[ALBSA-Info] Intl Crisis Grp on Albania's election

[Kreshnik Bejko]

Here's some light w.end reading for singles:) This document presents some 
interesting opinions of
our Western friends on politics and politicians in Albania.

INTL CRISIS GROUP

Albania's Local Elections: A Test of Stability and Democracy

Tirana/Brussels

Introduction
Local elections in Albania on 1 October 2000 will mark the first test of 
popular support for the ruling Socialist-led coalition since it came to 
power following the violent uprising in 1997.1 The Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), whose Office of Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (ODIHR) will be leading the monitoring effort, deems these 
elections to be of critical importance. Albania's electoral process has 
traditionally been bedevilled by the same handicaps encountered in most 
other institutional areas: namely, inadequate legislation, capacity 
deficiencies, politicisation of the process, and lack of all round political 
support. It is vitally important for Albania's democracy and international 
reputation that this year's elections do not repeat the mistakes of the 
recent past.2
There is, however, growing concern about political tension in the run-up to 
the elections, due to increasing political polarisation and the threat of 
non-participation by the main opposition party. Despite calls from 
international organisations to avoid extreme confrontation, the country's 
two main parties - the governing Socialist Party (SP) chaired by former 
premier, Fatos Nano, and the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) led by 
former president, Sali Berisha - have opened the debate with 
characteristically bitter polemics. Three years after he was forced from 
power in July 1997 in an armed rebellion in which more than 2,000 people 
were killed, Berisha, now 53, is back on the electoral campaign trail. Since 
losing power, he has waged a relentless campaign against his Socialist 
opponents, whom he accuses of rampant corruption, and has repeatedly called 
for early parliamentary elections.3 The last local elections were in October 
1996 and resulted in a sweeping victory for Berisha's Democratic Party. As a 
result, the DP dominates local government with 80 per cent control over city 
and district councils and therefore has the most to lose in the polls. In a 
remark that reveals the importance of the elections for the DP, Berisha 
claims the poll will be "the most contested elections in the history of 
Albania because the government has demonstrated that it drew up the law to 
manipulate them."4

A Council of Europe (CoE) resolution at the end of June declared that "the 
holding of elections in conformity with the new electoral law, in order for 
them to be fair and for their outcome to be acceptable to all the political 
parties, is a condition that Albania must meet, given all the promises made 
before it was accepted into the CoE in July 1995." This is as much a 
reference to Berisha as it is to the current government since it was under 
Berisha's administration that Albania joined the CoE. The persistence of 
polarisation and confrontation in Albanian political life is manifested by 
deep divisions within both major parties. The Socialists are divided between 
supporters of SP chairman Fatos Nano, and the younger element centred around 
Premier Ilir Meta and former premier Pandeli Majko. Whilst the Socialists 
are trying to paper over the cracks in order to present a united front to 
the electorate, the Democrat leadership has basically ignored its breakaway 
reformist faction, the Democratic Reform Movement (DPRM), now generally 
referred to as the "Young Reformers." Both main parties also have problems 
with their coalition partners. The outcome of the elections is likely to be 
very close between the two major parties and the results are almost certain 
to be contested.

Despite persistent threats to boycott the entire procedure, the Democrats 
will most probably take part in the elections but continue to boycott the 
Central Election Committee (CEC) and not recognise the results announced by 
the CEC because they believe it is biased in favour of the Socialists. The 
conduct of the elections and the willingness of the main parties to abide by 
their outcome will be seen as a measure of the level of political maturity 
Albania has reached and a valuable indicator that the country is progressing 
in the right direction. A successful electoral process would enhance 
regional stability and advance Albania's candidacy for increased integration 
into European structures. A serious monitoring effort by NGOs and OSCE 
governments would raise the prospects for a democratic outcome.




Background to the Electoral Preparations
So far, the whole electoral process has been very problematic. The OSCE has 
endeavoured to accommodate criticisms of the electoral code through a 
working group - chaired by Ambassador Geert Ahrens, Head of the OSCE 
Presence in Albania, or his Legal Counsellor - and open to all parties to 
deal with technical and legislative issues of voter registration and the 
enactment of the electoral code. Since the beginning of March 2000, the 
working group has met on an almost daily basis, discussing issues of a legal 
or technical nature raised by participants. As a result, by mid-April, an 
amended draft code had been prepared incorporating the changes agreed to by 
the parties, together with the proposals of international experts. In the 
view of the OSCE and the international experts on the working group, this 
text should provide Albania with an internationally acceptable legal basis 
for the holding of free and fair elections. The Albanian constitution 
provides for an independent, non-political Central Electoral Commission 
(CEC), excluding the nomination or participation of members on a party 
political basis. The constitution also entitles President Rexhep Meidani to 
appoint two CEC members, while the High Council of Justice, chaired by the 
president, can elect three commission members. The other two are elected by 
parliament.
Opposition Arguments against the Electoral Procedures

Towards the end of last year it became apparent that the opposition planned 
to attack the proposed arrangements for holding the elections - complaining 
that they had been inadequately involved in the preparatory process and 
strongly criticising the constitution of the CEC.5 Complicating the picture 
was the legacy of the OSCE's criticism of the conduct of the 1996 general 
election, which had incited Berisha's anger and led him to accuse the 
organisation of a leftist bias and of being under the control of communists.

As in 1996, dissent revolves around the composition of the electoral 
commission. Opposition parties accuse President Meidani of turning the CEC 
into a politically partisan body in order to assist the Socialist Party in 
rigging the elections. The DP would prefer the CEC to be reconfigured, with 
one representative from each of the seven parties who won the most votes in 
the 1997 general election. Of the seven parties, three might be considered 
right wing and four left wing. By permitting a representative of each to 
serve on the CEC, the DP argues, there would be a fairer balance between 
left and right. However, the composition of the CEC is not within the scope 
of the technical and legal tasks of the OSCE's working group.

Njazi Kosovrasti, head of the DP's Local Government Department, explained 
his party's opposition to the CEC: "[President] Meidani appointed two 
independents, cronies of his, and three others were appointed by the High 
Council of Justice, which is also headed by Meidani. Another was appointed 
by parliament. These six were appointed prior to the electoral code being 
passed by parliament on 12 May 2000. Two appointees resigned so there 
remained three empty places. Both parties' experts signed the electoral code 
agreeing that five out of seven [members] should agree to any appointment in 
order that it be legal. Parliament, however, refused to agree. The only 
possible reason, therefore, is to rig the votes."6

According to a DP memorandum, the electoral code was approved "only by the 
vote of the leftist forces, without taking into consideration some 
amendments that aimed at respecting the previous political agreements 
presented by other deputies." In the view of the opposition, the basis of 
the local electoral law should be that which stood at the time of the 1996 
local elections, which produced a landslide victory for the DP. The present 
code, the DP argues, creates a legal foundation for manipulating the 
elections and the CEC is invalid since five CEC members were nominated in a 
one-sided manner, before the code had been even approved and with disregard 
for the criteria laid down in the code, resulting in a commission that does 
not enjoy the trust of other political forces participating in the 
elections.7

An example of the difficulty of ensuring the neutrality of representation 
between the ruling coalition and the opposition occurred in mid-June 2000, 
when Fotaq Nano was appointed chairman of the Central Electoral Commission. 
The appointment outraged DP supporters, who claimed that not only is Fotaq 
Nano a relative of Socialist Party leader Fatos Nano and a close friend of 
President Rexhep Meidani, he is also a former Socialist member of previous 
central electoral commissions. "So much for impartiality," was the 
resounding response to news of the appointment from DP activists.8 Njazi 
Kosovrasti argued that by appointing a relative of Nano, the Socialists had 
been arrogantly provocative.9

Fotaq Nano had been elected by five fellow members to chair the commission. 
This left parliament to elect the seventh member, which the Socialist 
parliamentary majority agreed should be proposed by the DP. The DP, however, 
refused to participate in the process. Instead, they called for a new 
electoral code, which would give both the Socialist and Democratic parties, 
as the country's two major parties, equal rights to elect CEC members. In 
what the Socialists deemed as a compromise, it was agreed to appoint a 
seventh member of the CEC from the right-wing grouping. Not recognising the 
electoral code or the composition of the CEC, the DP refused to propose any 
candidates. The impasse ended with the election of Gjergj Koka as the 
seventh member of the CEC. Koka was proposed by Nexhat Kalaj, a lawyer and 
representative of the United Right of Shkoder, who expressed in his proposal 
a strong desire to break the deadlock and open the way to fair elections. 
Kalaj made it clear that this was a personal undertaking, free from 
engagement to any party or political grouping.10 This development is an 
indication of the growing impatience from both the left and the right at the 
DP's wavering stance regarding the elections. The leader of the Christian 
Democrats, Zef Bushati, advised the party to either accept the electoral 
code and the CEC and participate in the local elections, or boycott them 
entirely.11

The Municipal Division of Tirana

In August, Parliament swiftly approved a law that proposes to divide Tirana 
into eleven municipalities. This controversial plan has been opposed by the 
Council of Europe, which argues that there is not enough time to implement 
the changes before the October elections. The opposition accuses the 
Socialists of attempting to gerrymander districts to increase their party's 
prospects in the local elections and insist that, under Albania's 
constitution, a local referendum is needed for such changes. Although 
similar administrative changes have been proposed for the entire country, 
the main controversy centres on the changes envisaged for the capital, which 
has been a bastion of the DP since the end of the one-party state in 1991. 
Tirana's vast sprawling suburbs are home to recent arrivals from the north, 
who are traditionally DP supporters likely to re-elect a DP mayor.12 The 
Democrats argue that the changes are designed to minimise the risk of heavy 
Socialist losses in Tirana.

However, Minister of Local Government Bashkim Fino, who proposed the reforms 
in the first place, claims they are intended to improve overall management 
of the city, whose population has risen sharply from 290,000 in 1990 to an 
estimated 700,000 by 1999. Fino said Tirana's division from a centralised 
city hall into eleven municipalities would give more autonomy to local 
government. He added that the move was in line with the charter on local 
autonomy from the CoE that Albania had signed.13




The Socialist Party
The Socialist Party, aiming to win control of at least half of local 
councils, have adopted the campaign slogans, "Tomorrow Will Be Better," and 
"Vote for Your Freedom, Future and Property." Given the dire social 
conditions that a substantial proportion of the population living outside 
the capital endure, these slogans will not be easy to market. The Socialists 
will seek to take political credit for achievements since the present 
government came to power in 1997. According to one prominent Socialist, law 
and order has been restored throughout much of the country, and the state is 
now functioning in places where there was no state control whatsoever during 
the past few years.14 In mid-July, an IMF team announced that Albania was on 
track to achieve 7 per cent economic growth this year and had made 
significant progress in structural reforms. The country recorded two strong 
growth rates over the past two years signalling a swift recovery from the 
total economic collapse following the crisis of 1997. The economy is 
forecast to grow at around 5 per cent annually over the next two years. 15
Nevertheless, ordinary people may only be partially aware of such social and 
economic achievements. What they notice, and what concerns them most is the 
lack of jobs, low paid salaries and pensions, inadequate water and 
electricity supplies, unmaintained roads and sporadic refuse collection. 
During their three years of government, the Socialists have failed to ensure 
adequate and reliable supplies of daily essentials. In their defence, the 
Socialists argue that since most local government, including Tirana city 
hall, is in the hands of the DP, civic duties remain largely unfulfilled 
with the explicit political aim of undermining the national government's 
achievements. A leading SP figure, Dritero Agoli, recently lashed out at 
local government officials, most of whom are DP members, for their failure 
to use the funds given by the central government and, according to him, for 
creating the impression that the Socialists were not working efficiently nor 
keeping their election promises.16

Although the Socialists currently control more than two thirds of 
parliament, within the ruling party there is a good deal of infighting. 
Socialist Party Chairman Fatos Nano is under threat from increasing rank and 
file support for Premier Ilir Meta, and to a lesser degree former premier 
Pandeli Majko.17 Throughout the country in June, a series of conferences saw 
pro-Meta candidates elected as leaders of local SP branches at the expense 
of pro-Nano candidates. In the capital, anti-Nano Socialist leader Musa 
Ulgini was elected chairman of the SP branch. In discussions, Socialist 
supporters argue that Meta is widely regarded as a competent head of 
government and that Nano's position is weakening.18 Some members within the 
Socialist Party's district branches are also displeased with the behaviour 
of Socialist Party chairman Nano, and other prominent SP leaders, for not 
respecting grass roots Socialists' votes and opinions.

In many respects it can be argued that aside from his personal conflicts 
within the SP, Nano is being held hostage by the continuing presence of 
Berisha. Along with the DP leader, Nano is associated in people's 
consciousness with the fear and uncertainties of the past few years. 
Nevertheless, in the short term the strongest card of the SP remains the 
Berisha one. The Socialists are without doubt benefiting from the divisions 
within the DP, and from Berisha's growing international isolation. The last 
electoral victory of the Socialists in 1997 was based largely on wide scale 
public dissatisfaction with Berisha. However, in the run up to the elections 
there has been a strong call for a reunification within the party, which 
must be jointly spearheaded by Nano, Meta and Majko. The SP congress held at 
the end of June 2000 was an attempt to make the SP more democratic and 
European-oriented, which many rank-and-file members see as the best possible 
way to defeat the Democrats. The Socialists are concentrating much of their 
effort in rural areas where Berisha has also been campaigning recently, and 
where they received most of their support in the 1991 and 1992 elections.

Chairman of the SP elections committee Kastriot Islami has recently 
inveighed against complacency within the Party, reminding party members that 
if the SP and the government do not step up their work, the DP would 
continue to hold on to local power. He warned of a moral crisis, an absence 
of principles and the creation of clans on the basis of interests of various 
kinds. Indeed within both the major parties clans have emerged whose 
members' primary aim is furthering their own personal and family interests. 
In what could be termed a wake-up call, Islami argued that since coming to 
power the SP has lost its leading qualities at all levels, and its 
government is composed mostly of mediocre officials. He also noted that as 
preparations got underway for the forthcoming local elections, "many of its 
leaders are euphoric, which is baseless. There is a desire to win but there 
is also a gap between the wish and the systematic work required to make this 
wish a reality."19

The recent hasty political manoeuvring and policy decisions, however, 
suggest a lack of confidence rather than complacency. On 5 July 2000, 
Premier Meta announced a government reshuffle - replacing three ministers in 
a bid to give, in the words of a government spokesman, "a new impulse to the 
government's work." The changes were carried out in such haste that neither 
the presidency nor the Socialists' coalition partners were invited to 
discuss them. In an attempt to keep the Democratic Alliance Party (PAD) in 
the governing coalition, the party was given the portfolio of justice 
minister instead of the less important ministry of public works. However, 
this was not enough to placate the coalition. The SP has been increasingly 
accused of patronising its junior coalition partners.20 On 26 July the 
Socialists began the first round of negotiations on power sharing with their 
junior partners. In round-up meetings with the Social Democrats (PSD) and 
the Greek minority Union for Human Rights (PBDNJ), chairman Fatos Nano and 
his election staff discussed strongholds for their party allies. Social 
Democratic Party (PSD) leader Skender Gjinushi told reporters that he 
expected to join forces with the Socialists in October's elections "for a 
united front of centre-left forces."21 Only days later, however, he 
announced that his party's pre-election coalition with the Socialists was 
dead.22 This followed the Socialist Party's publication of a list of its own 
candidates for all municipalities and communes. The PSD will, therefore, 
have to field its own candidates rather than negotiate a joint list with the 
SP as planned earlier. The Socialists justified their decision that the 
coalition parties present their candidates separately as a test of the 
electoral support that each party has amongst the electorate.

The Democratic Alliance (PAD), which is at odds with the Socialists after 
the sacking of two of its ministers, said it would participate separately in 
the local elections. In an interview with the daily Shekulli, the PAD's 
Secretary General, Ridvan Peshkepia said the proposals made by the SP not to 
leave any free electoral zones to its allies but to present joint candidates 
are outside its concerns. Peshkepia criticised the Socialists for wasting 
time making such statements because his party does not view the SP as its 
master. For Peshkepia, some of his party's candidates are skilled enough to 
win the elections and compete effectively with the Democratic Party and the 
Socialist candidates.23 Meanwhile, the leader of the PBDNJ, Vasil Melo, said 
he expected a trade off with the Socialists in municipalities where each 
would run uncontested. The PBDNJ is ready to make deals with the SP but is 
against joint candidates, said Melo, who thought the Socialists had become 
more self-confident than they were in the elections of 1997. Melo did not 
exclude abandoning all co-operation with the SP if the Socialists refused to 
compromise with its partners in the Alliance for the State, pointing out 
that the present situation is vastly different from that of 1997 when the 
country was in complete turmoil. 24




The Democratic Party
The Democratic Party's campaign is very much centred around its leader Sali 
Berisha, who has been holding rallies throughout the country announcing that 
he is back on the political scene. Berisha, however, has a serious image 
problem. His name is synonymous not only with the dark years of 1997 and 
1998, but also with what many Albanians feel is the root cause of the 
paralysis in Albanian politics - the "communist mentality" that prevails 
amongst the country's political leadership. Obviously, this also applies to 
those older members of the Socialist Party, the successor to the communist 
Party of Labour. But many top DP officials, including Berisha, have tried 
unsuccessfully to disguise their own communist past. In reality, the whole 
evolution of the Democratic Party has been closely linked to that political 
tradition. The DP leader is still considered by many as an authoritarian, 
provocative and inflammatory politician, who survives only through the 
conflicts he provokes.

Just as the people's support for the Socialists in 1997 was, to a large 
extent, a vote against the authoritarianism of Berisha rather than for any 
specific policies the Socialists had to offer, Berisha's campaign is an 
appeal to protest against the current government rather than for an attempt 
to mobilise support for any specific DP policies. Berisha's intolerant and 
dismissive attitude towards the reformist wing of his own party is 
indicative of his style of leadership. In an interview with the daily Gazeta 
Shqiptare, Deputy Minister of Local Government Blendi Klosi claimed that 
many local officials - who were often moderate DP members - were ready to 
co-operate with Socialist-run central institutions, but were afraid of 
Berisha's reaction. 25 The position of the moderates within the DP thus 
remains difficult, having been completely excluded from the offices they 
previously held within the DP.

A recent European Democratic Union fact-finding mission to Albania concluded 
that Berisha had failed to establish himself as an opposition leader ready 
to work through the framework of legal and parliamentary institutions. He 
has continued to favour boycotts of parliament, confrontational rhetoric, 
and demonstrations on the streets. Part of the "Young Reformers" platform is 
the demand that the DP should adopt a more "constitutional" approach to 
politics. 26 Mainstream Democrats have persistently snubbed efforts of 
cooperation made by the reformists led by Gence Pollo. On 1 August 2000, 
Pollo told the independent daily Shekulli that the reformers would submit a 
list of candidates for mayors in some municipalities "in the hope of 
securing a significant victory for the Democrats and the entire opposition." 
27 It is unlikely, however, that the DP leadership will even acknowledge the 
list. The reformists have not ruled out putting forward independent 
candidates after their proposals for names of potential candidates were 
rejected out of hand by DP headquarters. The political allies of the DP in 
the Union for Democracy Alliance tend to have an extreme and 
"conspiratorial" understanding of the political situation in Albania. For 
them, the clash between Berisha and the reformers results from infiltration 
of the DP by the communist secret police. Whatever influence these parties 
have on the DP will tend to reinforce Berisha's hard-line stance. 28

The DP daily, Rilindja Demokratike, asserts that the DP was excluded from 
the June 1997 general elections because it was being attacked by criminal 
gangs in two thirds of the country, and was excluded again in the November 
1998 constitutional referendum. 29 In 1997, there were 35 districts that 
could not be contested by the DP because they had no representation and 
could not canvas in the south. 30 In interviews, the majority of DP 
activists express confidence that the situation has changed and they are 
headed to electoral victory. DP Head of Public Relations Gherji Thanasi 
believes that, "If they [the Socialists] win the local elections there will 
be hell here. I am totally convinced that the DP will win the elections." 31 
Chairman of the DP parliamentary group Jemin Gjana told reporters that, "I 
have the strong conviction that the DP and the entire right-wing forces will 
win the local elections because the experience of the period 1992-1996, when 
the DP was in power is testimony to the fact that it is a political force 
which has governed much better than the present [Socialist] government."32 
On 21 July 2000, at a meeting with deputy chairmen from local DP branches, 
Berisha warned that he could come to power in three hours if he wanted, but 
his party would, nevertheless, abide by the principle of the free ballot. 
Such statements, coming less than two years after the abortive coup d'etat 
in September 1998, cause concern amongst the Albanian public, and may well 
promote a Socialist victory.

Berisha, however, can no longer rely upon the support of large swathes of 
the north. His support nowadays is far more localised in central lowland 
districts such as Tirana, Durres, Kavaje and Mamurras, together with the 
little maverick village of Lazarat in the deep south. What Berisha does have 
is a hard core of very determined supporters, many of whom genuinely believe 
that the international community, most notably the OSCE, is actively working 
to ensure a Socialist victory. When asked what would happen if the 
Socialists won the local elections, a spokesman in a group of DP supporters 
in Durres said, "If they steal these elections from us, God save Albania."33 
It must be hoped that this is just empty rhetoric. If it is not, and serious 
problems do occur, they are likely to be centred in Tirana or Durres. It now 
appears that, with the exception of the Christian Democratic Party (CDP), 
the DP, unlike the Socialists, has managed to maintain their coalition 
partnerships and will participate in the local elections alongside its 
allies the Union for Democracy (UfD).

On the international front, playing the national card, Berisha has recently 
promised to take a tougher stance over the property claims of Muslim 
Albanians, or Chams, who were deported from Greece after the First and 
Second World Wars.34 During a recent ceremony which renamed a street in 
Tirana Chameria after the Thesprotia region of northern Greece (Chameria in 
Albanian) from where the Chams were expelled, Berisha told the crowd of 
Chams, "I pledge that I will be tough on Greece on this stance when I get 
back in power. I will do the utmost to make Greece recognise the property 
and resettlement rights for those deported." While this might help Berisha 
to burnish his nationalist credentials, it has to be asked whether the 
powerful Albanian Diaspora may in fact be more effective at assisting the 
Chams.

Berisha is still smarting from the humiliating rebuff he received from 
Kosovo's UN administrator, Bernard Kouchner, who in mid-June prevented 
Berisha from visiting Kosovo, citing the tense security situation as the 
cause. The actual reason, though, for barring Berisha was the plausible 
concern that he might aggravate the already tense pre-election atmosphere in 
Kosovo by calling for independence and siding openly with specific Kosovar 
political factions. Berisha was advised to reschedule his visit when the 
situation had calmed.35 Aware that a number of other prominent Albanians, 
including President Meidani and former premier Pandeli Majko, have visited 
Kosovo - albeit in a private rather than political capacity - an infuriated 
Berisha told a press conference that the refusal to allow him to enter 
Kosovo resulted from "mean arbitrariness and plots by the Tirana authorities 
and certain sectors of UNMIK."36

Berisha's supporters remain angry over Kouchner's decision, citing it as 
proof that the international community still wishes to keep Albanians 
divided. They argue the move has enhanced Berisha's prestige by proving how 
important a figure the international community believes Berisha is, 
otherwise he would have been allowed in. "They [UNMIK and the OSCE] are 
afraid of the power of Berisha and the support he has in Kosovo," said a 
number of DP supporters in Albania.37 The DP leader is arguably more popular 
in Kosovo - where in several southern Kosovo towns, crowds had gathered to 
await his arrival - than in Albania, having urged the Kosovars not to sign 
the Rambouillet agreement and given his full support for Kosovo's 
independence. Kosovars are, on the whole, unaware of Berisha's political 
legacy or the causes and consequences of the 1997 rebellion.

The event has fuelled growing dissatisfaction, evident across the right-wing 
spectrum in both Kosovo and Albania, at the meddling of the international 
community in the affairs of Albanians. The visit cancellation provoked a 
hostile media campaign in Kosovo, questioning international administration's 
right to restrict an Albanian's freedom of movement. Back in Tirana, Berisha 
said he would visit Kosovo when it has its own president and prime minister 
- a clear indication that he thinks it time for Kouchner and his fellow 
international officials to leave.38 Many Albanians believe that it is time 
for the international community to leave Kosovo. The DP press employs the 
word "temporary" whenever referring to the international authorities in 
Kosovo. 39

Nevertheless, contrary to what his supporters believe, the annulment of the 
visit was a severe blow to the political image of the DP leader and has 
without doubt affected his standing as a politician. The Socialists saw the 
episode as yet a further example of Berisha's growing isolation both 
externally and internally. Although Berisha appears to have maintained a 
strong hold over the party machinery, there is little evidence that he has 
managed to maintain a following amongst the broader Albanian population.




Conclusion
Nine years after the introduction of multiparty politics in Albania, the 
country still lacks a credible third force as a means for voters to register 
dissatisfaction with the two main parties. It would be a great step forward 
if the smaller political parties would put forward more initiatives, and 
accept greater responsibilities, in order to weaken the dominance of both 
the SP and the DP. Until this happens, an unhealthy climate of increasing 
apathy towards the whole democratic process will prevail. Albanians seem 
disgusted with politics, weary of the continuously tense political situation 
in the country stemming from the bitter disputes and infighting between the 
Socialists and Democrats. Albanians are exhausted by the mediocrity of their 
politicians, most of whom received their political education during the most 
intellectually arid period of Albanian communism.

As a result, many Albanians simply do not know who to support. Having tested 
all the current politicians and found them severely wanting, the electors 
are being asked yet again to choose between Nano and Berisha - the very same 
leaders whom they associate with the traumatic upheavals of 1997 and 1998. 
There is, therefore, a strong possibility of large-scale abstention, with an 
estimated 50 per cent of electors perhaps intending to boycott the poll. On 
a less than optimistic note, the daily Shekulli concluded that only a 
handful of militants and activists from the various political parties would 
actually participate in the elections.40 The Socialists and their allies are 
hoping that Berisha's reputation as an irresponsible, unpredictable 
troublemaker will ensure their victory. Indeed, without Berisha at the helm 
of the DP, the Socialists would have very little chance of securing a 
victory against the strong right-wing opposition. They would also find it 
hard to attract wavering voters.

Within the DP itself, the "Young Reformers" can afford to bide their time, 
comfortable in the knowledge that, although Berisha might command the 
support of his hard-core party followers, in the country as a whole DP 
supporters are showing increasing support for the more moderate, 
reform-minded, younger DP elements. The reformists see themselves as the DPs 
leadership-in-waiting, hoping that Berisha will burn himself out during this 
campaign, thus clearing the path to eject him from the leadership of the 
party in time to prepare for next year's general election.

However, even though the DP will almost certainly not win the 80 per cent of 
local offices it holds at present, it will likely still win a sizable 
proportion. It must be hoped that newly elected DP mayors will use the funds 
allocated to their districts by the central government in a responsible 
manner. It is encouraging to see that relations between the ruling parties 
and the opposition, although savage in Tirana, are more civil in the 
provinces, where there is a certain degree of co-operation between them.

Regrettably, the politics of power and personalities, rather than of 
policies, still mark the political scene in Albania. There may be more than 
a grain of truth in the recent statement by the pro-DP daily Albania when it 
claimed that, "this autumn's elections will be won by whichever political 
grouping has the strongest gang."41 Until the political classes accept the 
conventions of normal, inter-party behaviour found in other Western-style 
democracies, there is a danger that the effectiveness of international 
legislative and institution building assistance will again be wasted. 
Stability in Albania is important to the success of international community 
efforts in Kosovo and in the rest of the Stability Pact zone. The lesson of 
the last three years is that democracy in Albania is still a fragile and 
developing commodity, and the need for international attention and support 
is undiminished.42 After talking to ordinary Albanians across the political 
spectrum, a visitor is left with the impression that the campaign slogan 
most would like to see representing both the Socialist and Democratic 
parties is - "Time for a Change."




Appendix
Political Coalitions

Some of the smaller parties appear to be wary of aligning themselves with 
any of the coalition groupings. Others have been advised to present their 
own candidates to the electorate. Although by mid-August it is still not 
clear which parties will run independently or within a coalition, below the 
main political parties are listed according to their post-1997 coalition 
alliances. Altogether 34 parties, including at the last minute the DP, have 
registered to participate in the local elections.
Alliance for the State
Socialist Party
Social Democratic Party
Democratic Alliance Party
Union for Human Rights
Agrarian Party
National Unity Party
Conservative Party



Union for Democracy
Democratic Party
Christian Democratic Party
Liberal Union Party
Albanian Democratic Union Party
National Front Party
Legality Movement Party 2



United Right
Republican Party
Democratic National Front
Legality Movement Party 1
Movement for Democracy.



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