[NYC-L] Fw: EU/Eastern Europe politics: Kosovo —another Balkan crisis - EIU Viewswire, 28/11/06

[Aferdita Hakaj]

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To: Severine Rey/OCHA/NY at OCHA, Wojtek Wilk/OCHA/NY at OCHA, 
Louise.Agersnap at undp.org, kai.stabell at undp.org, Rachel Scott 
Leflaive/OCHA/GE at OCHA, hpeugeot at unicef.org, hakaj at un.org
From: OCHA-Early Warning/OCHA/NY
Date: 11/28/2006 02:28PM
Subject: EU/Eastern Europe politics: Kosovo?another Balkan crisis - EIU 
Viewswire, 28/11/06

EW FLASH

EU/Eastern Europe politics: Kosovo?another Balkan crisis
EIU Viewswire;

EU/Eastern Europe politics: Kosovo?another Balkan crisis

November 28th 2006
COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

A decision on the status of Kosovo is nearing, despite delays caused by 
deep differences among the major powers. Independence is widely regarded 
as inevitable and perhaps imminent, but such an outcome?particularly one 
involving UN membership?is by no means certain. Moreover, the outcome is 
guaranteed to be messy, contested and to generate perhaps considerable 
regional turbulence.

Despite the fact that the US and Russia have perhaps the decisive input 
into how the Kosovo endgame will play out, major EU countries have shared 
responsibility for the process and the EU will be left with the financial, 
political and effectively military responsibility of handling the ensuing 
situation. All signs are that there appears to be a striking complacency 
inside the EU about what lies ahead.

Europe?s failings

The problem is in large part of the EU?s own making and due to a 
combination of four factors: hubris, miscalculation, mismanagement and the 
EU?s political and institutional crisis. First, there was the conceit that 
the EU could impose a solution and easily manage the consequences of 
decisions that involved a change in international borders in very short 
order. Second, the EU underestimated Serbia?s determination to hold on to 
the territory and Russia?s opposition to a Western-imposed solution that 
revises the Helsinki Final Act and sets a precedent that is deeply 
troubling for Moscow.

Third, Kosovo under European management?albeit under the UN and NATO 
umbrellas?has made little progress on security, the protection of 
minorities or economic stabilisation. The EU has done little or nothing 
since 1999 to try to encourage the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians to explore 
solutions within a framework of existing borders. From an early stage, 
Europeans seemed to decide that independence was the only option. Kosovo 
Albanian leaders acted accordingly. Independence, however, threatens to 
open a can of worms because it contradicts the accepted practice in the 
former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union that only constituent republics had the 
right to self-determination. There have been no exceptions.

Finally, the EU takes on this problem at precisely the time that it has 
effectively lost its main foreign policy tool: holding out a realistic 
prospect of EU membership. The credibility of the accession process has 
been gravely, if not yet terminally, weakened in the wake of increasing 
?enlargement fatigue? within the EU and a consequent string of negative 
messages over the past year.

The delayed decision

The UN special envoy for the Kosovo negotiations, Martti Ahtisaari, 
announced in early November that he would delay his recommendations on 
Kosovo until after Serbia's parliamentary elections which have been 
scheduled for January 21st 2007. This has been portrayed as an attempt to 
help democratic political forces in Serbia and prevent a popular backlash 
that could propel the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) to 
power. Yet this explanation is highly questionable. To present the 
decision in these terms is actually a campaign gift to the Radicals. Even 
if the next Serbian government is dominated by democrats and reformists, 
an unfavourable decision on Kosovo would destabilise what is likely to be 
a very fractious and fragile coalition.

The most plausible explanation for the delay is that Mr Ahtisaari has not 
yet been able to garner sufficient support in the six-nation Contact Group 
for his proposals and has thus not been able to fulfil a pledge that 
Kosovo's status will be resolved before the end of 2006.

An independent Kosovo has been the preferred option for the US and UK 
(openly stated from some time in the case of the latter) from the outset. 
Although other Western Contact Group members (France, Germany and Italy) 
may have been less enthusiastic at various times, and there have been some 
recent reports about some getting cold feet, a split among the Western 
countries in the Contact Group is unlikely.

The key difference is between Russia and the major Western powers. Russia 
has repeatedly stated, in increasingly unequivocal terms, that there can 
be no Kosovo solution without the agreement of Serbia. Moscow has also 
argued that independence would inevitably set a precedent for breakaway 
regions in the CIS. Russia?s position has hardened throughout 2006. 
President Vladimir Putin has on several occasions warned that independence 
would set an undesirable precedent, and he has also stated that Russia 
would if necessary use its veto in the UN Security Council.

There is speculation that horsetrading is going on between the US and 
Russia on a range of issues, including Kosovo. However, Russia has gone so 
far and been so explicit in its rejection of an imposed solution, that it 
may find it hard to back down or reverse its position eve if it were given 
some incentive to do so.

What will Ahtisaari propose?

The exact details of the plan by Mr Ahtisaari remain to be seen. The 
document will contain a lot about human and minority rights, the 
decentralisation of local government, property rights, constitutional 
organisation and elections, the international civil and military 
international presence. But all this is a sideshow compared with the key 
issue of where sovereignty resides.

Various media reports and alleged diplomatic leaks point to the following 
outline of what might be in his report. Mr Ahtisaari will not mention the 
word independence, but nor will he mention Serbia, thus setting the stage 
for UN Security Council Resolution 1244 to be superseded and Serbian 
sovereignty over the province to be abrogated. There would be an interim 
stage before independence?of several months to several years?in which 
Kosovo would be an EU protectorate. Kosovo would during this period have 
only limited sovereign powers (no UN membership, no army, and no ministry 
of foreign affairs). Some of the limitations on Kosovo?s sovereignty?a 
possible ban on union with Albania, the special position of 
minorities?would persist even after formal independence.

If all this is true, the recommendation would favour a delayed or 
?managed? independence, which would keep Kosovo under an international 
protectorate for a while longer. It would also divest Serbia of 
sovereignty over the province and make clear that Kosovo would after an 
interim period become independent.

Left hanging

In terms of gaining broad international acceptance and legitimacy, Mr 
Ahtisaari?s proposals would not be worth much unless they are followed by 
a revision of UN Security Council Resolution 1244. As noted, Russian 
opposition has been strong and Russia might be joined by China, nervous 
about precedents for Tibet and Taiwan. The US and Europeans want to avoid 
a clash with Russia over Kosovo. But it appears that the only way to avoid 
a deadlocked Security Council is for Russia to drastically reverse its 
position, for some of the western Contact Group members to desist from 
pushing for Kosovo independence, or to defer the decision for some time. 
It is highly unlikely that at this stage the Contact Group would abandon 
its position that partition is not an option.

In case of a UN deadlock, the Kosovo government, perhaps with a green 
light from London and Washington, might declare independence and seek 
bilateral recognitions. A unilateral declaration of independence would 
cause a diplomatic crisis and international splits, and must surely be 
viewed as a nightmare scenario in Brussels.

The EU role in Kosovo

If there is a new UN Security Council Resolution authorising an EU 
mission, the international presence in Kosovo will have a different legal 
basis from Resolution 1244. But in practical terms, there would probably 
not be much difference. And even if UNMIK continues, the EU?which has most 
heavily financed and manned UNMIK?will continue to play the main role. The 
EU will for some time to come almost certainly have to retain far greater 
responsibility in Kosovo than it may have wanted to.

The record so far is hardly an encouraging one. The province has descended 
into an economic mess. Income per head is only about US$1,000 and real GDP 
is probably falling. In its own October report on the Western Balkans, the 
EU paints an extremely bleak picture of Kosovo. Administrative capacity, 
the civil service and the judiciary are all to be found severely 
deficient. With donor support declining, the report describes a fragile 
economy, with high unemployment, lack of respect for property rights, poor 
infrastructure and unreliable power supply. It also complains of no 
progress in fighting organised crime.

Reasons to be fearful

Serbia?s new constitution, reasserting sovereignty over Kosovo, makes it 
impossible for any Serbian government to recognise an independent Kosovo 
for the foreseeable future. Without this, it seems inconceivable that 
regional relations will be marked by the necessary cooperation to 
guarantee stability.

If the province becomes sovereign, copycat behaviour is possible, sooner 
or later?not least in the region?s fragile states of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina and Macedonia. Under practically any type of settlement 
northern Kosovo looks set to remain effectively under Serbian control, 
creating a risk of outbreaks of fighting and a new ?frozen conflict? in 
the region. Finally, there is a distinct risk of an exodus of the 
remaining Serb population from other areas of Kosovo, which could 
destabilise Serbia and possibly the wider region.

Another Balkan crisis is looming, resulting in large part from the EU's 
mismanagement, complacency and misjudgements related to the Kosovo status 
issue. Seemingly the only remaining issue at this late stage concerns what 
the intensity and duration of the crisis will be. EU enlargement 
commissioner Ollie Rehn has a fondness for rail metaphors in describing 
the EU's relations with the Balkans. The question now is whether the EU is 
heading for a prolonged derailment or a full-scale crash.

The Economist Intelligence Unit
Source: ViewsWire

© 2006 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. An Economist Group 
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