[ALBSA-Info] Wes Clark Article

[Agron Alibali]

THE DAILY TELEGRAPH(LONDON) 
October 30, 2001, Tuesday 
Pg. 22 


High command is no place for those who need consensus Gen Wesley Clark, Nato commander in the Kosovo conflict, says politicians and the military will always disagree on how to fight a modern war 

By Wesley Clark 


War, as the French prime minister Georges Clemenceau is said to have observed during the First World War, is far too serious to be left to the generals. Generals must obey their political leaders. 

But the reality is far more complex. In Nato's air campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999, the politicians' voices were at times conflicting and hesitant. Not until the Washington summit in late April 1999, more than a month into the campaign, were the heads of government able to agree Nato's precise objectives. And never was there a clear and full consensus on the measures and timing for strategic escalation beyond the air campaign if Slobodan Milosevic should fail to accept Nato's conditions. It fell to military leaders to push relentlessly - and sometimes unpopularly - for the escalations of tactics and means which would eventually bring Milosevic's concessions. But the political leaders also found the military frustrating. There were continuing instances of civilian injuries, the locations of Serb leaders were not known, and even the Milosevic regime's "centre of gravity" was in dispute. Each issue carried so much political impact that resolving it could not be left to the generals. Television coverage of the bombing, and the frequent press briefings, were political events, and occasional errors of the military briefers carried political consequences. 

In modern war, there is no sharp dividing line between the matters that diplomats and politicians handle and the activities of the senior military. Consequently, there is a rough-and-tumble, push-and-shove quality within the chain of command which is seldom understood outside the inner circles. Commanders' backgrounds, competence and motivations are often questioned. Decisions are second-guessed, or reviewed before execution. Authorities are withheld. Subordinates are encouraged to give their own opinions, often at variance with the official command view. High command in war is no place for those who need consensus. 

The American-British campaign against the Taliban - although spared the complications of operating within a formal alliance structure such as Nato's - will also have to deal with a range of controversial and difficult issues. While the Nato campaign was beset by the problems of targeting the use of Apache helicopters and the possible commitment of ground forces, the war against terror will have to face not only these, but also additional problems. How should operations be conducted best to disrupt al-Qa'eda and seize or eliminate Osama bin Laden? How can the coalition of interests between the US-UK and Pakistan be sustained, with rising tensions in Pakistan as the military operations in Afghanistan continue? What can be done to isolate the Taliban and al-Qa'eda from reinforcement and resupply? How much risk should be taken to accelerate the campaign? Should the military effort be slowed to enable development of a post-Taliban governmental structure? How can other Islamic nations be induced to play a more active and constructive role? And what of Iraq and its endless pursuit of weapons of mass destruction? 

The campaign against terror has been a difficult military as well as geostrategic problem. Cruise missile strikes, available within hours, had been tried in August 1998 with little result. A major land invasion, such as the Soviets sustained for almost a decade, was virtually out of the question - too slow and not likely to be fully successful. An extended air campaign alone was already recognised as inadequate. Diplomacy, intelligence, law enforcement and economic pressures also had important roles to play. 

And so a hybrid military option emerged, consisting of a sustained air campaign supplemented by ground operations executed by special operations forces, leading to the elimination of the Taliban and the support it was providing to al-Qa'eda, and ultimately exposing the terrorist network to precision attack from the air and the ground. 

So far as the public can ascertain, there have been no lucky breaks thus far. Bin Laden hasn't been taken out, nor has the Taliban collapsed. But by reasonable standards, the operation has gone well so far. The military operations appear well planned and well executed, despite the inevitable injuries of innocent civilians. But it has a long way to go. 

And during the course of the campaign, adaptations of the plan will doubtless emerge. Greater diplomatic efforts and deeper engagement with the UN will probably occur. New dangers may appear more salient, such as a possible nuclear threat from terrorists. And all of this is likely to be accompanied, even from within this comparatively disciplined US Administration, by rumours of displeasure or hints of internal disagreements. 

Differences of opinion may give rise to concerns about competence. But it would be a mistake for the public to lose confidence; nor is it necessary for the Administration to project a mantle of consensus when really tough issues remain to be resolved. 

Some degree of public discussion of the issues is likely to be useful in building public support and understanding, but the need for privacy in governmental decision-making has to be respected. 

This is perhaps the most important political-military struggle in American history and probably the most complex. Time is going to be required to bring the diplomacy into play, to track the funding trail and to conduct ground reconnaissance. It may take dozens of fruitless searches before the al-Qa'eda headquarters are found. 

But if the public is asked for patience in the absence of insider knowledge, it has a right to expect those in the know to face up to the problems of waging this campaign. However private the proceedings may be, the results will eventually be public. 

As one business leader said to me during the Kosovo campaign: "We don't know everything you're doing, and we don't need to. We expect you guys to do your jobs." And those expectations must be met. 
[PS]Features: [ES] 



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