[ALBSA-Info] JANUSZ BUGAJSKI & DANIEL N. NELSON: The final cut

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>>JANUSZ BUGAJSKI & DANIEL N. NELSON: The final cut
>>
>>
>>Copyright © 2000 Nando Media
>>Copyright © 2000 Christian Science Monitor Service
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>From Time to Time: Nando's in-depth look at the 20th century
>>
>>
>>
>>Christian Science Monitor
>>
>>WASHINGTON and GARMISCH-PARTENKIRCHEN, Germany (May 11, 2000 8:13 p.m. EDT
>>http://www.nandotimes.com) - The Balkan endgame draws near, and it should.
>>
>>After a disastrous decade, much of the Yugoslavia of Versailles and Josip
>>Broz Tito is a charred ruin. Only Slovenia escaped the military 
>>destruction
>>and/or economic trauma of warfare, genocide, refugees, and occupation.
>>Croatia suffered grievously from war damage and the psyche of nationalism
>>from which the country is only now emerging. Macedonia, spared armed
>>conflict, has nevertheless been forced to grapple with an immense flood of
>>refugees in 1999, and the discomfiting status as a NATO dependency.
>>
>>It isn't over. Kosovo's nonstate status, occupied but not governed,
>>separated but not sovereign, cannot continue. Kosovar Albanians cannot 
>>live
>>within a state led from Belgrade. Period. Multiethnicity has been killed,
>>literally and figuratively.
>>
>>Independence for Kosovo is now essential, even if it is not optimal. No
>>other outcome will "work," although the notion of anything "working"
>>overstates the potential for self-governance. Kosovo will not be ruled the
>>way we'd like, and Pristina-directed policies will not be those we want.
>>Still, an endless occupation qua protectorate offers nothing but cost and
>>danger.
>>
>>More important is the future of Serbia and its rump Yugoslavia. In Serbia,
>>there are no credible signs a democratic transition, precipitated by
>>opposition electoral success la Croatia, can be anticipated. Despite large
>>protest rallies, Serbia possesses no united mass support for ousting the
>>ruling clique. In fact, Milosevic consistently comes first in public 
>>opinion
>>polls, and opposition politicians are widely perceived as corrupt,
>>incompetent, or national traitors. Though two-thirds of the public 
>>apparentl
>>y would vote for one of the opposition parties, many of these people still
>>view Milosevic as a hero protecting the victimized nation against foreign
>>threats.
>>
>>There is no Croatian-model transition in Serbia's future. Indeed, evidence
>>mounts that Serbia is more likely to undergo violent turmoil than peaceful
>>transformation. The circle of violence and vendetta is accelerating in
>>Serbia. The "war at the top" in Belgrade literally is a struggle for
>>survival among a small clique of war criminals and profiteers. They'd
>>evidently murder their most loyal allies to remain in power, keep stolen
>>riches, and stay out of The Hague.
>>
>>Later this year, renewed conflict leading to warfare is at least possible,
>>if not probable, in Montenegro, Kosovo, and in Serbia itself. Serb
>>preparations for violent intervention against Montenegro's President Milo
>>Djukanovic are clear and present. The buildup of paramilitary forces
>>alongside the Yugoslav Second Army inside Montenegro is evident - the 
>>former
>>being a force loyal to Milosevic and more reliable for a violent showdown
>>with Montenegro's special police forces.
>>
>>Kosovo is far from quiet. Serbs claim their troops will be back when the
>>U.N. mandate expires in the summer, and continue to try to partition the
>>region, slicing off the valuable Kosovska Mitrovica area; at the same 
>>time,
>>Albanians seek the annexation of Southwest Serbia. Both sides seek to
>>provoke and escalate. It will be a hot summer.
>>
>>Within Serbia itself, the opposition has launched fresh campaigns and has
>>already assembled one massive protest rally in Belgrade last month.
>>Milosevic has countered with a campaign to eliminate independent media,
>>regroup military forces, and call up reservists. He and the
>>socialist/nationalist coalition seem to be preparing for local and federal
>>elections and for military action in southwestern Serbia or Montenegro.
>>Social protests, provocations, and armed conflicts within Serbia and rump
>>Yugoslavia are a good bet.
>>
>>NATO and the United States will be unable to stand aside. After dropping
>>bombs and deploying tens of thousands of alliance troops to occupy and
>>pacify Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, staying out of Montenegro will be
>>impossible. But we'd be foolish to expect Serbia's internal conflicts to
>>remain internal. Refugee floods and, perhaps, civil war would affect and
>>spill into surrounding countries.
>>
>>Before this scenario begins, let's recognize that Balkan stability and
>>Yugoslavia's existence are in direct contradiction. Containment, neglect, 
>>or
>>wishful thinking are not viable solutions.
>>
>>The dismemberment of Milosevic's rump Yugoslavia is an eventuality on 
>>which
>>we can depend. Timing is uncertain, but it won't be long. Three more 
>>viable
>>states - independent Montenegro and Kosovo, plus a democratized Serbia - 
>>may
>>be the most stable outcome.
>>
>>The democratization of Serbia isn't assured, won't be quiet, and might be
>>one of the most costly transitions of the post-communist era.
>>
>>Still, NATO and Washington had best come to grips with an uncomfortable
>>truth - the path to long-term peace and prosperity in a troubled region 
>>such
>>as the Balkans may lie directly through a period of intense instability.
>>
>>Attempting to produce stability when conditions for long-term security are
>>absent is a guarantee of failure. In Southeastern Europe, the "cause" of
>>instability isn't just Milosevic, but what the Serbian dictator 
>>represents.
>>
>>To end Balkan instability requires far more than bombing from 15,000 feet
>>and peace-enforcement. It may, ultimately, require military force to 
>>ensure
>>the dismemberment of Yugoslav remnants. To turn our backs on that 
>>likelihood
>>would be historically blind and politically naive. We ought not repeat 
>>those
>>kind of Balkan mistakes yet again.
>>
>>Janusz Bugajski is director of East European programs at the Center for
>>Strategic and International Studies. Daniel N. Nelson is professor at the
>>George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. Views expressed
>>here are the authors' and do not represent their institutions.
>>
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