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CIApathy

By Bob Krueger


The attacks of Sept. 11 revealed one of the most devastating failures of a national intelligence agency in U.S. history. Americans may legitimately ask: Was the failure an aberration, or did it result from a pattern of negligence and apathy on the part of the CIA regarding Osama bin Laden? Regrettably, my experience as a U.S. ambassador in an embassy that received a specific threat that it would be blown up by followers of bin Laden suggests to me that until September the CIA refused to take such warnings seriously enough.

I sat quietly on my outrage for a long time. But the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York convinced me that my silence was probably a disservice to my country. I tell this story now in hopes of advancing a solution.

At 10:35 a.m. on Aug. 7, 1998, two U.S. embassies in East Africa -- one in Kenya, the other in Tanzania -- were almost simultaneously car bombed by terrorists inspired by bin Laden. Immediately, all U.S. embassies worldwide were placed on alert. And within 48 hours, our embassy in Botswana, a near neighbor to Kenya and Tanzania, was given continuous protection by Botswana army troops who encircled the embassy.

Even so, over the next few weeks, embassy employees repeatedly observed what seemed to be unusual surveillance of our compound in Gaborone, the capital. An embassy clerical employee walking to work noticed a man in Arab dress photographing the embassy from a nearby pedestrian overpass, using a camera with a powerful lens. A car with bearded occupants who appeared to be Arabs, and who were taking pictures with a video camera, was seen slowly driving by. Its license plates, the police later determined, had been stolen in South Africa.

Some days later, the occupants of another car, who were also photographing the embassy, were caught by a local security company after a high-speed chase and found to be carrying passports from an Islamic country. They explained to police that they were simply taking pictures of local landmarks to show back home. And on two successive weekends, people in long robes were seen strolling by the embassy -- also stopping to take pictures. As far as I knew, no one before had ever thought the homely, Spartan cement chancery had the architectural distinction or aesthetic appeal to be photographed by foreign visitors to Botswana's capital. Andthe members of Botswana's small Muslim community -- not to mention foreign tourists -- never choose to stroll along the hot, treeless and shopless street that passes in front of the embassy.

We promptly reported such unusual occurrences to Washington. Still,my staff and I found it hard to believe we might be subject to attack. After all, our embassy building was well set back from the street, surrounded by walls and gates, and now guarded by armed Botswana soldiers.

The threat level substantially increased, however, in mid-December 1998. A U.S. military attache stationed in a nearby country was warned by that nation's intelligence service: A consistently reliable informant had reported that terrorists associated with bin Laden planned to blow up our embassy within two months.

The informant identified the two ringleaders of the alleged plot, who had been working in Botswana under Egyptian passports for more than a year and had previously worked in Albania. Their employer was a large construction firm headquartered in Kuwait, with offices and operations in many other Arab or Muslim countries. U.S. intelligence sources discovered that the Albanian office of this firm had the same telephone number as a Muslim "charity" known to be a front organization that raised money to support Islamic extremist groups.

Within three days of receiving this information, I met privately with the highest members of the Botswana government. Not 48 hours later the number of troops guarding the embassy was increased; an armored personnel carrier with mounted cannon was stationed near the embassy gate; and two adjacent streets were blocked to all through traffic. The Botswana government made but one request. Lacking electronic equipment to tap telephones, it asked that the U.S. government send a team to monitor the suspects' calls.

I replied that such assistance should be no problem. But it was.

The date by which the attack was to occur grew near, yet the CIA had taken no action on our urgent requests. Unable even to get replies to our cables, I flew to Washington and called upon several assistant secretaries and various security-related offices in the executive branch to urge immediate action.

Roughly two months later -- well after the final date given by the informant for the attack -- a retired CIA officer and a technician arrived in Gaborone. After several days of investigation, the officer reported that the telephone numbers called by the suspects did not show up on CIA computers as being suspicious and that he therefore considered the threat to be unfounded. Neither the officer nor the technician spoke the language of the suspects. Nor did they make recordings for later translation. Nevertheless, I accepted the officer's conclusions, since spying was his profession, not mine.

No terrorist attack against the embassy occurred. Perhaps the initial report was wrong. Or perhaps the presence of Botswana troops and the police questioning of suspicious photographers discouraged an attack. One thing is sure: If an attack was intended, it was a quick response not from the CIA, but from a small African country that prevented it and protected American lives.

When I served in the House and Senate, years before heading to Botswana, I had no direct dealings with the CIA or other intelligence-gathering agencies. And as an ambassador, my contacts with them were few. Nevertheless, I heard frequent complaints at the State Department of the CIA's arrogance toward those conducting our foreign policy, so my experience in Botswana didn't come as a complete surprise.

During my visit to Washington to urge action, I called upon a former colleague, a senior senator, to ask his advice on how to proceed. His response? "Bob, the CIA hardly pays any attention to us over here in the Senate." Members of the House and Senate select committees on intelligence all have many other duties and neither the time nor the mechanism for effective oversight.

My pleadings for meaningful technical assistance had gone unanswered, just as then-Ambassador Prudence Bushnell's requests for better protection for her embassy in Kenya had been ignored in 1998. In Nairobi, the consequences of that failure were deadly, as was the disastrous intelligence gap that became evident in this country three months ago. All of these incidents have convinced me of the need for much stronger outside oversight of our intelligence agencies.

One hates to suggest forming yet another committee in Washington. But well-known events during the past several decades, as well as countless actions that have never been made public, indicate that a different pattern of oversight is required if Americans are to receive the protective intelligence they deserve. Although a President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has existed since 1956, its distinguished and knowledgeable members have many other responsibilities. Moreover, the board reports only to the executive, not to the legislative branch. Both branches need to apply greater scrutiny.

A new 12-member, full-time committee charged with oversight of our intelligence operations, domestic and foreign, made up of people not currently in government,might be an answer. Itsmembers could be chosen by the president and House and Senate leaders, with equal numbers from each party. The committee should be fully staffed, and should report regularly to the president and congressional leaders. Members and staff should undergo the same background checks as CIA officers and should, on a need-to-know basis, have full access to CIA information.

Our intelligence operations have at times exhibited great strengths. But their recent lapses have cost many lives and caused much grief. They require not an overhaul but high standards of accountability and performance, which are the least that we in a democracy have the right to expect.

<em>Bob Krueger was a member of the House, and later the Senate, from Texas. He was U.S. ambassador to Burundi and, from 1996 to 1999, to Botswana. He now advises domestic and international firms.</em>