[ALBSA-Info] WHAT DID THE KREMLIN DO IN BELGRADE -- CAVE IN, OR DIG IN? - From JRL

[Gazhebo at aol.com]

The following was published in Johnson's Russia List


From: "John Helmer" <helmer at atom.ru>

Subject: WHAT DID THE KREMLIN DO IN BELGRADE -- CAVE IN, OR DIG IN?

Date: Sun, 8 Oct 2000 


Coming in The Straits Times, Tuesday, October 10,  2000. 


WHAT DID THE KREMLIN DO IN BELGRADE -- CAVE IN, OR DIG IN?

News analysis

>From John Helmer in Moscow


There is an old Russian saying that if you drink, you die. And if you don't 

drink, you die. So it's better to drink.


If that was the choice facing Russian policy towards last week's events in 

Belgrade, the Russian parliament was first to point out that President 

Vladimir Putin's endorsement of Kostunica's election was worse than death.


Was Putin's action a sign of vacillation and weakness under foreign 

pressure, as his domestic critics are now claiming? And does the Russian

action in conceding to the Yugoslav opposition, headed by Vojislav Kostunica, 

mean international pressure can also succeed in bringing down 

other governments close to the Kremlin, such as the Belarus government headed 

by Alexander Lukashenko?

  

On Friday, according to Gennady Seleznev, the speaker of the State Duma, who 

generally tries to stay in line with the Kremlin, there was no justification 

for Putin to support Kostunica, let alone join the United States and the 

NATO powers to encourage an opposition seizure of power in the streets of 

Belgrade. In the streets, Seleznev said, there was nothing but a "crowd high 

on alcohol and drugs."


Alexander Shabanov, a senior Communist Party deputy, told The Straits

Times on Friday "the present revolt cannot last long. The assault on the 

building of the parliament is a crime. A group of warmed-up people on the 

Belgrade streets is hard to reason with."


Shabanov was speaking after Putin had authorized the despatch of Foreign 

Minister Igor Ivanov to Belgrade on Friday. By then it was already known that 

Ivanov was carrying a message from Putin to Kostunica congratulating him on 

"his victory in the presidential election". 


In the West, that was immediately interpreted as a signal the Kremlin had 

caved in, and was abandoning esident Slobodan Milosevic to his fate. Noone 

attended Ivanov's later clarification. "I did not congratulate 

Mr. Kostunica as president," Ivanov said, "but congratulated him with his 

success, with his victory, in the elections."


Was there any practical difference, Ivanov's critics in the Duma thundered?

By the time Ivanov had returned to Moscow, Milosevic had met Kostunica, and

in 

the presence of the Yugoslav army chief, to confirm the transfer of power.


"The thing that happened today I cannot comment on in any other way than by 

using obscene language," Alexei Mitrofanov told The Straits Times.

Mitrofanov, 

a former Foreign Ministry official, is a member of Vladimir Zhirinovsky's 

small party in parliament, and a strong nationalist. He attacked Ivanov for 

bowing to NATO pressure. "Once again, Russia exercises the role of the 

advocate for Western countries, Germany first of all. It is the same role we 

played with German reunification. What did we receive from that -- thanks, 

plus two kopecks of credit." 


According to Mitrofanov, "Russia needed Milosevic. The 

situation was still recoverable. We still could get some guarantees. But now 

Russia's acknowledgement of Kostunica means Milosevic has lost his game."

Mitrofanov was one of the first deputies among the Duma nationalists to 

break with Putin. 


The Communists remained convinced that Ivanov was acting 

on clear Kremlin instructions; that the policy of supporting constitutional 

rule in Yugoslavia meant support for Milosevic, at least until after another 

round of voting; and finally, that there was no split between the Foreign 

Ministry, the Kremlin Security Council which acts as Putin's personal policy 

staff, or the General Staff. 


Putin's invitation to Moscow for both Milosevic and Kostunica, repeated

after Putin returned to Moscow from a trip to India, seemed to the Duma 

nationalists to mean the Kremlin was sticking to Milosevic.

 

"President Putin personally supervises foreign relations," said a spokesman 

for Dmitri Rogozin, the non-communist chairman  of the Duma International 

Relations Committee, and a well-known nationalist. Rogozin had publicly

backed 

Russian support for Milosevic as the constitutional head of state in 

Yugoslavia. "We can't comment on the Kremlin's opinion of the situation,"his 

spokesman told The Straits Times. "The Kremlin's opinion can't differ from

the 

Foreign Ministry or the Defence Ministry."


Rogozin did emphasize there was no support in parliament for a Russian 

offer of exile for Milosevic. But Rogozin also believed there was no need for 

the offer, so long as the Kremlin did not abandon Milosevic.


The Communists were equally adamant on this point. "The parliamentary 

statement on the situation in Yugoslavia supports President Putin's position. 

A coup is a coup," Shabanov told The Straits Times late Friday afternoon.

The Communists saw no reason why Milosevic should not be 

able to reestablish himself; and every reason why Putin should not do nothing 

to side with NATO against him.


Vyacheslav Nikonov, a former member of the Duma International Relations 

Committee, who runs a political consultancy that is close to the Kremlin,

told 

The Straits Times he did not see any evidence of a split among Russian 

policymakers between those favouring Milosevic, and those for Kostunica. 


According to Nikonov, the Kremlin saw events in Belgrade moving in two 

directions. "The first is if Milosevic is convinced by Russia, or by his 

generals to leave. Or [secondly], if Milosevic keeps claiming power, the 

situation may become murderous. In both cases, Milosevic will not need 

political exile. In case he gives up, he will receive protection within the 

country. If he keeps fighting for the presidency, then he will not ask

anybody 

for political asylum."


The key issue for Putin and his staff, according to Nikovov, was "how 

Milosevic estimates his chances."


That is what Putin despatched his foreign minister to Belgrade to find out. 

While the west was focusing on Ivanov's meeting with Kostunica, the meeting 

that followed between Ivanov and Milosevic was the decisive one.


Russian sources in Moscow believe Milosevic had made his decision to 

give up the presidency, but remain in the Yugoslav parliament, before

Ivanov arrived. It is possible Milosevic had already signalled his intention, 

and Ivanov was despatched to make sure. 


Russian sources do not credit Russian pressure as forcing Milosevic, 

because they do not believe Milosevic has trusted the Kremlin since former 

President Boris Yeltsin and former Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin 

abandoned him during last year's NATO bombing campaign.


Yeltsin's actions at that time launched Putin's rise to power, by 

triggering a General Staff rebellion against his authority. The first 

manifestation was the Russian military occupation of Pristina airport on 

June 11, 1999. Yeltsin became so fearful over the next several weeks, he 

decided he could not trust his then Prime Minister, Sergei Stepashin.

Putin, the head of the Federal Security Service, replaced Stepashin in

August. 


While pro-American newspapers in Moscow are now reporting there was a split 

between the Security Council, favouring Milosevic's resistance, and the 

Foreign Ministry, favouring NATO, the real choice in Russian policy was 

already made. Milosevic made it.


Russians acknowledge that after last year's events, Milosevic had no reason

to 

trust Russian promises. The Russian assessment was there was little they

could 

do to assure their interest in Yugoslavia so long as Milosevic hung on to 

power; little they could do if he relinqished it; and nothing they could to 

persuade him in one direction or another.


Was this a policy of "foolishness and betrayal", as Mitrofanov now says?


The Kremlin will not argue the point in public. The game, Milosevic told 

the Kremlin, isn't exactly over. For Russia's reasons, not NATO's, Putin 

agreed. Preserving the anti-western opposition in Yugoslavia, after Milosevic 

steps down, is the main Russian reason now.