[ALBSA-Info] Abramowitz at Washington Post

[Agron Alibali]

The Washington Post 

November 28, 2000, Tuesday, Final Edition 

OP-ED; Pg. A27 

Old Issues For the New Serbia 

Morton Abramowitz 


The overthrow of Slobodan Milosevic has greatly
improved prospects for democracy in Serbia. But
democracy and stability will not prevail if Serbia
continues to insist on controlling Kosovo, with its
overwhelming Albanian majority, and, to a much lesser
extent, Montenegro. Can Serbia free itself? 

Once again, much depends on what Western countries do.
Their recent actions are not entirely encouraging.
With incredible speed, and without conditions, the
West brought the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia--until
last month Milosevic's illegitimate enterprise--into
most international institutions. It virtually ignored
the events of the past decade and simply passed over
the questionable legal basis of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia. (It raises the question: What would
happen if Milosevic's henchmen were to retake power?) 

Why did the West act so precipitately? For two
reasons. It wanted to give a quick boost to newly
elected Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica to help
stabilize his coalition's control and make it easier
to remove Milosevic holdovers. And it sought, as it
tried unsuccessfully to do in 1991, to freeze borders
in the former Yugoslavia, fearing what changing them
would do to Bosnia and Macedonia. Thus Montenegro
could not be permitted to go its own way, because
without Montenegro there would be no federal republic
for Kostunica to preside over. Moreover, without the
federation, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1244
declaring Kosovo a part of the federation would be
impaired. 

It is always questionable when democratic states
conspire to preserve unrealities, such as the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. In this case the impulse is
understandable: Serbian democracy is fragile; its
leaders need to focus on keeping the poverty-stricken,
energy-short country intact and facilitating
democratic change. But the accumulation of memberships
in international institutions does not give Yugoslavia
reality. The fact is that the federal republic is
Serbia and has been for a number of years. Moreover,
in pursuing its Serbia policy, the United States has
unceremoniously begun to dump the friendly republic of
Montenegro, uneasily federated with Serbia. 

Indeed, for the past three years the U.S. government
has talked incessantly about plucky little Montenegro
standing up to Milosevic and has helped keep the
country alive financially. Montenegro had achieved
virtual independence. But with Milosevic gone,
Montenegro has become for us a Montecristo, a good
cigar we enjoyed. Not only have our diplomats
instructed its government that they can't have
independence, they warned recently that they would cut
off some badly needed technical assistance if
Montenegro persisted in pursuing independence. Only
congressional intervention reduced U.S. diplomatic
pressures. 

There is another way to deal with Montenegro. After
the Serbian elections on Dec. 23--which should produce
a government free of Milosevic's flunkies--fresh talks
can be held between Serbia and Montenegro. If the two
agree to a continuation of a federal arrangement or
some other kind of union such as a commonwealth, so
much the better. In any event the peoples of
Montenegro and Serbia need to vote on their
relationship. The West has no business denying
Montenegro what it has accepted for the other former
Yugoslav republics, none of which is any more
deserving than Montenegro. 

Kosovo is a far more difficult issue. European Union
leaders proclaim that its fate lies with the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. So does Milosevic's successor,
Kostunica. The problem is that Kosovo's people regard
such a fate as unacceptable. Any effort by the West to
permit the return of Belgrade's institutions or forces
to Kosovo would produce major violence. But this
doesn't mean some arrangement can't be worked out. 

An immediate and dangerous issue coming up will be the
Serbian elections next month. Will the United Nations
allow Belgrade authorities into Kosovo to conduct the
voting? Or will the U.N. administration in Kosovo run
elections on behalf of Belgrade? The first
action--perhaps either--would lead to violence. 

But there is still an opening for a serious dialogue
between Pristina and a democratic government in
Belgrade. It will require the establishment of a
Kosovo government committed to protecting minorities
and the emergence of Kosovo interlocutors with the
legitimacy that comes from democratic elections.
Successful local elections in Kosovo last month bode
well for elections to create a functioning government.
This voting--which has been promised by the
international community--needs to happen early next
year. Once two new governments are in place, talks are
possible. 

Effective management of its own affairs is the
essential requirement for Kosovo at this time. And as
long as independence is possible down the pike,
Kosovars may well accept some sort of loose union as a
first step. That would be more acceptable to the
outside world and thus more fitting, given Kosovo's
dependence on the West. 

The prospects for such cooperation might be better if
the West stopped encouraging Belgrade to believe it
still has a future in ruling Kosovo. Whatever happens
between the two sides, Western military forces will be
needed in Kosovo for a long time. 

Serbia now has an excellent chance of climbing out of
its misery and becoming the most dynamic state in the
area. That will not happen if Serbian nationalism
regains ascendancy. While many nationalist leaders are
still around, the Serb people--though largely
supportive of Milosevic's treatment of Kosovo--seem
tired of violence, poverty and exclusion. Many, it
appears, are not all that concerned about what happens
to Kosovo. 

Serbia has shown it can't integrate a highly
antagonistic Albanian population into its polity. As
an aspiring democratic state, it needs to begin
talking to Kosovo on a regular basis, maintaining ties
if possible but also preparing to accept an
independent Kosovo if necessary. To insist on more
will mean more violence, much less democracy and
exclusion of the Serbs from European integration. 



The writer is a senior fellow at the Century
Foundation. 


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