
not want to hear it. During the summer of 1998, I worked to try to create a
NATO threat to restrain Milosevic. I remember calling him on the 25th of
June. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke was there. Holbrooke had met with Rugova.
He was meeting with Milosevic. He was traveling to the village of Gllogjan,
which at that time, was considered, as Holbrooke said, "the most dangerous
place in Europe." 
He asked me to call Milosevic and make sure Milosevic knew he was in danger.
So I called Milosevic who was very cordial on the phone. He invited me to
come to Serbia: "Please come and ride horses at Karagjorgica. Please, I can
play golf".
"Oh yes, thank you Mr. President," I said, "but Mr. President, what we don't
want you to do is to attack your own people." He said to me, "General Clark,
they're my own people. They are all citizens of our country and I just want
them to live together in peace, despite your threats." 
My NATO threats. Well, I had many hours of dealing with Milosevic and I knew
what a liar he was and the next day after Holbrooke had left he attacked
with his military, paramilitary.... And through the summer of 1998, he
conducted a campaign of ethnic cleansing in the villages in Drenica. NATO
secretary General Solana called it "A village a day, keeps NATO away",
because Milosevic knew that as long as he only attacked one or two villages
a day, he could escape the wrath of NATO. But we called him on the carpet.
We didn't let him escape NATO attention. After Ambassador Holbrooke did the
negotiations in early October, that resulted in the creation of the Kosova
Verification Mission, I realized that Milosevic had not committed himself to
withdraw forces.  So, with Secretary General Javier Solana and General
Nauman, we took a trip to Belgrade. We talked to Milosevic and he got very
angry. I went back alone so that I could talk to him, one man to another. I
said, "Mr. President, if you don't pull those forces back out of the field,
we're going to bomb you."  
And of course, there he was, the president of a country in his own palace -
and here am I, just an American general, a man that he has known for five
years - threatening him. So he shrugged his shoulders and said, "General
Clark, NATO must do what it must do."
I said, "Mr. President, get real. You don't want to be bombed by NATO". 
He said, "You're right".
So we used the threat.  We held off the conflict until the 15th of January
when Ambassador Bill Walker called me and said, "Wes, I've seen massacres. I
know what a massacre looks like.  I am looking at a massacre.  These people
are not fighters, they're farmers. I recognize the boots that they are
wearing, I'm looking at the calluses on their hands. These are people of
every age. They've been shot at close range. The clothes they are wearing
are the clothes they've been shot in, they haven't been rearranged. This is
a terrible tragedy."  Ambassador Bill Walker was in Prishtina as the head of
the Kosova Verification Mission and was looking at the trench going up to
Racak.
And I knew at that moment that we were going to go to war to stop the Serbs
in Kosova. It was only a question of what it took. Many people have asked me
what the worst night of the war was? And they talk about the bombing of the
Chinese embassy. But you know that wasn't the worst night of the war for me
or for any of the men and women who flew. There were two really bad times in
the war. 
The first had to do with Albanian civilians who were killed in the air
attacks. All I want to tell you right now how terribly sorry all of us and
NATO were for those casualties. It was a terrible thing, and that was the
worst night of the war. There was a place called, I think Korishe.  We had
watched it and we knew this farmhouse was a Serb police station. We saw the
Serb vehicles there and unfortunately that night, it was used to imprison
Albanian civilians. 
The other bad time in the war was when the KLA was attacking over Mt.
Pashtrik.  Because I know there are some people here who have fought in that
battle from the Atlantic Brigade, and I know that you guys are very proud of
what you did there. But I also knew that the Serbs had waiting for you and I
knew how little I could do to help. And I worried about that a lot. Thank
God it worked out okay. You accomplished a mission and we accomplished our
mission to help you.  And Milosevic recognized that he was facing an
inevitable defeat. So, he gave into all of NATO's conditions. He called a
cease fire and pulled all of his forces and his thugs back out. NATO went in
and we had the largest, spontaneous return of refugees in Europe since WWII.
I knew this was going to happen because I had been in camp and talked to the
Albanian refugees.
U.N. officials said, "Oh no, you have to slow them down, there might be
mines." 
I said you can't slow these people down. They're going to their homes. 
I went in early, I think the 17th, 18th of June was my first trip into
Kosova. I went in with the Secretary of Defense. We went up the road and
stopped in villages and cities and we were just surrounded by people. I
think he had no idea what the incredibly powerful emotions were. You see for
some of the people who were in the U.S., the NATO effort was -- I hate to
say it -- but was more of a distraction. They didn't understand, but for me,
it was a passion. We were dealing with a man whom I believe is a mass
murderer; and that's Slobadon Milosevic. He told me in January of 1999, that
Kosova was more important than his head. So I knew that when we went after
him in Kosova, he would lose his head. We never could get the approval to
make an official objective the ending of Milosevic. We knew that that was
beyond what we could accomplish with air power alone, immediately. But we
also knew that with the results that we achieved and with the tremendous
courage and spirit of the people of Kosova, that Milosevic was finished.
And he is in the Hague today. 
Six months ago, I was in Houston and I was speaking to a group.  Afterwards
two Albanian men came up to me and one of them stood very tall and straight
and said, "I am Albanian, and we are 300 strong in this community today." He
was very proud of himself. He put his arm around the man next to him and
said, "and my friend is from Bujanovc and he is going home to fight for his
homeland." 
I said, "Does he have to fight?"
He said, "Yes, he must fight".
And I said, "Why does he have to fight? 
"Because there are Serbs.", he answered.
I asked, "Aren't you an American citizen?"
He said, "Yes, for five years".
I said, "So let me ask you a question. If a Serb moved next door to you,
could you be kind to him, treat him as a neighbor and become friends with
him even though he was a Serb?"
He thought about this question and finally he gave me what he thought I
wanted to hear. He said, "Of course not." 
I understood his passion and I understood his love for his country and I
understood why he felt the way he did. 
But now I have to tell you how I feel about that. What I was fighting for
was not to write the wrongs of the 19th century but try to set in place a
framework for the 21st century. Somehow everyone in the region has to get
along without changing borders, without changing boundaries, without forcing
people to leave their homes or the graves of their ancestors, without
requiring them to change the language they speak, but somehow all get along
together, because I think the Euro-Atlantic community, where we live in this
country, we're all Americans and we should all be in this together.  Whether
we live on this side of the Atlantic or on that side of the Atlantic. So I
want to tell you that I am very, very proud to be with you tonight.  I am
very proud of the spirit, courage, the patriotism shown by the
Albanian-American community. I feel very, very honored the way you welcomed
me and taken me into your hearts. And I thank you for that. 
Q: Regarding Gen. Jackson, was he ordered to hit the Russians?
Clark: Ok, I'm going to tell you the story of Prishtina airport. As the
negotiations continued, the French came to me and said you need a plan to
take the airfields and France volunteers to receive the glory of taking
Prishtina airfield. I said, "Ok, I'll mention that to Gen. Jackson". 
Jackson didn't want to do this. He said the airfield was too dangerous to
occupy. And that it wasn't important. And so he turned down the request of
the French to lead an air assault. On Thursday afternoon, June 10th, as we
concluded the air campaign, I had the expectation that Gen. Jackson's forces
would be entering the next morning, but he called me and he requested a
delay and said that the Serbs had come to him and asked a 24 hour delay so
they could get their forces back and we wouldn't come in so soon. So since
he was the field commander, I said, "I'll discuss this with the Secretary
General, we'll get back to you". 
We supported the field commander. Well, that was the day that the Russians
came. During the morning of the 11th of June, I ordered Jackson to prepare
to launch an air, what we call an air assault to occupy the airfield. In
accordance with the original French plan, which he had even though he didn't
want to use it. But he developed many reasons why this was not a good idea.
Ultimately, confusion on the ground plus assurances from the Russian Foreign
Minister convinced Washington and London not to do anything. So I was
ordered to do nothing. That night, just as I feared, the Russians got to the
airfield. 
The next morning, I was ordered to move as rapidly as possible with
Jackson's forces to get to the airfield before the Russians could do
anything with it. But it took all day. That night, Washington called and
asked me to block the runways on the airfield so that the Russians couldn't
land reinforcements. I passed the order to Jackson, but there was a
thunderstorm.  We were going to fly the Apache helicopters in, set them down
on the runways and block the runways. But Jackson did not want to do this,
and there was a storm. I was already planning to go to Macedonia to meet
with Jackson. So I just said we'll settle it face to face. I knew I had
highest level support in the American channels for blocking the runways. So
when I went to confront Jackson, he told me no, he wouldn't do it. I called
the British government and said your commander doesn't want to take my order
and they said we agree with the commander and so does Washington. So I
called Washington and I woke up the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at
three in the morning and said, "You told me that I had your support to do
this, now the British are saying that you don't support it. What is your
view?"
He said, "There is some confusion, I knew the British didn't want to do this
but I knew that you were being instructed to do it, I support you."
I said, "Fine, you and the British have to get an agreement because you have
a policy problem". That's where it really was. It was a disagreement between
London and Washington. You see what decided the outcome was that it was the
British that had the soldiers on the ground, not the Americans. Americans
didn't want to lead on the mission. They wanted the British to lead.  They
didn't want to be in Prishtina, they wanted the British to be in Prishtina.
The Americans didn't want the majority of the forces, they wanted the
British to have the majority of the forces. The Americans didn't want to
have the commander, they wanted the British to have the commander. So the
Americans had to live with the British commander's judgment. 
It's a very important lesson in the use of military power. If you want to
lead, you have to put your troops in the lead, and that means if Washington
is going to have a voice in helping to solve the problems in Macedonia
today, there have to be American soldiers in the lead in that mission. 
Q: What is the significance of the Battle of Pashtrik and the significance
of the KLA soldiers in their operation?
Clark: Early in the war, we heard that the KLA was about to be destroyed. I
knew this was going to be a very bad thing for NATO, even though we were not
allowed to cooperate with the KLA. I knew that the presence of KLA forces on
the ground was a critical ingredient in bringing pressure there to cause the
Serbs to call off their ethnic cleansing campaign. So I was very pleased to
see the KLA passage, that I think went to Junik through Koshare. Then on
about the 20th of May, I received the first indications of this operation
"Arrow" that was going to take place over Mt. Pashtrik, to go as far as to
seize both banks of the Beli Drin (Drini i Bardh). I was astonished when I
saw the boldness of this plan because the Serbs had heavy forces there with
artillery and armored vehicle and the KLA did not have these forces. The KLA
men were armed with mortars, rifles and light machine guns to the best of my
knowledge. (And American snipers, said someone from the crowd --
laughter)...
I knew there were men from the Bronx serving in there because it was in the
newspapers. When I looked upon it, I said you know this is going to do two
things: 1. It's going to provide an opportunity for NATO to be able to draw
the Serb forces out and then attack them, but if it fails, it is going to
end not only with loss of this KLA force doing the attacking, it's going to
bring the Serbs into Albania. That's going to be extremely dangerous for us
because I had planned a ground operation to take place at the end of the
summer. They would go over Mt. Pashtrik, and sweep the Serbs from the field.
I planned to use many KLA troops along with this force although I didn't
have permission yet. One thing was clear to me - we weren't going to commit
NATO troops on the ground against the Serbs in Kosova and at the same time,
preventing Kosovar Albanians who wanted to fight for there own land from
doing so. So I knew we had, if we had 200,000 NATO troops, we would have
probably had 50,000 Kosovar Albanians. I'll tell you who the Serbs would
have been most afraid of. You know who they would have been afraid of. The
Kosovar Albanians. 
So I didn't want that operation "Arrow" to fail. When I saw it being
launched, I made it the priority of all of our air efforts. Behind it I had
radars that could detect Serb artillery. I had apache helicopters flying at
night but I never got permission to fire our American artillery. I never got
permission to fire the radars. I had long range missiles, I never got
permission to use them. So I don't know how many people from the Atlantic
Battalion became casualties in that operation. Six wounded? Well you were
lucky. I'm glad that that was all because I was quite concerned. I think it
was highly significant, for me it was the most important operation of the
war and we didn't lose it. 
Q: How much damage was done from the French spy at the NATO headquarters in
the Kosova matter?
Clark: The French General Kelsh called me when we discovered the French spy
had given the Serbs the operations plan. We discussed how much damage was
done. The Serbs had the operations plan, they knew we were going to first
attack the air defense system.  They knew we were going to attack air
fields.  They knew we were going to be attacking ammunition supply points.
They did not know which air fields, or which ammunition supply points, or
which air defense and communication sites. Some damage was done, but not
enough to invalidate the overall thrust of the plan. Not enough to endanger
the pilots. 
If we could have had stronger support for a stronger strike initially, we
would have probably had, we might have had better results. But as it was, we
did as much as we could. The first day of the war, before the first strike,
I went to the North Atlantic Council where the ambassadors meet for NATO.
One ambassador said, are you going to strike the barracks with the Serb
soldiers? I knew what the answer had to be. The answer was no. The idea was
to cause no Serb casualties, none. So that Milosevic could gracefully say,
okay in that case, thank you for striking me, I'll stop everything I'm
doing. That was the NATO logic. About two hours into the fight that night,
the 24th of March, I received word that we had shot down the first three
Migs. They had flown up to challenge us and our airmen took them down
immediately. One was shot down by a Dutch F16. I called Secretary General
Solana, I was happy; when you're a commander and the enemy comes up to
challenge you, you strike and hit him hard. Solana was not happy. 
I said, "but Javier, we shot down three aircrafts".
He said, "This is bad, this is bad", because he was hoping that Milosevic
wouldn't resist and then would call off the campaign in Kosova. But it
wasn't to be. And so from that time forward, will power became stronger. We
basically through out the plan, we did as much as we could do. It's too bad
about the French spy, I feel bad for France and I wish we hadn't had him.
The lesson to that is, you can spy all you want, nothing stops an idea whose
time has come. That idea of freedom and democracy in Eastern Europe.
Q: What are your thoughts on Mitrovica and the French policy there?
Clark: Mitrovica should be a multi-ethnic community and every institution
should be multi-ethnic. There should not be a dividing line of the Iber
River. It's wrong. I had trouble with one government in NATO that believed
that the only way to prevent conflict in Mitrovica was to separate the
groups. Now, you know who that government is, I don't have to name it, but
you also have to understand that this is the challenge for the Kosovar
community. You must create a multi-ethnic climate, a multi-ethnic
acceptance, a multi-ethnic community in Kosova. You must do this for your
own legitimacy and credibility. You can't have a single ethnic community
anymore than the Serbs can. The way to claim Mitrovica is to demonstrate
hospitality to the Serbs, and that's the hard truth. I know that's a hard
truth. I know there are things that are wrong there but that's what has to
be done. 
Q: Other U.S generals have become sort or celebrities after their wars. Do
you feel that you've been short-changed?
Clark: I am very grateful that I got to be the Supreme Allied Commander in
Europe in NATO and I was given the most wonderful gift that any person can
be given. It's not the publicity, it's not becoming a celebrity, it's not
becoming a hero. It's the chance to stand up and fight for what you believe
in. If anybody ever gives you that gift, take it. It's the most precious
gift in the whole world.
Q: Would you consider to become a Kosovar citizen and would the U.S. allow
you to have both US citizenship and Kosova citizenship? Would you be willing
to do that?
Clark: Well, it would really be an honor, thank you very much. You know I
saw after the war the most wonderful spirit in the Kosovar Albanian
community. We went to a school, George Robertson, became the NATO Secretary
General and he and I went a school where several young people had been
massacred by the Serbs. The school was rebuilt, the children were there, the
parents were there and I saw real courage and I saw real determination. You
know it's a pretty easy thing to drop bombs but it's a really hard to put
your life back together and your families life back after a war is over.
That's what takes real courage and I solute the people of Kosova for that
courage. 

<<end transcript>>

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