[ALBSA-Info] FW: Kostunica's view on recent events

[Lukaj, Richard (Exchange)]

Try reading this article after you read Bugajski's position paper on
Russia's card.  There is lots of work to do yet to achieve peaceful
coexistance between the political leaders of Serbia and their own citizens
let alone the relations that it should wish to develop with its neighboring
countries in the Balkans.  I hope for better days ahead for the innocent
people of the Balkans who are caught in the middle of so many agendas in the
region.

Rich

-----Original Message-----
From: Sokolrama at aol.com [mailto:Sokolrama at aol.com]
Sent: Thursday, April 05, 2001 12:08 PM
To: agron at rcn.com; IZherka at aol.com; GQKokalari at aol.com; rlukaj at bear.com
Subject: Kostunica's view on recent events


Following is Kostunica's press conference as reported by a Belgrade TV on
the 
wake of Milosevic's arrest. It very much gives an insight in the way he 
thinks and beyond that.






Milosevic extradition not something we are thinking about now - Yugoslav 
leader 


Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica has said that the extradition of 
Milosevic to the Hague war crimes tribunal is "not something which is being 
considered at this very moment". Speaking at a news conference in Belgrade
on 
3 April, Kostunica denied any link between Milosevic's arrest and the 
announcement that US aid to Yugoslavia would continue. "Two days before the 
deadline it was more than obvious that Bush would sign the document on the 
basis of everything that has been accomplished in this country over a very 
short period of time and under extremely difficult conditions, and that the 
Milosevic issue is not a special issue, at least not the primary one," 
Kostunica said. He added that the Yugoslav courts would tackle the issue of 
Milosevic's guilt much more stringently than The Hague and that it was in
the 
country's interest to arrive at the truth. Referring to moves for
Montenegrin 
independence, Kostunica said that pro-independence arguments were untenable 
and secession would mean the failure of the Helsinki principles on the 
inviolability of state borders. "This would start a whole new chain of 
further events that would further destabilise the whole region," Kostunica 
reiterated. If Montenegro does secede, Kostunica said, Serbia would need to 
stage fresh elections and draft a new constitution. The following is an 
excerpt from a report by Belgrade-base independent BK TV on 3 April: 

[Protocol official] I now open the press conference. Mister President, we
can 
begin. 

[Kostunica] Ladies and Gentlemen of the press, I will talk about several 
issues, as is the usual custom, but also, of course, I will talk about the 
issue of all issues, about what happened a few days ago. 

In the past few days there were two events that drew our attention: the 
departure of Slobodan Milosevic to the investigation prison, and the fact 
that US President Bush signed a document that qualifies us, as a state, to 
receive economic help. I want to outline that the help is small, it is 50 
million dollars, which is extremely small when compared to the material 
damage inflicted upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during the NATO 
bombing in 1999. Let me remind you of those figures one more time. 50
million 
dollars in comparison to 30 billion dollars of damage in total, which is the

estimate given by G17 Plus, and 3 billion of that total refers only to the 
Serbian Power Industry. So, the help is small, but it qualifies us for 
cooperation with the IMF and the World Bank, without which we would hardly
be 
able to survive and finally renew the economy that was destroyed by an 
erroneous economic policy, sanctions introduced by the international 
community and, finally, by the NATO bombing. 

I will outline immediately that there is no connection of any kind between 
these two events, the US president's signature and Slobodan Milosevic's 
departure to the investigation prison, no matter how many people will 
maliciously seek that connection. I will add one more thing: by the way the 
action of detention, arrest, or whatever it was called, was carried out, the

whole operation could have put in danger this other matter. What am I trying

to say here? Two days before the deadline it was more than obvious that Bush

would sign the document on the basis of everything that has been
accomplished 
in this country over a very short period of time and under extremely 
difficult conditions, and that the Milosevic issue is not a special issue,
at 
least not the primary one. Nevertheless, in spite of that, the change of 
guards on Uzicka Street was undertaken, then the attempt to detain Slobodan 
Milosevic, which was done in a pretty unplanned and clumsy way, which could 
have resulted in the loss of that small amount of public trust we have 
managed to gain since October. And that public trust, regardless of the fact

that in today's world things are being measured by the money criterion, is 
something extremely important. Luckily, it all ended well, reason prevailed,

and there was no bloodshed on either side, the state officials were finally,

after dozens of hours, informed and a joint stance was adopted. That is why,

in some respect, the events on 30 and 31 March can be considered the 
epilogue, the second act of the events on 5 October. Then we managed to 
preserve the state, to avoid a civil war. 30 and 31 March were, in some way,

the second act of our Yugoslav, or Serbian, peaceful revolution. Maybe I 
should now add something, although it is not of general importance, but is 
important for our country: not only have we managed to preserve the state,
to 
avoid a civil war, but we have also managed to keep a political party that 
this country needs in its spectrum of political parties, the Socialist Party

of Serbia, since such a left-orientated is undoubtedly necessary in our 
political life. 

All that has happened showed us one more time to what extent we were under 
authoritarian pressure; over those several dozens of dramatic hours it
became 
clear how little people still understand about the basic principles of 
institutions, how mistaken they are about the authorities, and that even 
lawyers do not care much for something that is above everything else, like 
formality and procedure. A typical example of not understanding authority
and 
not grasping procedure were the critics of the Yugoslav Army [VJ] who
claimed 
the latter were uncooperative and had even obstructed the detention of 
Slobodan Milosevic. One thing was forgotten at the time: that the army is
not 
the police, that its authorities on Uzicka Street are very clearly 
determined. It is known what authority is invested in the police and in the 
court official who was supposed to hand the suspect the warrant. It is
known, 
or at least it should be known, what a criminal charge is, how it is carried

out and where it should be registered. It is also known who has the 
authority, and who does not, to reveal that someone has been taken to the 
investigation judge. I say it is known, but we have lived for too long in a 
non-lawgoverned, one-party state to be able to speak of reliable, good 
experience with an independent judiciary or investigations that do not take 
sides... 

I have to repeat one more thing: if we want to cooperate with the Hague 
tribunal - and in a way that allows our judiciary to take part in the trial,

a kind of repatriation of the trial, and cooperation with the Hague tribunal

does not exclude that option, a fact which you can see in trials not only in

The Hague but in countries with war crime suspects, Croatia, for example -
if 
we want that kind of cooperation, then we have to show that we know what a 
trial is and what the regularity of a court trial means. Unfortunately, what

happened in front of the cameras on Uzicka Street could hardly be
interpreted 
as proof of our maturity. When we speak of Slobodan Milosevic, of course he 
is responsible - in the way the broad Serbian public and not only political 
parties, see it - firstly before his people. That responsibility was proved 
twice in the elections held last year, first on 24 September and then on 23 
December. That responsibility consists of what Milosevic has done and of
what 
he has omitted to do. It consists of dissolving the state and of a drastic 
impoverishment of the people. I would like to outline that Slobodan
Milosevic 
has a great deal of responsibility for what happened in former Yugoslavia, 
now reduced to Serbia and Montenegro, primarily before his own people, but
he 
has accomplices for what happened both here and in the other parts of former

Yugoslavia. Those accomplices are, of course, among the leaderships of the 
former Yugoslav republics and in the international community, of course, 
which omitted at some crucial moments to give peace an advantage, to 
permanently and firmly insist on certain actions that would gradually bring 
us a peaceful solution... 

The responsibility of Slobodan Milosevic, without going into details, is 
enormous, at times primarily for not doing anything. Kosovo is the best 
example, given what could have been done there over the past 10 years in 
order to reach a solution to a very difficult issue. And you can never say, 
if you did not try to do something, that there was no possibility for you to

do something to solve even an issue as difficult as the Albanian
relationship 
with all the nations in the region, with all the neighbouring countries. The

Macedonian example is proof of this. It is a country that has, in recent 
years, truly integrated the Albanian population and political parties into 
its political life. The Macedonians had two governments in which Albanian 
representatives participated, their political parties. Those political 
parties now bear the responsibility for what is happening in Macedonia. This

issue is difficult even where much more was done than what Slobodan
Milosevic 
did. Of course, he has great responsibility for what he did not do, for not 
having dealt with the Kosovo issue, for having thought that such a large 
nation as the Albanians, with such great state ambitions as theirs, could be

left out of political life without producing all the consequences it 
subsequently produced. I am talking about his responsibility before his own 
nation. We will undoubtedly tackle this issue much more than any court
would, 
including the Hague tribunal, it is undoubtedly in our primary interest to 
get to the truth about those events, and I will remind you that I thought a 
body should be set up in search of that truth, a body such as existed in 
numerous countries that faced the difficulties and problems associated with 
confronting the truth after the fall of authoritarian regimes, from South 
Africa to Chile. That is why we founded the commission for truth and 
reconciliation. 

Now I would like to talk about southern Serbia, about the negotiations and 
the misfortune of abducted persons. Their number has decreased, there are
now 
five of them instead of six, but the drama continues. Of course there cannot

be negotiations until they are freed, not a single state can allow itself 
such a luxury. That would only falsely encourage the terrorists, who are 
being dubbed extremist by some - my guess is in order not to offend them. 
There will be no deals with the terrorists, that is out of the question and 
it is something NATO has to understand. The idea of strengthening confidence

in southern Serbia cannot apply to terrorists. The Macedonian example has 
shown that. 

There are also problems in Kosovo, in its northern part, as a result of the 
attempts to broaden the buffer zone to Kosovska Mitrovica, thereby 
potentially - through an exodus from that small part of Kosovo inhabited by 
the non-Albanian population, by Serbs in the first place - converting Kosovo

into a monoethnic region. That game is very dangerous, the increased
pressure 
against our people in the north of Kosovo is dangerous as well, and I hope I

will be able to discuss it in detail over the following days with the UNMIK 
head in Kosovo, Hans Haekkerup, when he arrives in Belgrade. There was a
kind 
of preparation for that conversation in Geneva, during a conversation with 
the UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. I would like to say that the 
conversations with Annan, French President Jacques Chirac and the special UN

human rights envoy, Jiri Dienstbier, were more than useful and fruitful. I 
would like to draw your attention to Dienstbier's reasonable thesis about
the 
Albanian question, the way it is manifested now, above all as a question of 
uniting territories with the objective of, among other things, carrying out 
unlawful activities. This might sound like a euphemism. Of course I refer to

dealing in drugs, arms and everything else. It is not about human rights and

it is pointless to reduce this problem only to the problem of human rights. 

Without any intention to meddle in the internal affairs of the other
Yugoslav 
federal republic before the elections on 22 April there, my attention is 
drawn to Montenegro insofar as I would like to express my hopes, once again,

that our state stays joined together, that the law should be respected and 
that those who are undermining the state, if nothing else, should be warned 
in due time that they will bear the consequences for this. 

Those who advocate Montenegrin independence today quote two kinds of reasons

for independence. One group is historical, that is the ten-centuries-old - 
how familiar that sounds - existence of an independent Montenegrin state
once 
called into question, and that this independent Montenegrin state is simply 
something which represents an overriding value, a value so precious that it 
needs to be fenced off by a wall as high as possible from another area 
inhabited by a great number of people who - though they originate from 
Montenegro - think of themselves as Serbs or Montenegrins, just the same. 

The other reason quoted by the fierce advocates of Montenegrin independence 
today is no less interesting - it is a contemporary argument, but just as 
untenable. The argument is that the problem lies in the fact that Montenegro

is much smaller than Serbia, that there is disharmony and imbalance in the 
size of the two federal units which cannot be amended by any means, that 
there is no constitutional solution good enough to respect Montenegrin 
equality and independence within a joint state. 

Thus we arrive at the fact that some of the fiercest and poorly-argued 
critiques that I have received in my political life come precisely from the 
advocates of Montenegrin independence. The question to be asked is where
they 
are coming from. I am accused of Milosevic-like behaviour by the recent 
allies of Milosevic and front-line fighters of the yellow plank
[Serbo-Croat: 
zuta greda]. This is why, of course, it is not worth responding to those 
kinds of remarks. 

There is, however, another course of events concerning our problems to which

I was alluding when I talked with foreign representatives, and this concerns

neither relations between Serbia and Montenegro nor does it concern the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Rather, it concerns peace and stability in 
the region. Montenegro's departure from Yugoslavia - that is, Montenegrin 
secession - would only signify the failure of the very well-known Helsinki 
principles on the inviolability of state borders. This would start a whole 
new chain of further events that would further destabilize the whole region.

The Balkans lie within Europe and since Europe has already become involved 
with sorting out the situation in the Balkans, then they need - today, more 
than ever before - to reaffirm the value of the Helsinki principles, that 
borders in such a sensitive region of Europe as the Balkans should be strong

and inviolate and that within such clearly-defined borders [TV signal 
interrupted, loss of perhaps half a second] one needs to affirm the
principle 
of the rule of law and protect the rights of minorities. This is the best
way 
to avoid what has burdened this region for the past ten years but also
during 
the whole of the past century. 

Finally, a few words should be said on a topic that attracted considerable 
interest after my statement at the session of my party's executive
committee, 
the party of which I am president, the Democratic Party of Serbia, more than

a week ago. I said that the elections - whether federal or republican - are 
of course sooner or later inevitable after the elections in Montenegro. Of 
course, I never thought this would provoke such interest and such fierce 
responses. On this occasion, I would like to remind you of the fact that on 
another occasion, at a DOS convention in the Sava Centre [in Belgrade], I 
gave my word clearly and loudly that federal elections will be carried out 
within a year, or a year and a half at most, and nobody raised a voice 
against my promise. As far as federal elections were concerned, my promise 
then was based on something that was in itself more than understandable. If 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia survives the Montenegrin elections, then 
there is a need to reconstruct it constitutionally. If that state is to be 
reconstructed constitutionally, then one needs to include in the work of the

federal parliament those political forces which did not take part in the 
elections in September last year. This is the only proper way to reach a
kind 
of constitution that would be acceptable to both federal units and all its 
citizens. 

On the other hand, as far as elections in Serbia are concerned, sooner or 
later - I emphasize: sooner or later, not overnight - if the Federal
Republic 
of Yugoslavia does not survive, then the elections carried out in December 
last year represent elections aimed at a part of a state and not at the
whole 
of this state. If the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia does not survive,
Serbia 
will be a new, self-supporting, independent state and this will demand - at 
its incipient stage and during its first steps - elections and a new 
constitution. 

There are a great number of those, also on the democratic side in Serbia,
who 
tend to overlook the simple fact that in this case elections should be 
organized - that solving the question of a new Serbian constitution should
be 
carried out in a thorough way, even if it stays in the joint state. I would 
remind you that there are now a great number of pressing demands for solving

the question of a new status for Vojvodina but without changing the 
constitution of Serbia, that is, without changing the constitution which was

adopted in September 1990 by the one-party assembly during Milosevic's rule.


So, for some political parties in Serbia, the only thing which this 
constitution lacks is regulation of the status of Vojvodina. Everything else

is fine and nothing should be changed. That constitution should be combed, 
dusted out, and it should remain as it is. Of course the constitution should

be changed, especially if Montenegro leaves. In case of its secession, we 
have a new situation - from the constitutional and internal point of view - 
where Serbia would be a new and independent state. Thank you. 

[First journalist] In practical terms, will you oppose, or will you be 
neutral in regard to the extradition of former President Milosevic, a 
procedure which he himself signed by accepting the Dayton Agreement. That
is, 
will you fight for his delivery to The Hague through democratic means, will 
you be neutral or will you fight for a trial by The Hague but here in 
Belgrade, or will you fight for a trial only by Serbian courts? 

[Kostunica] On the question of the extradition of former President Milosevic

to the Hague tribunal and my willingness or unwillingness to do so, I would 
like to emphasize the following: I would like, once again, to recall the
fact 
that there are some things which fall under the competence of the federal 
president and as far as the job description for the jobs I do is concerned, 
the extradition of our citizens and those who find themselves on our 
territory - including even former officials such as former President 
Milosevic - none of that fits the job description of the president of the 
republic. 

But, of course, the president of the republic must have a stance regarding 
this question and my stance is the following: the extradition of Slobodan 
Milosevic and cooperation with the Hague tribunal to this end is not 
something which is being considered at this very moment in the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. What we are considering is what I have talked about 
and this is the political and legal - by facing the investigative judge - 
accountability of Slobodan Milosevic before our authorities. 

Starting from the fact that the most pressing need to satisfy the [demands 
of] justice lies here - as far as the responsibility of our officials, 
including Milosevic, is concerned - before our institutions and our courts,
I 
believe that, at this moment, we are not thinking about anything else - 
unless, of course, you ask me about a proper court procedure which would 
determine all these elements of responsibility. The Hague is not in our 
thoughts now, and not in my thoughts at all, considering the preoccupation 
with the south of the country, with Kosovo, with poverty, Montenegro and
with 
all our other problems. 

On the other hand, seen in the long run, The Hague very frequently sends out

little darts and remarks pointing out the incompetence of the judicial 
institutions in this country and emphasizes that this is why all those who 
are indicted for crimes should be handed over to The Hague. Just as The
Hague 
speaks about the shortcomings of our judicial institutions - and I would 
agree in many respects - there are many reasons to speak about the 
shortcomings of the judicial institutions in the Hague itself. 

Every court must take one tenet of justice as its guiding principle. The 
Hague tribunal takes selective justice as its guiding principle. Selective 
justice is not justice. The selectivity of justice - in the case of the most

important people politically, i.e. heads of state and, as far as the Hague 
tribunal is concerned, after the clashes in the former Yugoslavia - lies in 
the fact - and I will repeat once again - that not once was the question of 
responsibility raised of any important person on the Croatian, Bosniak 
[Bosnian Muslim] and Albanian side, and if you like, on NATO's side as well,

because NATO is also responsible for a part of the crimes carried out in 
1999. When this happens, we could think about proper cooperation with the 
Hague tribunal. 

Besides, a question is being asked here which is not only a theoretical but
a 
practical question and that is: what kind of court is it that judges in 
portions, so to speak? An international court that judges in portions, which

judges or accuses or summons to court those who are indicted for crimes in a

single war? How many wars have there been in the past 50 years? How many 
crimes have been committed in different parts of the world? All this is 
leading us towards an idea of a different kind of court - a much more 
objective and impartial one - an international war crime tribunal which
still 
does not enjoy the support of the international community because it does
not 
enjoy the support of one country in the international community and that is 
the United States of America... 

[Source: BK TV, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat 1110 gmt 3 Apr 01]