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[ALBSA-Info] Odyssey Nov-Dec. 2000

Agron Alibali aalibali at yahoo.com
Sun Feb 11 10:53:29 EST 2001


Subject:  Greece-Serbia: With Slobo To The End

 
Odyssey

November-December2000

With Slobo To The End 
http://www.odyssey.gr/templates/features.asp?issno='200005'&iss='2000'&categA=2&categB=0&ThemNo=2&window=November/December2000

As the Serbian regime fell, most of Greece seemed
unaware, or even hostile, to the historic changes
taking place in its erstwhile northern ally. 

Takis Michas

The final days of the Milosevic regime in October were
greeted throughout the democratic world with feelings
of relief, if not euphoria. But there was one country
in Europe where the events unfolding in Serbia did not
seem to cause any feelings of joy. This country was
Greece, a country that prides in calling itself "the
cradle of democracy." It would not be an overstatement
to say that the overwhelming majority of the political
forces and the population of the country reacted to
the events in Serbia with feelings of disenchantment,
if not dismay. To the very end, it seemed that senior
members of both the government and the opposition were
going out of their way in their official statements to
please Milosevic.

That the country was not going to side with the
Serbian opposition was made patently clear a couple of
weeks before the elections. Otpor (Resistance), the
Serb student opposition group, had the idea of
organizing a public concert in Thessaloniki.

"We believed," Slobodan Honem, a leading Otpor
activist told me, "that a massively attended
anti-Milosevic concert in Greece would send a strong
message to the people of Serbia. Namely, that it is
not only the Western powers that want the ouster of
Milosevic, but also the people of a friendly country
like Greece."

But none of the major Greek music groups and artists
that had distinguished themselves in anti-NATO events
during the wars in Kosovo and Bosnia agreed to take
part in the anti-Milosevic concert. And the few minor
bands that agreed to participate were subjected to
threats and harassment, aimed at discouraging their
participation.

The concert was supposed to take place in a
state-owned concert hall that fell under the
jurisdiction of the prefect of Thessaloniki, Kostas
Papadopoulos. Two days before the event was to take
place, Papadopoulos, a prominent member of the
governing PASOK party, decided to ban the concert. He
argued that it constituted an interference in the
politics of another country.

This was, however, the first time in recent history
that Greek authorities had tried to prevent a
political gathering from taking place. Countless
public events linked to international politics have
been staged in Greece, celebrating individuals such as
the Palestinian Abu Nidal, the Kurdish rebel leader
Abdullah Ocalan, Saddam Hussein, and more recently the
Bosnian-Serb indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic.
Yet neither PASOK nor New Democracy-which together
represent 90 percent of the Greek electorate-protested
the action of the Thessaloniki prefect.

The attempt to prevent an anti-Milosevic event in
Greece was a sign of things to come. Both during and
after September's historic elections in Yugoslavia,
many prominent Greeks spared no effort in trying to
legitimize the electoral results and offer support to
the ousted dictator.

The first such attempt was made by the "independent"
election monitors that Milosevic had invited from
Greece. 

They included Alexandros Lykourezos, a member of the
New Democracy party who is also indicted war criminal
Radco Mladic's lawyer, as well as Liana Kaneli, a
communist deputy who according to press reports, spent
time in Begrade during the war in Kosovo. 

The monitoring committee was led by Milosevic's old
pal, former foreign minister Karolos Papoulias, who is
the current chairman of the Greek parliament's foreign
affairs committee. 

Upon returning from Belgrade, Papoulias stated that
the election process in Yugoslavia had taken place
smoothly and democratically. This assessment of the
situation was immediately adopted by the Greek
government and became its official mantra: "From the
information at our disposal," government spokesman
Dimitris Reppas stated, "the electoral procedure took
place smoothly and without any cause to question the
outcome of the results." The next day he reiterated
this position adding, moreover, that the result that
would eventually be announced would be fair: "We must
all be calm and exhibit responsibilty and
self-control," he said. "Just as the elections were
conducted smoothly, the vote counting and the
announcement of the results will be as well. The
Yugoslav people have the final word which they
expressed through their vote."

If anybody had expected that the Yugoslav elections
would provide the opportunity for the government of
Costas Simitis to change its official stance and
improve the tarnished-
by-association-with-the-Belgrade regime image of
Greece, this was a great disappointment. Greece, once
again, had differentiated its policies from those of
the Western democracies and the Serb Opposition. Both
the West and the Serb Opposition had immediately
pointed out the grave irregularities that had taken
place during the elections. Indeed, the only country
which seemed to share totally the Greek government's
uncritical acceptance of the fairness of the election
was Iraq. "The elections," Iraq's internal affairs
minister Muhamed Zaman Abdel Razak said, "took place
freely and without any pressures being exercised."
Similar opinions were voiced by Russian
ultranationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky.

It's a Con

In Belgrade, and in the rest of Yugoslavia, the
opposition was busy denouncing the electoral fraud and
organizing massive strikes and demonstrations aimed at
toppling Milosevic and preventing him from holding a
second round of elections. While the Serb people took
by the hundreds of thousands to the streets in an
outpouring of people power, the Greek government was
publicly supporting the Serb oligarch's demands for a
second round of elections.

In an interview with Greek radio station "Flash",
Greek foreign minister George Papandreou (who was
under intense pressure from a virulently anti-Western
Foreign Office establishment) advised the Serb
opposition to succumb to Milosevic's pressure and take
part in the elections.

"Our advice, coming from our own experience," he said
"is that abstention even under very harsh conditions,
even under conditions which are not fully
democratically controlled, is not the best solution."
(Papandreou had, it should be pointed out, played a
major role in encouraging the Serb opposition, and
particularly the independent media in Serbia in the
run up to the elections. See previous story).

Greek defense minister Akis Tsochadzopoulos was less
subtle. The election results, he said "pointed toward
the path leading to a second round."

Until the very last moment, sections of the Greek
government were still seen as trying to convince the
Opposition to participate in the second round of the
elections.

For its part, the Serb opposition immediately rejected
the option. In a public statement N.Bakarec, an
adviser to Vojislav Kostunica, dismissed the
proposals: "We cannot accept a second round
irrespective of what we get in return." Had the
opposition followed such advice, Milosevic would still
be in power today.

It must be stressed at this point that the
pro-Milosevic attitude of most of the Greek government
was shared by the majority of the Greek political
forces as well as by the majority of the population.

Indicative of the attitude of the main opposition New
Democracy Party were the statements by its honorary
leader and former prime minister Constantine
Mitsotakis. "The policy of NATO and the US-which
openly and provocatively intervened in the elections
even as they followed an inexplicable policy towards
Kosovo and Montenegro-essentially harmed the
opposition," he said. 

In his statement he called for the "immediate lifting
of the embargo" and "the abandonment of a policy of
one sided-prosecution of war criminals." At the same
time, Mitsotakis called on the Simitis goverment to
differentiate itself from the West.

"The role of Greece," he said "cannot be that of a
rearguard in a wrong-headed policy ,which is rejected
by the overwhelming majority of the Greek people and
which can have direct negative repercussions in the
country." Mitsotakis was right in at least one
thing-his assessment of the support which Milosevic
enjoyed among the overwhelming majority of the Greek
population. According to a poll taken in Greece by the
Athens radio station "Flash" during the huge Thursday
afternoon demonstration that led to the toppling of
Milosevic, 65 percent of the respondents said that his
fall was a sinister plot engineered by the West and
the US. Only 30 percent of the respondents hailed the
event as a victory for democracy and popular
sovereignty.

In December 1994, during one of his frequent visits to
Greece, Slobodan Milosevic proposed that Greece and
his country should team up and form a confederation.
Andreas Papandreou, at the time Greece's prime
minister, called the proposal "interesting" but the
matter was put to rest. Surely Milosevic must feel
sorry today that he did not pursue the matter further.

Had his plan for a Greek-Serb federation materialized,
he may have won the elections in his country. The
majority of Greeks would have voted for him at any
rate. 

-------------


 
Odyssey

November-December2000
http://www.odyssey.gr/templates/features.asp?issno='200005'&iss='2000'&categA=2&categB=0&ThemNo=1&window=November/December2000

A Little Help from One's Friends 

Michael Howard

Greece's behind-the-scenes support for the Serbian
opposition, and its actions in Belgrade during the
crucial days of Milosevic's ouster, has done much to
restore its diplomatic credibility with the West. 

Michael Howard

The largely peaceful removal of Slobodan Milosevic
from power in Belgrade will go down as one of the
brighter moments in the turbulent history of the
region. In the first of two articles, Odyssey explains
how Greece turned its back on its old "friend" and
supported the democratic opposition forces in Serbia.
But, as Takis Michas argues, many in Greece were
hostile to the historic changes taking place in its
erstwhile ally to the north.

"What we are doing today is making history," declared
the new president of Yugoslavia, Vojislav Kostunica,
in front of Belgrade city hall on the night of October
5. Before him stood a jubilant crowd who had just
taken part in the remarkably peaceful ouster of
Slobodan Milosevic. 

"This was not Washington or Moscow," Kostunica told
the crowd. "We did it for ourselves." Albeit with a
little help from their friends.

Many factors caused the downfall of Slobodan
Milosevic, not least a hubristic miscalculation of his
ability to keep his opponents divided. The United
States and European Union countries made no secret of
their financial support and political encouragement
for the democratic opposition in Serbia. But during
the run up to the Yugoslav presidential elections on
September 24, and the tense period that followed, the
behind-the scenes-role played by two Greeks-foreign
minister George Papandreou and his special Balkans
envoy Alex Rondos-proved critical.

As a result, and despite the domestic tensions caused
by what some termed "high-risk meddling" in the
politics of a neighboring country, many commentators
believe Greece stands to gain major international
dividends-most importantly, a promotion from its
status as a member of Europe's awkward squad. 

"Greece seems to be tired of being a Balkan country in
the European Union and is asserting itself as a
European country in the Balkans," said Gary Dempsey, a
foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute in
Washington.

Blood Brothers

Greeks often speak of their special bond with Serbs.
For the government, it also can be a burden. 

Last year, Athens' reliability as a NATO partner was
put into question by its lukewarm support for the
assault on Yugoslavia. Greeks mounted many protests
against the bombing campaign, which was seen as
unjustified aggression against a fellow Orthodox
country. Greece's political and media establishment
were largely pro-Milosevic. Greek businessmen,
meanwhile, were busy building dubious links with their
pro-regime Serbian counterparts. The large volume of
aid donated by Greeks during the bombing confirmed, or
so the state-run Serbian media said, "the traditional
friendship between the two nations." 

But that relationship had soured. Last April, Greece
hosted a major meeting of Milosevic's opponents. Alex
Rondos, who addressed the gathering, had been attacked
in the Greek media, and by pro-Milosevic elements in
the Greek parliament, for showing open government
support of the Serbian opposition.

Others, however, saw the meeting as the first clear
signs of a break from the Greek tolerance of Milosevic
during the gruesome unraveling of Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav foreign minister Zivadin Jovanovic
launched a fierce attack on Athens. He berated the
Greek government for meeting Serbian opposition
figures while, at the same time, refusing to invite
Yugoslav delegations to international conferences in
Greece. He said Athens was under "NATO influence" and
demanded that the Greek government do "much more in
order to have the sanctions against Yugoslavia
lifted."

"Jovanovic's statement was breathtaking," said a
Yugoslav diplomat in Athens who is close to Kostunica.
"It showed how out of touch with reality Belgrade was.
How could it realistically expect Greece, a NATO and
EU member, to go against those organizations in order
to support a regime that was so clearly in decline?"

Yugoslav officials, he said, were unable to accept the
fact that Athens could find NATO and the EU "more
important than its friendship with Milosevic." Prime
Minister Costas Simitis was reported to be furious
with Jovanovic's statement. He responded by describing
the Milosevic government as a major headache in the
region. 

Belgrade Gets Petty

On September 5, a day before Papandreou was due to
make an official visit to Serbia to convey the EU's
concerns about the forthcoming elections, Belgrade
barred a scheduled Athens-New York Olympic Airways
flight from crossing Yugoslav airspace. The aircraft,
with Simitis and his delegation on board heading to
the UN Millennium Summit, diverted over Italy.
Relations between Athens and Belgrade were at a low.

The Greek foreign minister and his aide arrived in the
Yugoslav capital 10 days before the elections.
Papandreou appealed to the Yugoslav authorities to
ensure a free, fair, and peaceful ballot. 

According to the official Serbian media, bilateral
relations and the regional situation were at the
forefront of the talks. During his tour, however,
Papandreou met candidate Kostunica and activists from
the Otpor (Resistance) student movement. This provoked
further friction between Athens and Belgrade.
Kostunica, the minister said, "clearly saw the future
of Yugoslavia in Europe."

Four Otpor activists invited to a reception at the
Greek embassy in Belgrade were arrested by plain
clothes Serbian police as they arrived. Only after
Papandreou personally telephoned Milosevic were they
released from custody. The incident sent important and
encouraging signals to the Serbian opposition. "For
the majority of Serbs, Greece's support of Serbia
amounted to support for the Milosevic regime," Milan
Protic, the mayor of Belgrade, said. "There was a
tremendous difference in the politics of the present
Greek government compared to the previous ones. George
Papandreou supported actively the democratic changes
which the Serb opposition was demanding."

The harassed independent media in Serbia also took
heart. Sasa Mircovic, vice president of the B92 radio
and TV station told Odyssey, "George Papandreou was
the only Greek politician who supported the
independent media in Belgrade when we were facing the
repression of the Milosevic regime. Others showed no
interest in the fate of the independent media. They
did not want to know what was really happening in our
country."

Revolution Time

The heady week in October that preceded Milosevic's
downfall was one of confusion and tension. Kostunica
was claiming an outright victory in the first round of
elections on September 24. The Yugoslav authorities
insisted that he had fallen short of the 50 percent
needed to win the presidency outright and that a
second ballot would have to take place. The
opposition-and the majority of the international
community-cried foul. They demanded that either a
Kostunica victory be declared or an independently
monitored recount be held. 

Opposition groups were busy organizing a massive
demonstration ("Serbia comes to Belgrade") against
Milosevic on the streets of the Yugoslav capital for
October 5. Meanwhile, the Russians, apparently
stalling for time until they could get a grasp on the
situation, had invited Kostunica and Milosevic to
Moscow for talks the next day. 

Kostunica faced a dilemma: whether to go to Moscow and
sit at a table with Milosevic (whom he'd never met),
or authorize the massive street demonstration-with all
the uncertainties that would throw up. It was clear
that the law professor, who had emerged as Milosevic's
unlikely nemesis, needed some advice. 

There were few foreigners of any rank in town, and
fewer still that Kostunica felt he could trust.
Rondos, who Papandreou had sent to Belgrade on October
1, appeared the ideal choice. "We knew there was a
quiet and discreet role we could play," Rondos told
Odyssey. "We had their trust and I went to see if
there was anything we could do." 

"There was a slight sense of slight desperation," he
recalled. "No one was sure how the army or the police
would act." 

So, for two days of "hard policy and tactics," Rondos
played a guiding role with Kostunica. "Suddenly, we
all hit the right pitch. Kostunica was raising the
problems, Papandreou was doing the political thinking,
and I was interpreting between the two."

Rondos also proved a vital link for Kostunica with key
figures in Europe and the US. "I was in touch with
counterparts in other countries. Given the nature of
the crisis you needed very quick communications to let
Washington and others know what was happening, but
also to say 'don't push too much on this,' and advise
them on how to respond to certain things." 

The events surrounding the fateful day of October 5
are still shrouded in myth. But some sources have said
that it was Rondos who persuaded Kostunica to ignore
Russia's invitation to talks in Moscow and make what
was, with hindsight, the crucial decision to give the
go-ahead to the rally. Whatever the truth, it was
clear that the center of gravity in the Yugoslav
capital had begun to shift.

Role Playing

On October 7, George Papandreou became the first
Western minister to be welcomed by the new president.
Greece, he said, intended to play a full role in
Serbia's rehabilitation with Europe and the West.

"Greece has always said it can play a role," Rondos
said. 

"To use its comparative advantage of its knowledge on
the ground to help inform and shape in a constructive
way what is happening. Finally, we can have a good
clean relationship with Serbia without being
embarrassed about it. There had to be a change in
Belgrade. Milosevic created a bloody traffic jam, and
we had to get him out in such a way as to open up the
system and thus the whole region."

Yet many in Greece remain unconvinced by Papandreou's
vision of a brave, new, democratic, Balkans.
Papandreou and Rondos have come under fire for taking
unnecessary risks with Greek foreign policy, and for
side-stepping Greece's admittedly often inept
diplomatic corps. And the apparent dissonance between
what Papandreou and Rondos were trying to achieve and
the residual support for Milosevic in Greece means the
jury is still out on the sustainability of the
country's progress towards the international
mainstream. Michael Howard 


 



_______________________________________
Panayote Elias Dimitras
Spokesperson
Greek Helsinki Monitor
e-mail: panayote at greekhelsinki.gr

Internet Addresses:
Balkan Human Rights Web Pages:
http://www.greekhelsinki.gr
The Balkan Human Rights List:
http://www.egroups.com/group/balkanhr
The Greek Human Rights List:
http://www.egroups.com/group/greekhr
Dikaiomatika! [monthly human rights review in Greek]:
http://www.egroups.com/group/dikaiomatika
Alternative Information Network (AIM) - Athens
[articles in Greek]:
http://www.egroups.com/group/aimgreek


Mail Address:
P.O. Box 60820
GR-15304 Glyka Nera, Greece
 


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