[ALBSA-Info] Press:Instability in Albania

[KreshnikBejko]

http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000/020300.ASP

Albanian Instability Threatens NATO's Kosovo Mission
February 3, 2000 

Summary 

Albanian media has reported that the head of the Albanian intelligence 
service, Fatos Klosi, secretly met with Prime Minister Ilir Meta to brief 
him on the possibility of armed protests against his government. Though 
not the first time that Albania has been threatened by armed unrest, this 
time it could have serious implications for the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organizations (NATO) Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR) support operations 
located in Albania. 

Analysis 

The Albanian newspaper Koha Jone reported Jan. 29 that the head of 
Albanias National Intelligence Service (ShIK), Fatos Klosi, secretly met 
with Prime Minister Ilir Meta to brief him on the possibility of an armed 
protest against government corruption. As well, the Albanian newspaper 
Rilindja Demokratike reported four days earlier that chairman of the 
opposition Democratic Party of Albania (PD) Sali Berisha, in a speech to 
local officials in northern Albania, had called for an uprising against 
government corruption. 

In a meeting with U.S. Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering Jan. 31, 
Berisha reportedly accused the Albanian government of involvement in 
contraband and corruption, and of the murder of PD Deputy Azem Hajdari in 
September 1998. Pickering himself was in the country to visit NATO 
support units in Albania and to discuss government corruption with 
Albanian government officials. 

These calls for an overthrow of the Albanian government are not the 
first. In August 1998, the Albanian newspaper Shekulli reported that 
former Albanian army officers, discharged following an attempted coup in 
March 1997, were planning another attempt to overthrow the government. 
Paving the way for the next round of factional infighting, which had 
subsided during the NATO aerial campaign against Kosovo, was Albanian 
Prime Minister Pandeli Majkos resignation in October 1999. 

However, unlike previous upsurges in instability, this new signal could 
have ramifications outside of Albania and inside of Kosovo. The stability 
of the NATO operation in Kosovo hinges on the continued stability of the 
Albanian government. Albania has become a major staging base for the 
42,500 NATO troops deployed in Kosovo. NATO support operations in 
Albania, known as Communication Zone West (COMMZ W), totals 2,400 troops. 
Its primary mission is to protect supply routes and communication lines 
between Albania and Kosovo. The Italian-led mission also acts as a main 
logistics pipeline for NATOs Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR), accounting 
for 31 percent of total NATO support personnel divided among Albania, 
Macedonia and Greece. 

Albanian instability is an endemic problem. In all likelihood, as before, 
the information in advance of planned demonstrations will allow the 
Albanian security services to deal with any potential threats to the 
government. However, if the security services cannot handle the unrest, 
it not only poses a threat to Albania, but also endangers NATO support 
operations in Albania for Kosovo, which would impact the whole of the 
KFOR mission. 

Unrest would pose a serious problem for the COMMZ W and KFOR commanders. 
They would need to weigh the relative importance of the mission against 
interfering in yet another Balkan factional dispute. As well, the fact 
that COMMZ W is an Italian-led mission raises another interesting 
possibility. Italian support for Allied forces in the spring of 1999 was 
lukewarm at best. Another Balkan ethnic dispute would not be received 
well by Italian Prime Minister Massimo DAlemas domestic constituency nor 
by other NATO members with similar positions, such as the Greeks. 

In the end, Albania, with its inability to resolve long-standing 
regional, ethnic and personal feuds, now threatens the security of the 
force that was inserted to protect the interests of ethnic Albanians in 
Kosovo. In short, the Albanians may accomplish what the Serbs could not  
undermine NATO operations in the region.