[ALBSA-Info] Christian Science Monitor

[Agron Alibali]

The Christian Science Monitor

 March 6, 2000, Monday

OPINION; Pg. 11



Stay the course in Kosovo

Michael O'Hanlon

DATELINE: WASHINGTON

 
 
Having won the war against Serbia last year, is NATO
now losing the peace in
Kosovo? Based on February's violence in the divided
city of Mitrovica, one might
easily think so. In fact, that is not the case:
Overall trends in Kosovo are
positive, and recent events in Mitrovica are not a
fair referendum on the state 
of affairs there.
 
On the other hand, the US and other NATO countries
have made some bad decisions 
in recent weeks - and if they keep it up, the
favorable prognosis could change. 
Countries on both sides of the Atlantic need to get
back to military basics to
make sure their victory last year is fully
consolidated.
 
First, though, how can one say that life is getting
better in Kosovo today?
After all, about 150 Serbs have been killed there
since the June peace accord.
Largely as a result of the violence, the province has
been divided into two
almost completely segregated ethnic communities - and
half of the population of 
Serbs has left Kosovo altogether. In February, two
more Serbs were killed in the
ethnically divided town of Mitrovica when an ethnic 
Albanian  fired a rocket at
a bus; Serb reprisals raised the overall death toll to
11.
 
It's true that these developments are regrettable. But
it would be remiss to
forget that this was a land at war less than a year
ago. Nor was this just any
war. It was a systematic violation of ethnic 
Albanians  by an organized Serb
campaign of violence.
 
Expecting people to forgive and forget within months,
when many ethnic
 Albanians  are still mourning the loss of loved ones
and the rape and abuse of 
many who did survive, is unrealistic.
 
At least in terms of physical security, life in Kosovo
has improved a good deal 
in recent months. According to NATO commander Gen.
Wesley Clark, the province's 
monthly murder rate declined from roughly 200 last
summer to about 35 this
winter. Even if the recent tragedies in Mitrovica have
bumped the murder rate up
somewhat, it remains at least four times less than six
months ago - and lower
than the per capita murder rate in Washington, D.C.
Part of the reason,
admittedly, is ethnic segregation -  Albanians  no
longer have as easy access to
Serbs as they once did. (In fact, the preponderance of
violence in Kosovo today 
is  Albanian  on  Albanian) . But it is better to be
segregated and alive than
intermingled and at risk of death - particularly in
the immediate aftermath of
an ethnic war.
 
Another major, positive development is that the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA),
which fought Serbian forces last spring, has
surrendered large caches of weapons
to international forces and demilitarized its
activities. Even if pockets of
KLA-related forces remain active, they pose only a
limited threat to the peace
at present.
 
That said, there have been troubling developments in
recent weeks in the
peacekeeping efforts of the NATO-led force in Kosovo.
Last week, the New York
Times reported that American troops were directed to
stay out of Mitrovica by
the Pentagon, out of concern for their safety after
Serbs in that city threw
snowballs, stones, and bricks at them. Other recent
reports from Kosovo have
described how other countries, including Britain, have
drastically curtailed
their military strength in Kosovo, leaving commanders
worried they may not have 
enough forces to carry out required missions.
 
The US is wrong not to send its troops into towns like
Mitrovica out of concern 
for their safety, and should change its policy. It's
right for the US to expect 
its allies to provide most troops in Kosovo, given its
role in the air war and
other military responsibilities from the Persian Gulf
to Korea. But whatever
troops it has there should not have - and probably do
not want - special
treatment. That is unfair to the armed forces of other
countries in KFOR, the
NATO-led protection operation. And it is dangerous. If
the US telegraphs to the 
world that it is terrified of suffering casualties, as
it did in Somalia in
1993, it puts a bull's-eye on the chest of American
troops around the world
and severely hamstrings foreign policy.
 
US troops are not cowards. Tens of thousands sleep
near their gas masks in
Korea, maintaining a still-tense cease-fire. Thousands
patrol the Persian Gulf, 
where war and terrorist attacks have claimed American
lives on several occasions
in the last decade. Dozens lose their lives every year
in training and
operational accidents simply because they are using
dangerous equipment or
carrying out other risky activities in difficult
environments. They are capable 
of facing down stone-throwing Serbs and  Albanians, 
and if they're needed for
that mission, they should be sent.
 
That does not mean troops should be asked to do the
impossible, or to take
unnecessary risks. Some want NATO troops to do
whatever it takes to allow
 Albanians  and Serbs to live together peacefully,
protecting isolated pockets
of citizens wherever they are in the ethnic minority,
or searching
house-to-house for weapons in a massive disarmament
effort. These ideas are
unrealistic.
 
Kosovo, for all the distance it has come since June,
is a recent combat zone in 
a war that stoked ethnic passions and left many
thousands dead. Neither US
troops, nor UN police, nor any other external
assistance can change these facts 
overnight. But even if international forces cannot
make Kosovo a harmonious
multiethnic society, they must continue to keep it
stable.
 
That is where the allies come in, too. Their recent
troop cutbacks - 12,000 out 
of a total KFOR force of 50,000 - are a bad idea. KFOR
must remain strong enough
that extremists within Kosovo aren't tempted to test
it. It also needs to remain
strong enough to deter Serbia. After all, Slobodan
Milosevic's military and
police forces outnumber NATO troops - three to one -
even when KFOR is at full
strength. Given KFOR's superior forces, and Serbia's
awareness that NATO would
send reinforcements if trouble began, KFOR's numerical
disadvantage is
acceptable - but that doesn't mean we should cut
forces further.
 
Recent problems aside, things are going reasonably
well in Kosovo. But that's no
reason to get careless, or tempt fate.
 
*Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings
Institution, is co-author of
the forthcoming book, 'Winning Ugly: NATO's War to
Save Kosovo' (Brookings).
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