[ALBSA-Info] Radicals are the winners

[Kreshnik Bejko]

>Follow this link:
>http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010326_1_n.shtml
>
>Or simply read this:
>
>26 March 2001      Radicals are the winners in Macedonian fighting
>
>By JIR Special Correspondent Zoran Kusovac
>
>The upsurge of ethnically motivated fighting in the Former Yugoslav 
>Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) has brought into the limelight the 
>ethnic-Albanian organization calling itself the National Liberation Army 
>(Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare - UCK). Although sharing the same 
>Albanian-language acronym as the better known Kosovo Liberation Army, now 
>disbanded, the NLA appears to be an indigenous force, created in a matter 
>of weeks since fighting started on the Macedonia-Kosovo border in late 
>February.
>
>Despite repeated allegations made in Macedonia throughout last year, no 
>ethnic Albanian armed organisation existed in Macedonia. Both 
>ethnic-Albanian parties of Macedonia, although mutually competing, have 
>remained peaceful.
>
>However, when the agreement on borders, signed by FYROM and the federal 
>Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 23 February, threatened to endanger the 
>unique position of Tanusevci as a smuggling haven straddling both sides of 
>the Kosovo-Macedonia border, local gangs tried to keep the contraband 
>routes open with guns. Cut off from the hinterland in Kosovo by KFOR troops 
>and unable to match the superior numbers and equipment of the Macedonian 
>Army (Armija na Republika Makedonija- ARM) in the open, the smugglers 
>retired into the hills.
>
>The hasty response of FYROM's leadership and the international community, 
>who referred to the smugglers as insurgents, opened a window of opportunity 
>for radical Albanians in Macedonia who have long been waiting for a chance 
>to radicalise the Albanian population. They made a grand entry onto the 
>scene, with loud gunfire during a peace rally in the predominantly Albanian 
>town of Tetovo.
>
>As a result, moderate Albanian politicians were discredited and humiliated. 
>Macedonian authorities over-reacted, ordering a strong Interior Ministry 
>(Ministerstvo na vnatresnji raboti - MVR) force to 'defend Tetovo', later 
>augmenting it with ARM units with T-55 tanks and 105mm howitzers.
>
>It came as little surprise that the MVR/ARM joint force, ultimately 
>numbering nearly 3,000, adopted the tactics reminiscent of its predecessor, 
>the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA), and for days shelled Kale hill 
>overlooking Tetovo, from where there was very little return fire. Constant 
>pounding caused concern among civilians; minority Macedonians fled Tetovo 
>as a precaution, while better-off Albanians sent their families abroad, 
>mindful of previous Balkan sieges. Every shell strengthened radicals on 
>both sides of the ethnic divide and provided them with a 'justification' to 
>call for guns.
>
>Within days the NLA increased its membership from a two-digit figure to 
>some 600. Encouraged, the NLA announced it now had a political wing, 
>represented by Ali Ahmeti. Kastriot Haxhirexha, a defector from the 
>moderate Democratic Albanian Party, formed the National Democratic Party to 
>cater for the growing radicalisation. On the Macedonian side, Prime 
>Minister Ljubco Georgijevski talked tough but, somewhat surprisingly and 
>possibly fearing failure, allowed President Boris Trajkovski - hitherto 
>considered a political lightweight and a figurehead - to spearhead calls 
>for tough measures.
>
>After five days shelling Kale hill, the government announced that its 
>forces would finally advance, but before they had a chance to move, the NLA 
>announced a unilateral cease-fire and offered to start political 
>negotiations; Trajkovski refused and responded with a 24-hour ultimatum to 
>surrender.
>
>When the combined ARM/MVR force finally scaled Kale hill on 22 March it 
>found that the NLA, its main aim of coming to the limelight achieved, was 
>gone. Driven by the politicians' need to claim a victory rather than sound 
>military judgement, Macedonian forces are continuing the mop-up operation, 
>but, untrained and inexperienced, they will have to stop well below the 
>2,700m peaks of Mount Sar.
>
>There are already reports that the Macedonian force has done little to 
>differentiate between NLA members and civilians as it has entered remote 
>villages, and allegations of its heavy-handedness and use of 
>'scorched-earth' tactics are likely to increase in future, further 
>deepening the rift between the two ethnic groups.
>
>The first weeks of April will be crucial for the fate of Macedonia. 
>Apparently content with its new-found prominence, the NLA has dispersed 
>into the civil community. Unless ARM over-reacts, it is still possible that 
>political means may be used to resolve the situation in Macedonia. If 
>Macedonian forces do not demonstrate self-restraint on Mount Sar, however, 
>the NLA is likely to retaliate in other parts of the country, possibly even 
>the capital, Skopje. That would be the point of no return, as radicals on 
>both sides would probably take up arms - readily available at an affordable 
>price - and start another Balkan civil war.
>
>
>
>Copyright 2001 Jane's Information Group. All rights reserved.

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