[ALBSA-Info] Patten's speech

[Agron Alibali]

Western Balkans Democracy Forum

Speech by The Rt Hon Chris Patten, CH
Western Balkans Democracy Forum - Thessaloniki, 11 April 2002 - SPEECH/02/150 - Check against delivery 
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I am delighted to be able to take part in your meeting this evening. This week like most of my weeks has had a strong Balkan flavour. On Monday, I met Deputy Prime Minister Labus and President Djukanovic in Brussels. On Tuesday, I presented our first annual report on the Stabilisation and Association process to which I shall return in a moment - to the Commission. Yesterday, Javier Solana and I discussed the Balkans with Colin Powell in Madrid. This morning I was in Sarajevo and Mostar, seeing some of our housing projects there. I visited our Reconstruction Agency here in Thessaloniki this afternoon. Now I am here, and tomorrow I will be discussing with your Prime Minister and Foreign Minister the great opportunity that the Greek Presidency of the EU gives us to take all this work forward. 
At a time of deep crisis in the Middle East, what does this show? That while the Balkans may have slipped off the nightly TV news, they have not diminished in importance for the EU. Our job here is not yet done. Peace is not yet irreversible and self-sustaining. The task of building strong states, of establishing the rule of law, of fashioning effective institutions in which all citizens have confidence, regardless of their ethnicity, is making headway, but it all takes a very long time 
Our aims in the Balkans 
Far from getting out of the Balkans, the EU is getting more and more deeply involved in the region. Our policy amounts not to an exit strategy, but to an entry strategy a strategy to help the Balkan countries themselves become members, one day, of the EU. 
Two years ago, the European Union explicitly recognised Albania, BiH, Croatia, FRY and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as potential candidates for membership, and put in place a policy the Stabilisation and Association process - to help turn that dream into a real possibility. Romania and Bulgaria are already candidate countries in their own right. 
Recent progress 
It is early days, but the policy is beginning to work. The explicit destination has given the region a sense of direction, and a sense of momentum. 
The Balkans today, as the United States Institute for Peace observed in a paper recently, are in better shape than they have been for a decade. Compared to only two years ago, the situation has been transformed. Every country has a democratic government. Milosevic is on trial. Serbia and Montenegro are being reconciled. Kosovo has held its first elections, and set up institutions of provisional self- government. Croatia is welcoming back tourists, and winning at Wimbledon and the Olympics. Bosnia has just picked up an Oscar. Tremendously talented peoples are starting to be associated with success again. 
This is not the Balkans of just a few years ago. But, I am sure you would acknowledge, is it not yet the European Union. 
The region remains desperately weak and vulnerable. Corruption and organised crime have descended like carrion crows. They pose a huge threat to the security of the European Union itself. 
The challenges ahead 
In some ways, the really hard work is only just beginning, as our first annual report on the Stabilisation and Association process makes very clear. The report is a frank assessment of the situation in the region, and in each country, as we see it. 
The main challenges identified are clear: 
 
   Entrenching the rule of law throughout the region, upheld by professional police forces and reliable courts and judges 
 

   Tackling organised crime and corruption 
 

   Building strong public administrations 
 

   Securing a free media throughout the region, as a bulwark for liberty 
 

   Turning economies based on socialist central planning into free market economies in which enterprise can thrive under the law, and in which barriers to legitimate regional trade are steadily eliminated 
 

   Reconnecting regional energy, transport and other links 
 

   Forging a climate of trust so that regional co-operation becomes as second nature as it is within the EU. 

The Stabilisation and Association Agreements and the whole process of preparing for, negotiating and then implementing them drive this process forward. These Agreements are extremely demanding because they are not just frameworks for dialogue and for good relations: they are milestones on the path to possible future accession. The agreements therefore draw heavily on our experience in preparing the existing candidate countries for membership. Signatories undertake to align their entire legal and economic frameworks with that of the EU. They begin to take on the core obligations of EU membership, and to put in place a network of co-operation and free trade agreements with their immediate neighbours. 
In the last two years we have negotiated and signed agreements with Skopje and Zagreb. We have worked intensively with reformers in Albania to prepare that country to start negotiations. Two years ago we set out in a so-called 'road map' the practical steps Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to take before we could consider negotiating a Stabilisation and Association Agreement . Since democrats have taken office in Belgrade, we have been working hard, through the mechanism of the Consultative Task Force, and through our assistance programme, to prepare for negotiations. 
Next steps 
So where do we go from here? 
Our priorities for the coming months are simply stated. 
We will continue to work with Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia on the implementation of their SAAs, setting up the apparatus that will enable us to give detailed policy advice, and equip us to work with the countries effectively in implementing their own reform agendas. 
Croatia has been making good headway. But, as our recent report highlights, Zagreb needs to overcome its reservations about regional co-operation, and devote more attention to implementing, and not just discussing, institutional reform especially in the court system and the judiciary. 
In the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, we expect all parties to continue to adhere scrupulously to the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. Our assistance will continue to depend on that. But we also expect the government to move ahead with implementing the SAA and, in so doing, to return to the path of integration with Europe. 
All parties in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia tell the EU they are committed to that. Let them show it by implementing the agreement. The EU has lived up to the promises it made on assistance for the implementation agreement, not least at the Donors' Conference we arranged with the World Bank last month. Huge sums were raised at that conference. We expect the money every euro of it to be properly spent. And we are determined to see in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and indeed throughout the region, a really determined effort made to root out corruption. Corruption poisons political and economic life throughout the region: it has got to be tackled by with total and unstinting resolve. 
We hope to be able to start negotiating an SAA with Albania soon. But how soon is soon will depend to a great extent on Albania. While I welcome the fact that recent political developments have generally taken place within the constitutional framework, they have not burnished Albania's image in the EU. Rather they have vindicated the warning the Commission gave about the need to strengthen Albania's chronic lack of institutional capacity when we recommended to the Council that it should authorise the start of SAA negotiations. My message to Albania is very simple: prove the doubters wrong. Deliver real reform on the ground if you want the EU to begin negotiations on an SAA. That will be the yardstick by which the EU will judge Albania, not the eloquence of Albanian Ministers visiting EU capitals. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina has now completed 9 of the 18 measures listed in the road map, with many on the verge of completion. Good, but not good enough. If, as I hope and expect, BiH can conclude those six or seven points by mid year, we could have a further Consultative Task Force before the summer break. We would then look sympathetically at the progress made and, if we judged it sufficient, we could proceed with a feasibility study in the autumn and, if it was positive, and if the Council agreed to it, get into negotiations next year. That is my hope. But for that to happen, Bosnia and Herzegovina will have to show real determination in finishing the road map before the summer, and a determination to make faster progress towards integration with the EU. With sufficient political will, there is absolutely no reason why Bosnia's leaders shouldn't be able to do that. I hope that the voters will insist that they do. 
And what of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? The FRY has made immense progress in the 18 months since Milosevic's departure, metamorphosing from pariah to partner in just a few months. The economic team in charge in Belgrade are impressive. Inflation in Serbia is down from 116% in 2000 to under 40% in 2001. Bold fiscal reforms have streamlined the tax system, reducing the number of taxes from 200 to just 6. The FRY has joined almost all international organisations. 
So much for the good news: but serious problems still confront the reformers. Recent events have shown, to a frankly alarming extent, how much still needs to be done to reform the military and security services, and bring them under proper civilian control in line with EU standards. Equally, if the FRY is to proceed along the path of European integration, then full and consistent co-operation with the ICTY is an obligation, not an optional extra, for the FRY, as it is for BiH and Croatia as well. Non-co-operation would be a serious brake on our relations. So I welcome the fact that the law on co-operation with the Tribunal was adopted in Belgrade this afternoon. This is significant step forward. Now we need to see it translated into action without delay; and we need to see that co-operation cover all those indicted by the Tribunal. 
We very much welcome too the agreement signed last month between Serbia, Montenegro and the Federal authorities. The EU was happy to play midwife to the birth of that agreement. Now we look to the parties to it to nurture it, and to put it into practice. The EU will be happy to continue to help in that. We will, for our part, be ready to offer technical and political assistance to help resolve problems that arise. We will do that, gladly. But we cannot substitute for the central role of the parties themselves. This is their agreement, and it cannot work without their good will and their good faith. They will now be called upon to show in even greater measure the sense of imagination, the generosity of spirit, and ultimately the power of leadership that they did in reaching the agreement in the first place. 
I hope that they will. Because the agreement could and should represent a turning point in the Balkans - an example of how sensitive political problems can be dealt with by sitting down and talking, instead of standing up and shooting. 
I very much hope this agreement will serve to speed up the process of EU integration for Serbia and Montenegro. If all goes well, as I said to Deputy Prime Minister Labus and to President Djukanovic, we hope to finish the Consultative Task Force process by the summer, do a feasibility study by the end of the year, and start SAA negotiations under the Greek Presidency. 
In Kosovo, the EU pillar of UNMIK is spearheading reconstruction and economic recovery, and in mentoring the new institutions dealing with finance, trade and industry. It is a tribute to the EU pillar's work that the 2002 Kosovo Consolidated Budget can meet all recurrent expenditure from domestically generated revenue. Seven commercial banks are operating in Kosovo, the euro is in use throughout Kosovo, and a proper market oriented framework of legislation is being put in place. 35,000 private enterprises have now signed up to the UNMIK business registry. Much still needs to be done to ensure sustainability, to establish an effective legal basis for privatisation, to improve the management of public utilities, including energy. But very solid progress has been made. 
The EU's contribution: bigger and better 
It is up to Belgrade and Podgorica, just as it is up to Tirana, to Zagreb, to Skopje, to Sarajevo, to get on with reform themselves. We cannot do it for them. 
But we can offer our total support, and we are. 
The scale of the EU's total engagement in the region is bigger now than it has ever been, and it is still continuing to grow, if not in financial terms, then certainly in political terms. 
We are involved at every level. 
 
   Strategically, by holding out the prospect of potential membership in the long term, and much closer association with the EU in exchange for reform in the short term. 
   Militarily, by supplying 38,000 peace-keeping troops from EU Member States, the bulk of the total. 
   Politically, by taking a very active role in the affairs of the region, including in responding to crises like in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Southern Serbia, or in helping to find solutions to sensitive political questions like the relationship between Serbia and Montenegro. 
   Institutionally, by working across the board to build strong institutions, so that these countries can manage their own affairs, uphold the rights of their citizens, and tackle organised crime. 
   Economically, by assisting with economic reform, by providing substantial budgetary assistance, and above all, by taking the radical step of opening the entire EU market to exports from the Balkans, without, at this stage, demanding reciprocal concessions in return. 
   Financially, by backing our policy with enormous financial help extending over many years. We are spending some €800m in the Balkans this year, and have allocated some €4.65billion up to 2006. This region is receiving some of the highest per capita assistance in the world, comparable to the levels we are giving to the candidate countries. 

Delivering results on the ground 
Everywhere you go in the Balkans today, there is evidence of this strategy being implemented. You see it in physical reconstruction the bridges that EU money has re-built across the Sava from Croatia to Bosnia, for example, or the operation we are funding to clear the Danube. You see it in the excellent work of the European Agency for Reconstruction. You see it in the 16,500 homes we have rebuilt in Kosovo, or in the 380km of roads we have repaired, or in the 30% increase in main crop yields our agricultural support has delivered. You see it in the major improvements we have made to energy, water supply and sanitation facilities, or in the 600 schools we have refurbished in Serbia, or in the homes we have built for returning refugees in Bosnia. You see it in the airport terminals we have rebuilt at Sarajevo or Mostar. You see it in the high profile crisis management negotiations led by the EU, with NATO and the US, in Southern Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and in the energetic work of the EU's Special Representative in Skopje, Alain Le Roy, helping to facilitate the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement; and in the fact that the incoming High Representative in Bosnia, Lord Ashdown, will also be designated a Special Representative of the EU. You see it in the myriad meetings and task forces taking place under the Stabilisation and Association process. 
You see it in the customs assistance missions we are running in Bosnia, Kosovo and Albania, from the new equipment we are supplying to help police the 5000 kms of new borders across the region, to the advice on integrated management techniques. You see it in the help we are offering to reform the judiciary in Bosnia, Croatia and Albania, or in our help for returning refugees region-wide. You see it in the advice we are giving in Belgrade and other capitals on how to make laws business friendly and in line with EU standards. You see it in our massive budgetary assistance to help governments cope with the strains on their public finances, or our humanitarian aid to help those in dire need. You see it in the nearly 800 conflict damaged homes we have repaired in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia since the summer, or in the restored electricity and water supplies in Aracinovo or Kumanovo and Tetovo. In January 2003 the EU's effort will step up a further big notch when we take over the international policing mission in Bosnia from the UN, and the EU has made clear its readiness in principle to take over Operation Amber Fox from NATO. All of this adds up to a formidable commitment to the Balkans, evidence of the leadership role the EU is determined to play in rebuilding the region. 
Now that the emergency phase is by and large over, more and more of our assistance is directed towards institution building. 
Our priorities aren't plucked from thin air. They respond directly to the preoccupations of people across the Balkans, as a fascinating poll last week by the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance made clear. It showed that people in the Balkans are most worried about are what people everywhere are most worried about: secure jobs, a decent standard of living, public security and honesty in public life. They have immense distrust in their current institutions: only 17% of people in Croatia, for example, said they trusted the courts, while only 12% trusted the government in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and only 19% trusted local authorities in Serbia. We hear that message, we hear it loud and clear. Our priorities are the people's priorities: creating effective institutions, the rule of law, beating crime and corruption, and generating jobs. 
We are getting a lot better at deploying the enormous resources at the EU's command from political influence to trade measures, from humanitarian aid and reconstruction support to confidence building measures, from technical expertise to policing capacity faster and in a more integrated way. We showed that in the crises in Southern Serbia and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where the Commission's aid programmes have been carefully tailored to support the Union's diplomatic efforts; or earlier in our Energy for Democracy or media support programmes in Serbia. These were political programmes as much as they were economic: designed to promote democracy and regime change. 
In the coming months, we need to build on the progress of the last two years, by deepening still further the special relationship between the EU and the countries which are part of the Stabilisation and Association process To that end, the Commission proposed last week the development of the Zagreb process into a regular political forum in which EU Ministers would meet their senior colleagues from the region on a regular basis. We are open as to how frequently such meetings would occur, and at what level: but we think that they would be valuable. 
We need, too, to keep up and to strengthen international co-operation in the region. I am very aware that the EU cannot do everything on its own, nor would it wish to. This is a team effort, of which the EU is a leading player. But we will only succeed as a team. There is a particularly important role for the Stability Pact, in stitching together the web of regional co-operation without which the Stabilisation and Association process will fail, and helping to ensure the wider international effort actively supports the integration of the Balkans with Euro Atlantic structures. The new Stability Pact Special Co-ordinator, Dr Busek, brings very great experience to bear on these issues. He has set out a clear agenda for the Pact in the coming months: we will give it our full and enthusiastic support. We will also continue to work extremely closely with NATO, with the OSCE and with the United States across the whole region, including in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, where our co-operation last summer was a model of its kind. Indeed, our co-operation with the US in the Balkans in the last two years, and also with NATO, has been a real success story. Without it, the progress that has been made would simply not have been possible. We must make sure it continues. 
Conclusion 
Even before the horror of 11 September, the recent tragic history of the Balkans had shown to Europe and to the wider international community the danger that failed, or failing, states can pose to our stability and security in this small and interconnected world. The Balkans have demonstrated how instability is contagious, how quickly someone else's problem can become everyone's problem. They have reminded us that it is less costly - in political or financial capital, and above all in blood - to take early and decisive action, rather than prevaricate until matters have spiralled out of control. It is worth noting that our intervention in Fyrom has cost just a fraction of our effort in Kosovo or Bosnia. In the wake of September 11, these are all lessons that plainly have a wider application. They have reminded us and this too has wider application that standing up for our values when they are in danger, standing up for democracy, for others' rights, for justice, is not flabby idealism: it is a matter of hard security, and profoundly in our self-interest. 
The choice for us in this case is very clear: either we export stability to the Balkans, or the Balkans export instability to us. I know which I would prefer. 
There is one more lesson I take from the Balkans today: never, never, never give up. Because what is happening in this region today shows how it is possible to turn failed states into successful states, how it is possible to fashion hope out of despair, how it is possible to make a difference. We have a long way to go in the Balkans: but we are getting there.



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