[ALBSA-Info] {QIKSH =?ISO-8859-1?Q?=AB?=ALBEUROPA=?ISO-8859-1?Q?=BB?=} INFO: New ICG briefings on Kosovo reaction to Kostunica victory and FRY sanctions (10 October 2000)

[Wolfgang Plarre]

Betreff:  [balkanhr] New ICG briefings on Kosovo reaction to Kostunica
victory and FRY sanctions
Datum: Wed, 11 Oct 2000 00:08:27 +0200
Von: Greek Helsinki Monitor <office at greekhelsinki.gr>
Rückantwort: balkanhr-owner at egroups.com

Please find attached two new briefings by the International Crisis
Group. One covers the Kosovo reaction to the Kostunica victory in
Yugoslavia. The other provides an up-to-date picture of the sanctions in
force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, taking into account
the decisions made at yesterday's EU Foreign Ministers' meeting. Sascha
Pichler *************** 
International Crisis Group 
149 Avenue de Louise 
1050 Brussels Tel 32 2 502 90 38 
Fax 32 2 502 50 38 
www.crisisweb.org 

Balkans Briefing 

Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 10 October 2000 

REACTION IN KOSOVO TO KOSTUNICA'S VICTORY 

I. SUMMARY 

While the world watched in fascination as mass demonstrations in
Belgrade toppled Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic from power,
Kosovo-where Milosevic had committed some of his worst crimes-had an
almost eerie air of normalcy. On the night Milosevic fell, cafes were
full and the usual crowd of young people strolled along Pristina's
central artery, Mother Theresa Street. But Pristina's surface
indifference masked serious unease about events in Serbia and especially
about the swelling international welcome for newly elected President
Vojislav Kostunica. Kosovo Albania's political circles, opinion leaders,
and public, which for long had a head-in-the-sand approach toward the
rise of the democratic opposition in Belgrade, are only beginning to
come to grips with the changed political landscape in the Balkans caused
by Milosevic's fall. 
     Initial reactions to Kostunica's election suggest the
radicalisation of Kosovo Albanian opinion on issues such as co-operation
with the international community and Kosovo's future status. If NATO
governments go too far toward welcoming the new Serb democratic forces
without sending some positive and reassuring signals to Kosovo, the
already evident sense of impatience among Kosovo Albanians with aspects
of the international mission could grow and eventually turn dangerous. 
     Over the next year or so, the international community should seek
to turn the attention of both the Kostunica government and the Kosovo
Albanian community toward confidence-building measures and dialogue that
could lay the foundation for diplomatic engagement at the proper time.
Over the longer run, the international community should recognise that
Milosevic's departure makes it imperative to accelerate plans to create
interim Kosovo-wide democratic institutions, with elections held no
later than early 2001, and after that to move promptly to create a
clearly understood roadmap for resolving Kosovo's final status. 

II. PUBLIC REACTION 

As the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) put together its
well-planned campaign of elections and street protests that on 5 October
led to Milosevic's downfall, Kosovo Albanian political leaders and media
acted as if events in Serbia were occurring on another planet. The day
before Milosevic fell a senior official of the Democratic Party of
Kosovo (PDK) revealed that his party had "made a decision not to decide"
on taking a stance on events in Belgrade and added that, "No matter
which party wins in Serbia, it will be a matter of complete indifference
to Kosovo." 
     Most Kosovo Albanian papers reported events in Belgrade in a
low-key fashion, usually in small articles drawn from wire service
reports that were buried deep inside the papers. Not until 6 October,
the day after Milosevic fell, did the Belgrade story make the front
pages of some Kosovo Albanian papers. On the night Milosevic fell,
journalists at a Kosovo news agency newly formed under international
auspices refused to cover events in Belgrade at all. Journalists at the
Kosovo evening television news program initially adopted a similar
approach, until a foreign colleague galvanised them into using available
live television feeds to produce more normal coverage of breaking events
and to arrange a program of commentary by a couple of respected Pristina
"talking heads." The Kosovo television journalists, however, rebelled at
a possible interview with Kostunica, which could have been arranged live
for Pristina virtually as the new president was assuming power and would
have presented an opportunity to question the new president on issues of
interest to Kosovo. Similarly, all prominent Kosovo Albanian
politicians, except Alliance for Kosovo's Future (AAK) head Ramush
Haradinaj, refused an offer to appear on Kosovo television to discuss
events in Belgrade. 
     The most extreme example of this "What, me worry?" approach was
provided by Bota Sot, one of the largest circulation dailies in Kosovo.
Its chief editor, Bajrush Morina, noted that he was carrying no news
about events in Belgrade because Serbia is an "enemy" country. According
to Morina, Kosovo Albanians were more interested in what was happening
in world centres such as New York, Geneva, and London than in Belgrade.
Asked whether he had not noticed and reported the enthusiastic reaction
of leaders in these world centres to events in Belgrade, Morina replied
that he edited out of his paper's coverage the parts of the foreign
leaders' statements with which he disagreed. In a conversation which
occurred a few days before the climactic events in Belgrade, Morina said
that even if Milosevic fell he would not report it and, indeed, when
Milosevic did fall the readers of Bota Sot remained blissfully unaware
of the event, reading on the front page instead a tribute to martyred
Albanian guerrilla leader Adem Jashari. 
     Only on 7 October, two days after Milosevic fell, did Kosovo
Albanian political leaders or parties begin to make public statements on
events in Belgrade and even then these were largely provoked by reaction
to United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) chief Bernard Kouchner's
efforts to enlist Albanian support for beginning a dialogue with
Kostunica on Kosovo. Although most Albanian leaders professed to be
pleased with the democratic changes in Serbia, they also expressed great
scepticism about Kostunica's approach toward Kosovo and considerable
unease about what they clearly regarded as an unseemly rush by the
international community to embrace Kostunica without seeking some
actions with respect to Kosovo, especially the release of the
approximately one thousand Albanian prisoners held in Serb jails. All
Kosovo leaders also emphasised their view that democratic changes in
Serbia had no direct connection with Kosovo, which they universally said
would only be satisfied with complete independence from Belgrade. 
     There has been little strategic thinking among Kosovo Albanian
political leaders about how to respond to the advent of a new regime in
Belgrade. As usual, however, Veton Surroi, the respected owner of
Kosovo's leading daily, Koha Ditore, is well out in front. In a long
editorial article on the implications for Kosovo of Milosevic's fall,
Surroi wrote that the fall of Slobodan Milosevic was part of the
historical processes that would make Kosovo free of Serbia forever. He
called for a parallel process of building democracy in Serbia and Kosovo
and set out a strategy for dealing with the new reality that included
close co-ordination with Montenegro on future relations with Belgrade,
prompt introduction of a market economic system, and setting up a
functioning system of democratic self-government at the Kosovo level
after the October municipal elections. Surroi said it was wrong for the
international community to believe that Kosovo could be part of a
democratic Serbia but urged Kosovo Albanians to defer discussion of
Kosovo's final status until later. 
     Disappointment and building anger with the West over its reaction
to Kostunica are widespread throughout Kosovo Albanian society. But the
views of a group of young, urban, and entrepreneurial Albanians who have
been responsible for building some some small but successful high tech
enterprises in Kosovo over the past year are noteworthy. Among this
group of entrepreneurs and activists, generally under 30, who over the
past year have rejected opportunities to study and work overseas to
build something lasting in their newly liberated society there exists
extreme disappointment in the West for its rapid support of the new
regime in Belgrade, coupled with growing personal cynicism that their
dreams will never be realised at home. This group is sophisticated
enough to recognise that the dynamics of the region are shifting far
sooner than anyone had expected and that Kosovo could be lost in the
shuffle. While most also recognise that a Europe without Milosevic is
far better off, they are jaded enough to know that their little corner
of the continent is currently not ready to compete with or even to
complement a strengthened Serbia. Older Kosovars hope that the West will
become wary of Kostunica when the true extent of his nationalism is
revealed. These young entrepreneurs seem much more aware that in today's
world economic interests can just as often trump political concerns.
Regardless of when and where democracy will take hold, Serbia represents
to the West a much more promising market, with more opportunities for
privatisation and none of the tricky legal issues over ownership and
status that have so far impeded formal development of the Kosovar
economy. Young Kosovars whose stake at home just as often includes
business or commercial interests as well as the political struggle
inherited from the prior generation seem to hold the view that what they
will lose commercially in the long run could matter more than the loss
of independence. Young Kosovars dream of a free market and economic
status within the EU in much the same way their elders dreamed of
political and social liberation. All they were hoping for, said one
young man, was just a few more years to learn to "
.get it right. Serbs
are ultimately more sophisticated. They know the game, we've barely
begun to figure it out." Now they watch the West accept Serbia with open
arms. This group has more opportunities to work, study and build new
enterprises elsewhere, and if their fears about Serbia are realised they
could just as easily leave on the heels of the international aid which
they fear could soon be pouring out of Kosovo. 

III. MILOSEVIC VERSUS KOSTUNICA 

The way in which Kosovo Albanians view Milosevic and Kostunica is shaped
by their perception that on the issue of Kosovo there is no essential
difference between Milosevic and the (former) Serb opposition. At the
beginning of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) election
campaign-which Kosovo Albanians boycotted, as they have every Serb
election campaign since 1990-it was widely said that if they would vote,
Kosovo Albanians would support Milosevic in order to ensure that Serbia
remained locked in international isolation. In at least one of the
Kosovo Serb enclaves, the pro-Milosevic officials organising the 24
September FRY elections hopefully set up a polling place at the edge of
the Serb territory to allow any Albanians who wished to do so the
opportunity to vote for Milosevic. Some Albanians even went so far as to
resurrect the old canard that the first statute put up in independent
Kosovo would be to Milosevic-as the man whose brutal approach to Kosovo
finally forced the international community to expel Serb forces in 1999. 
     When pressed, however, thoughtful Kosovo Albanians admit that they
are, in fact, glad to see Milosevic disappear and even-albeit often
through gritted teeth-acknowledge that they would prefer to see
Kostunica rather than Milosevic ruling in Belgrade. Mahmut Bakalli, the
former head of the Kosovo League of Communists who resigned in 1981
rather than consent to the use of Yugoslav troops against Albanian
demonstrators and who retains considerable back-stage influence among
political circles in Kosovo, said that only "shallow thinkers" believed
it would be better for Kosovo if Milosevic stayed on. Serious Albanian
political thinkers, according to Bakalli, recognised that in the final
analysis it would be much easier for the world and for Kosovo Albanians
to resolve issues of importance to Kosovo, with a democratic Serbia than
with one ruled by Milosevic. 
     There is, on the other hand, deep reserve in Kosovo regarding
Kostunica, who is believed to be just as nationalistic as Milosevic on
Kosovo but even more dangerous in some ways because of the support he is
gaining from Western leaders. Two days before Milosevic fell, a senior
Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) official commented that "Kostunica is
just as nationalist as Milosevic himself." Kosovo Albanians reacted with
anger and alarm to statements that Kostunica made during the campaign to
the effect that he expected Serb forces to return to Kosovo. Albanians
also noted that Kostunica emphasised the suffering of the Serb people
under NATO bombing but that he has never expressed any contrition or
remorse for the sufferings of any of the peoples of the former
Yugoslavia victimised by Milosevic, including the thousands of Albanians
killed and hundreds of thousands expelled from their homes during the
fighting in 1998 and 1999. In the feverish climate of ethnic hatred that
currently prevails in Kosovo, a picture that was circulated widely in
the Kosovo media of a distinctly uncomfortable looking Kostunica
carrying an automatic rifle, allegedly during a visit to Kosovo during
the 1998, led many Kosovo Albanian political leaders and ordinary
citizens alike to assert that Kostunica-who, whatever his political
tendencies may be, is personally a man of distinctly peaceful
temperament-was a backer or even a member of the Serb para-military
forces. A teenager summed up the opinion of many Kosovo Albanians by
saying about Milosevic and Kostunica, "I hate them both." 

IV. KOSOVO ALBANIAN POWERLESSNESS 

The new regime in Belgrade is forcing Kosovo Albanians to confront two
serious disadvantages they face in responding to Kostunica. The first is
the lack of Kosovo Albanian political leadership with the stature,
vision, and flexibility to deal with the challenges presented by a new
regime in Belgrade. The second-even more galling to them-is the absence
of Kosovo Albanian institutions with the authority and the legitimacy to
represent Kosovo Albanian interests vis-a-vis Belgrade or the
international community. The already visible consequences of this
situation are the radicalising of Albanian opinion toward the Serbs and
the international community and an insistence, which will only grow
stronger as time progresses, on the prompt creation of the interim
institutions of Kosovo self-rule that are authorised under UNSC 1244.
Put another way, Kosovo Albanians were willing to be treated as wards of
the international community as long as Belgrade was an international
pariah. As Belgrade becomes an accepted member of the international
community Kosovo Albanians will also demand a seat at the table. 
     Some of these underlying tensions became evident when UNMIK chief
Bernard Kouchner held a special session of the Interim Advisory Council
(IAC) on the evening of 6 October to discuss the impact of developments
in Belgrade on Kosovo. Kouchner's initial public reaction was music to
the ears of the Kosovo Albanians. He welcomed the changes in Belgrade
but warned the international community against allowing attention and
resources to be diverted from Kosovo. Kouchner also sharply criticised
the statement by UN Human Rights Rapporteur Jiri Dienstbier that
Milosevic should be offered a deal to escape war crimes prosecution if
he voluntarily left power. But Kouchner reportedly ran into a buzz saw
of Albanian opposition at the IAC when he sought support for a statement
welcoming developments in Belgrade and authorising himself to open a
dialogue on Kosovo with the new Yugoslav government. In what was
described by participants afterwards as a stormy session, the Kosovo
Albanian members of the IAC refused to endorse any statement on
developments in Belgrade and questioned the desirability of initiating
dialogue until the new government in Belgrade had made its intentions
toward Kosovo clearer. After the meeting Albanian participants issued
statements to the press that indicated considerable reserve toward the
approach that Kouchner had proposed. LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova welcomed
democratic changes in Serbia but said his objective remained-as it
always has been-to work toward an independent Kosovo. The PDK
representative said that they could not stop Kouchner from contacting
Belgrade but expressed reserve toward developments in Serbia and
criticised Kostunica for saying that he intended to seek the return of
Kosovo to Serbia, which the PDK representative said was inadmissible. 

V. KOSOVO ALBANIAN RADICALISATION 

The radicalisation of Kosovo Albanian opinion as a result of Kostunica's
victory will have an effect on the way Kosovo Albanians view future
co-operation with the international community and on the political
constellation of forces within the Kosovo Albanian community itself.
Demands for independence-which the Albanians never abandoned but have
been willing to downplay in recent months as the international mission
moved forward, however haltingly, with implementation of UNSC 1244-have
once more risen to the top of the agenda. Typical of Kosovo Albanian
reactions in this regard was that of the commander of the Kosovo
Protection Corps and former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) Chief of Staff
Agim Ceku who said "Kosovo has separated from Serbia forever." 
     Impatience with the perceived slowness and incompetence of the
international mission-already strong-will rise. AAK chief Ramush
Haradinaj observed that, "The UN administration is killing the future of
Kosovo because it is not working." This kind of anger at the
international mission will intensify more rapidly if duplicity is added
to charges of incompetence. Some within the UNMIK administration have
shared their fears that Western governments-France and the United States
particularly-could take advantage of the upcoming November European
Union (EU) summit in Zagreb on South-eastern Europe to derail the
further development of independent political and economic institutions
in Kosovo until its future with Serbia is worked out. This is placing
enormous pressure on concerned UN officials to complete as much as
possible of Kosovo's legal and political framework in the short run,
essentially by the end of October, in anticipation of pre-emptive
pressure that may soon arrive from UN headquarters. "Right now no one in
New York is thinking about the effect (of changes in Serbia) on Kosovo,"
a senior UN official claimed. "It's been five days and I have yet to
receive a single call. We have to push something, anything, through
before someone in New York realises the local impact of this thing and
decides to pick up the phone." 
     If the international community's new-found love affair with
Belgrade is seen as compromising Kosovo's desire for independence,
support for hard-line elements within the Kosovo Albanian community will
likely rise. Before Milosevic fell, a senior figure within the Kosovo
Protection Corps is reported to have told Western diplomats that a
change of regime in Belgrade, together with the sweeping LDK victory in
the October municipal elections that many observers expect, could
increase the strength of radical elements and even cause the KLA to
prepare for a renewed armed struggle. 
     Another-and more positive-reaction to the victory of the Serb
opposition will be to stimulate Kosovo Albanian pressure on the
international community to move more promptly to create the Kosovo-wide
interim institutions of democratic self-rule that are called for under
UNSC 1244. Kosovo Albanians had argued for holding Kosovo-wide election
in the fall of 2000. They acquiesced-because they had no choice-in the
international decision to hold only municipal elections. Kosovo
Albanians understand-although the international mission in Kosovo seems
not to-how disadvantaged they now are in not having their own
institutions capable of dealing on a basis of equal democratic
legitimacy with the new democratic government in Belgrade. Even before
Milosevic's fall Kosovo Albanian leaders were becoming more publicly
vocal in demanding the introduction of an interim Kosovo constitutional
structure promptly after the October municipal elections, which Kosovo
Albanians now see as decidedly secondary affair. AAK leader Ramush
Haradinaj has said that he will demand that Kosovo-wide elections be
held in the spring of 2001 in order have Kosovo's first democratic
President inaugurated in June 2001, two years after the end of the 1999
war. Similar demands can be expected from other Kosovo Albanian leaders
as a result of the changes in Belgrade. 

VI. KOSOVO SERBS 

Support for the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) was widespread among
Kosovo Serbs, not out of enthusiasm for Milosevic but rather because
Belgrade's instruments of coercion and propaganda remained strong
throughout the Kosovo Serb community and because many Kosovo Serbs did
not see a better way to return Belgrade's rule to Kosovo and end what
they all hoped was the temporary nightmare of international rule. To a
certain extent, Kostunica's ability to control developments within the
Kosovo Serb community will depend on how promptly and how effectively he
takes charge of the propaganda, police, and financial instruments
Milosevic used to solidify his control over the minds and pocketbooks,
if not the hearts, of the Kosovo Serbs. 
     However, Kostunica's victory is already having a major impact on
politics and personalities in the Kosovo Serb community. In some ways
this impact will mirror the radicalisation within the Kosovo Albanian
community. The sight of world leaders rushing to embrace Kostunica, who
throughout his campaign sharply criticised NATO's 1999 war against
Serbia and the international presence in Kosovo, will diminish the
already tenuous willingness of the Kosovo Serbs to co-operate with the
international mission, which they view as responsible for failing to
protect them against Albanian attacks after the 1999 war and for working
to create a Kosovo separate from Belgrade. 
     The tenor of the response of Kosovo Serbs to developments in
Belgrade will nevertheless be different from that of the Kosovo
Albanians. Kosovo Albanians-now less confident that future trends will
go their way, meaning toward independence-are already reacting in a mood
of anger, resentment, and threats of future non co-operation. Kosovo
Serbs, by contrast, seeing from the outpouring of Western support for
Kostunica that their dream of the return of Kosovo to Belgrade's rule
may not be so unrealistic after all, will react with a tone of smug
self-satisfaction, calling for a change in the policies of the
international mission and for Kosovo Albanians to accept an outcome less
than independence. This switch in mood was already evident in the
above-mentioned 6 October IAC session. Although the Kosovo Albanians
reacted angrily to Kouchner's efforts to establish dialogue with
Belgrade, the Kosovo Serb representative on the IAC, Rada Trajkovic, was
cited afterwards as welcoming international support for the new
government in Belgrade and for calling upon Albanians and Serbs together
to build up the institutions of "Serbia and Yugoslavia." 
     On the personnel side, Oliver Ivanovic, the charismatic leader of
the Mitrovica Serbs, is likely to enhance his standing as a result of
the changes in Belgrade. Ivanovic endorsed Kostunica during the election
campaign and stood by Kostunica during the latter's ill-fated campaign
visit to Mitrovica, when rock-and-vegetable-throwing Milosevic thugs
forced Kostunica off the podium. Other beneficiaries of the new regime
are likely to be Marko Jaksic, Kostunica's representative in Mitrovica,
and Momcilo Trajkovic, leader of the Serb National Resistance party, who
was spotted with Kostunica on the podium in Belgrade as the latter made
his first victory speech. Bishop Artemije and Father Sava, the
international community's anointed "moderate Serbs," are likely to find
their support among Kosovo Serbs even more reduced. 

VII. POSSIBLE FLASHPOINTS 

There are several potential flashpoints where actions by the
international community or the Kostunica government could cause problems
in Kosovo. 
     The first possible flashpoint is the pace and conditions of
international community moves to integrate Belgrade into the world
community. Across-the-board actions such as lifting all sanctions,
restoring full diplomatic relations, and reintegrating Belgrade in
international organisations without seeking anything in return regarding
Kosovo would have a disastrous and potentially dangerous effect on the
mood of the Kosovo Albanians. Naim Jerliu, a Deputy Chairman of the LDK,
asserted that, "lifting sanctions without conditions on Kosovo would
increase the strength of nationalist and extremist forces in Kosovo."
Another senior LDK official said that lifting sanctions immediately
without conditions could lead to violence in Kosovo. 
     LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova made a distinction between lifting
economic sanctions, such as the oil embargo, which he said would help
democratic change through their positive impact on the daily lives of
Serbs, and broader steps such as recognition or membership in
international bodies, which he said should only be undertaken after
achieving certain guarantees regarding Kosovo from the new Kostunica
government. In recent days a number of Kosovo Albanian leaders and
political parties have issued statements on reintegration which
basically boil down to three demands: release of the estimated 2,000
Albanian prisoners held in Serb jails, extradition of indicted war
criminals to the UN-created tribunal in The Hague, and recognition of
the right of the Kosovo Albanians to self-determination. If, however,
the international community allows Serbia to reintegrate without gaining
the release of the Albanian prisoners, seized by Serb forces at the end
of the war and held illegally and reportedly in poor conditions since
then, the anger of the Kosovo Albanian community could be re-directed
from Milosevic toward the new democratic government and the
international community, jeopardising future co-operation with the
international community. 
     Another potential flash point would be the return of the up to 999
Serb troops that UNSC 1244 stipulates could be allowed into Kosovo.
Before the FRY election, the Milosevic regime had demonstrated a newly
formed unit of elite special forces troops, consisting of exactly 999
men, that it said was intended to return to Kosovo. During the election
campaign Kostunica said repeatedly, including during his brief foray
into Kosovo, that he intended to make it possible for Serb forces to
return to Kosovo. So far, KFOR has refused to allow these forces to
return on grounds that they would be a de-stabilising element. Should
the international community reverse this policy and decide to "make a
gesture" to Kostunica by allowing the return of these forces, the result
would be catastrophic. Kosovo Albanians would turn against the
international mission overnight. The Serb forces-together with the Serb
population in the enclaves-would come under immediate Albanian attack
and would need sizeable and permanent NATO guards to survive. AAK leader
Haradinaj said that if the 999 Serb troops returned to Kosovo, "it would
mean that the KLA would once more return to the field."  The return of
large numbers of Kosovo Serbs-some 150,000 of whom are believed to be
sheltering in Serbia, having fled Kosovo in the wake of the 1999
war-would be another possible flashpoint. During the election campaign
Kostunica said that all Serb refugees from Kosovo should promptly return
and sharply criticised the international community for not doing enough
to assist this. One of Kostunica's strongest backers in Kosovo is Oliver
Ivanovic, who has long advocated a more robust approach toward Serb
returns. Radicalisation of the Kosovo Albanian community because of the
Kostunica victory, however, will likely make more difficult even the
limited returns that have occurred so far. Depending on how far this
radicalisation goes, more aggressive Albanian actions against Serbs in
the enclaves cannot be ruled out, particularly in isolated areas such as
Orahovac or Obilic. Large-scale, internationally assisted Serb returns,
which the international community flirted with briefly in the spring and
early summer of 2000, would probably become even more difficult without
significantly expanded and permanent armed protection. Albanian
resistance to the more limited, step-by-step returns carried out under
the auspices of British forces as part of the "Trojan" program will
probably also mount and might threaten the results of Trojan, so far the
only successful program of Serb returns actually accomplished by the
international mission. 
     Another major complication could arise if the international
community invited the Kostunica government to participate in
negotiations over Kosovo's future without at the same time allowing
Kosovo Albanians to participate. This is another area where the absence
of interim democratic institutions in Kosovo could exacerbate tensions.
As Kouchner discovered during the 6 October IAC meeting mentioned above,
Kosovo Albanians simply will not recognise the right of the UN to
negotiate on their behalf on issues which affect their future status. If
Kostunica is, as expected, to attend the November EU summit on Southeast
Europe in Zagreb, it is imperative that a way also be found to allow
Kosovo Albanian representatives to participate. 
     Another obvious potential flashpoint is how Milosevic and other
senior indicted Serb war criminals are treated by the international
community. Kosovo Albanian leaders recognise the sensitivity of the
issue for Kostunica and are prepared to cut him and the international
community some slack regarding timing. Any attempt to allow Milosevic
and other senior indicted Serb war criminals to escape prosecution,
however, would subvert the prestige and effectiveness of the
international mission in Kosovo. 
     The most serious potential flashpoint would be if the Kosovo
Albanian community became convinced that the advent of a new government
in Belgrade had led the international community to rule out independence
as an eventual outcome for Kosovo. Albanians understand that
independence now is not an option. They also understand that in the
modern world independent states have many limits on their sovereignty
and they are prepared to consider regional arrangements with
neighbouring states, including Serbia. Kosovo Albanians have not the
slightest interest in "substantial autonomy" as an end point in their
relationship with Serbia. They are convinced that the international
community has an obligation-some claim to believe that they have been
promised this-to transform what they consider the de facto independence
they now enjoy from Serbia into de jure independence within a few years.
Should Kosovo Albanians conclude that this is impossible, their attitude
toward the international mission in Kosovo would shift fundamentally.
Discussing this prospect, a senior PDK official said with evident
bitterness that the international community had required the KLA to
disarm and if it now turned its back on Kosovo independence, "we are
ready to fight and to die," but the responsibility for the what he
called the ensuing "genocide" would rest on the international community. 

VIII. CONCLUSION 

With good will on all sides-seldom achievable in the Balkans-the
immediate impact in Kosovo of a Kostunica victory need not be dire,
provided the international community avoids the flashpoints described
above. In the short run, the new Kostunica government in Belgrade will
likely be preoccupied with consolidating power internally and with
working out its new relationship with the outside world. It is not yet
clear that it will have an interest in seeking immediately to engage on
Kosovo, although it will continue to adopt tough public stances on such
things as the return of Serb forces and Serb refugees to Kosovo. 
     Or so the Kosovo Albanians hope, because they have no interest in
seeing Kosovo become part of the international agenda with Belgrade
until after Kosovo-wide elections create their own interim democratic
institutions and leaders capable of participating on an equal basis in
any discussions on Kosovo's future status. 
     Over the next year, accordingly, the international community should
encourage both Belgrade and the Kosovo Albanians to lay the foundations
for reasonable engagement by, to the extent possible, avoiding mutually
inflammatory rhetoric and actions and exploring confidence-building
measures and dialogue that will facilitate more serious diplomatic
engagement at the proper time. All players-Kostunica, the Kosovo
Albanians, and the international community-should focus on the immediate
steps necessary for good-faith implementation of UNSC 1244, avoiding the
short-run flashpoints described above and efforts to prejudge any
potential option for the final political settlement of Kosovo's status. 

Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 10 October 2000


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