[ALBSA-Info] Western concerns about Albania

[Kreshnik Bejko]

http://www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/sentinel/balkans/albania.shtml

August 10, 2000

Albania

After some encouraging indicators in 1999, particularly as the security 
forces successfully managed to tackle the lawless north and curb the 
influence of the armed gangs, criminals in Albania seem to be fighting back. 
The Chief of Police in the troubled northern city of Shkodra, Arben 
Zylyftari, was killed on 3 July 2000 in a shoot-out with an armed gang. 
Shkodra remained tense but avoided plunging into chaos as has happened on 
two previous occasions in 1997 and 1998.

The unifying effect of the Kosovo crisis, which had forced the bitterly 
opposed Albanian internal factions to temporarily reconcile, has since 
abated; both the Socialist and Democratic parties have changed their 
policies to prepare for the anticipated internal confrontation. This trend 
was clearly indicated in October 1999, when influential moderates in both 
camps were sidelined in high-level meetings to ensure that there would be no 
internal opposition to the collision-course policies set by both parties. 
This proves that, despite substantial Western efforts, there is neither the 
willingness nor the wisdom within the Albanian hierarchy to start solving 
the real problems, indicating that the country, may, at any point, revert 
back to anarchy.

The removal of Genc Pollo, deputy Chairman of the Democratic Party, and 
Leonard Demi, president of the Committee for International Relations, both 
advocates of moderate policies and rapprochement with the Socialists, has 
enabled Sali Berisha to consolidate his grip on power within his party. With 
no moderates of sufficient standing remaining in a position of influence 
from which they could challenge Berisha's views, the Democratic Party is 
obviously preparing for another bid at unseating the current Socialist 
government, with a view to return to power. The fact that such an attempt 
may once again vent onto the streets does not seem to worry Berisha and the 
hardliners.

Berisha's main opponent, Fatos Nano has taken pains to consolidate his 
position by ensuring scant support for pro-European Prime Minister Pandeli 
Majko within the party, thus forcing Majko to resign in October 1999. His 
successor, Ilir Meta, is perceived to have less strength of character, which 
should allow Nano to maintain a firm hold on the party reins. The focus of 
domestic political activity is once again the expected confrontation between 
Berisha and Nano.

Albania managed to steer through the enormous crisis created by the military 
action in neighbouring Kosovo and the massive exodus of Kosovar refugees 
into its territory without ever coming to a point where its internal 
security as a whole would be endangered, particularly given the poor state 
of law and order in the country. However, the end of the conflict and NATO 
deployment in Kosovo do not automatically mean the end of Albania's 
problems.

In one of the most amazing returns of refugees ever recorded, over 500,000 
refugees who flooded northern Albania between early April and late May 1999 
returned to Kosovo as soon as NATO-led KFOR troops opened the borders. This 
eased the enormous pressure on the Albanian authorities, the Albanian and 
international security forces, and the country's extremely poor 
infrastructure.

Fears that the lawless Albania is providing a `safe haven' for international 
terrorism continue. US Secretary of Defense William Cohen abruptly cancelled 
a scheduled trip to Albania in mid-July after US officials determined that 
supporters of Osama bin Laden were looking to strike at a "high-profile 
target". Cohen was not believed to be a target but his travel plans to 
Albania were apparently cancelled on the advice of NATO Supreme Commander 
Gen. Wesley Clark. US sources claimed US intelligence officials had received 
reports indicating that bin Laden's operatives may have planned to use 
Albania as "the staging area for an attack" against a "target of 
opportunity."

In the summer of 1999 the Majko government took steps to bring the Has and 
Tropoja districts in the lawless north of the country under control. While 
several local warlords were arrested, there was no backlash from their 
member gangs - possibly because most of them were across the border in 
Kosovo trying to take advantage of the lack of order. The north will remain 
troubled for the foreseeable future and it would be unwise to disregard the 
possibility of some sort of attempted takeover by gangs in the near future.

The border between Albania and Kosovo, often referred to both in Albania and 
in Kosovo as the "inter-Albanian border", remains open and uncontrolled, 
despite a token international and local presence. With the border between 
Kosovo and the rest of FRY not policed for political reasons, it is only a 
question of time before organised crime establishes connections with their 
counterparts in FRY to exploit the situation for the smuggling of drugs, 
arms, and people. The problem is further exacerbated by the lightly guarded 
Bosnian-FRY and Bosnian-Croatian borders, which provide an opportunity for 
establishing a major contraband route straight to the doorstep of Central 
Europe and the EU. In February 2000 Federal Customs deployed a 300-strong 
force at the main crossing point into Kosovo, to fight smuggling and 
organised crime. De-mining of the border started in June 2000 by an 
international non-governmental organisation and is expected to be completed 
by October 2000. While reducing risk to civilians, de-mining will further 
increase the vulnerability of the border.

The need for regional co-operation in crime fighting was highlighted by the 
seizure of two significant shipments of Albania-bound heroin in Bulgaria and 
the presence of several arms caches in the hands of ethnic-Albanians in 
Macedonia. The prime ministers of the regional countries addressed this 
issue at several meetings and agreed to establish closer co-operation 
between their respective interior ministries.

Albania's security services remain poorly organised and are often undermined 
by political and clan allegiances. The government managed to create an 
almost credible, small, core force, but despite some success in the summer 
in dealing with the warlords in the northern areas bordering Kosovo, the 
security services cannot be considered fully professional or reliable. In 
October 1999, eight anti-contraband teams, equipped and trained with 
external assistance, began operating in Albania; however, it is too early to 
offer an impartial assessment of the impact that this force might make, 
given the prevailing conditions in the country.

Head of the anti-smuggling department in the Ministry of Public Order, 
Kastriot Bruka, was gunned down on 7 June 2000 by what appear to be 
professional killers. Authorities believe that the killing might be an act 
of revenge for the seizure of a huge fuel shipment, considered to be part of 
an illegal consignment from Italy, in an operation conducted during Bruka's 
previous posting as police chief in the port of Durres. The murder might 
have been an `insider job', which would indicate that criminals have 
infiltrated into police ranks.

The loyalty of members of the Secret Service (DSK, formerly ShIK) remains, 
for the most part, uncertain. There were suggestions that officers from the 
Tirana branch of the ShIK were implicated in the September 1998 murder of 
Ahmed Krasniqi, a `defence minister' in the shadow Kosovo government. The 
agenda of the DSK is not clear either. In August 1999 Sali Berisha accused 
the DSK of operating Majko's agenda in Kosovo, rather than doing their job 
in Albania itself. The DSK's real agenda and loyalties were subjected to 
scrutiny again in late 1999 and early 2000, when one of the leaders of a 
Kosovar Albanian political faction, Bujar Bukoshi, openly accused Albania's 
secret services of de-stabilising Kosovo. Just what Berisha considers their 
job within Albania to be, remains as questionable as the nature of their 
business in Kosovo.

The exodus of refugees initially threatened to overwhelm the poorly 
organised Albanian authorities. After initial chaos and mayhem in the north, 
in April Italian NATO troops went out to provide emergency assistance to the 
refugees while civilian agencies were gearing up to the task. The resources 
in the north soon became too thin for the swelling number of refugees, and 
security was becoming a problem due to shelling and VJ (Yugoslav Army) 
incursion, so camps were established further south to relocate some of the 
refugees. Despite their unwillingness to be moved away from Kosovo, the 
situation at the border has been somewhat relieved, particularly after an 
airstrip of sorts was hurriedly built at Kukes.

Weapons smuggling increased in frequency prior to NATO intervention, despite 
nominal efforts of the government to control it and despite VJ's widening 
and reinforcing of the border belt inside FRY territory. A number of UCK 
fighters crossed the border back into Albania with weapons, and with the 
need to re-arm the UCK widely accepted within the Albanian society, more 
weapons flowed into Albania. Many of these weapons remained in northern 
Albanian UCK training camps, practically annulling two years of efforts by 
the Albanian government and the international community to bring in the guns 
looted in the 1997 riots. Several weapons shipments intended for the UCK, 
originating from Austria, Bosnia and Croatia, were intercepted in the course 
of 1999 by Croatian and Italian authorities.

In June 2000 Albanian authorities released the latest revised estimates of 
the fate of weapons looted in 1997. Only 21 per cent of the near one million 
assorted arms have been recovered. Interior Minister Spartak Poci believed 
that most of the remaining weapons were no longer in Albania, having found 
their way into Kosovo.

One of KFOR's main tasks in Kosovo was to demilitarize and disarm the UCK 
within the three-month deadline. Although this has been nominally 
successful, it is unclear if all the weapons have been handed over and put 
into KFOR-controlled storage. There is a possibility - particularly given 
the numbers and types of arms handed in - that substantial quantities of 
weapons were moved back across the practically non-existent border and are 
now stored in secret locations in northern Albania.

With the military threat removed, the priority for the international force 
is to establish an organised, credible, professional and properly equipped 
police force. Training assistance is underway from MAPE and INTERFORZA and 
in August the European Union Council of Ministers has agreed to spend over 
US$3 million to re-establish a viable police force by providing training and 
advice to the country's existing officers and the Ministry of Public Order. 
NATO's AFOR mission to Albania, which reached a strength of 8,000 during the 
conflict in the FRY, officially ended on 1 September 1999. A 2,000-strong 
follow-on force, mainly composed of Italian troops, remains in support of 
KFOR's Communication Zone West.

In response to the Kosovo crisis, the Albanian Army has attempted to 
reconstitute itself as something of a fighting force; troops have been moved 
to border areas in high profile deployments and live-fire exercises have 
been held within sight of the border, to the dismay of aid workers. The US 
and other countries have provided a measure of practical and material 
assistance, notably through Partnership for Peace (PfP) arrangements. 
Despite these efforts, it is clear that without a major infusion of 
financial and training assistance, the Albanian Army would have been unable 
to defend itself against an enemy of any kind. Italy, Greece and Turkey are 
also providing modest amounts of assistance.
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