[ALBSA-Info] Only Independence Will Work: Noel Malcolm

[Sorkadh Mustafa]

     (The article below originally appeared in The National Interest
-Winter 1998/99)

      

     Kosovo: Only Independence Will Work

     by Noel Malcolm, author of Kosovo: A Short History (New York
University Press, 1998)

         If Flaubert were alive today, he would be taking a special
interest in Western
     policy on the Balkans. He was always fascinated by a certain kind of
accepted
     wisdom, which shades off into platitudes, cliches, and expressions of
sheer stupidity
     -- what he lovingly described as la betise. An updated version of his
Dictionary of
     Received Ideas would have to include several new entries derived from
Western
     policymakers during the Bosnian war: "Balkan people: full of ancient
ethnic hatreds.
     Cannot stop fighting one another." "NATO air strikes: completely
ineffective without
     the deployment of hundreds of thousands of NATO ground troops."
"Arming the victims:
     creates a level killing field. Only prolongs the war", and so on.

         More recent events would have added a couple of new entries:
"Kosova, autonomy
     of: must be restored." "Kosova, independence of: dangerous and
destabilizing; would
     lead to new Balkan war." These two received ideas are constantly
affirmed by our
     politicians and diplomats; the moe they are repeated, the less often
anyone pauses
     to question their truth. How could a policy assumption be wrong, when
the foreign
     ministry of every major power in the West is agreed about it? The
Bosnian
     experience suggests that the answer to that question is: very easily.
Some serious
     thinking is needed about the possibility of independence as a
long-term solution for
     Kosovo. If, as I believe, the foreign policy establishment has got
this issue completely
     wrong, the consequences, in terms of Balkan instability and costly
Western
     involvement -- to say nothing of the lives of thousands of the local
inhabitants --
     could be severe.

         Already, the West's insistence that autonomy is the only solution
has generated
     problems, both for Western diplomacy and for the Kosovo Albanians.
Despite the
     self-congratulatory spin that Western governments put on Richard
Holbrooke's
     October agreement with Slobodan Milosevic, it is clear that major
concessions were
     made to the Yugoslav president. (Perhaps the most important was the
abondonment
     of plans to have NATO-controlled observers backed up by NATO
firepower; instead,
     the unarmed observers are controlled by the OSCE, a notoriously
toothless,
     amorphous, and politically manipulable body.)

         Holbrooke was in fact in a very weak negotiating position. The
message his
     political masters were sending to Milosevic was: "We shall attack
your forces in
     Kosovo, going to war, in effect, on behalf of the Albanians against
you -- and then,
     when we have defeated your army, we shall turn around to the
Albanains and tell
     them to go back under your rule, with a little regional autonomy to
keep them
     happy." Milosevic must have known that this was illogical, and
therefore he must
     also have known that the threat of military action could be heavily
discounted.

         Now that the deal has gone through, however, the illogicality is
simply transferred
     to the West's dealings with the Kosovo Albanians. For more than six
months
     American diplomats were preoccupied with getting the Albanians to
form a united
     negotiating front. After the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement was
signed, the
     diplomats' aim has been to persuade those Albanians to negotiate for
autonomy, and
     nothing more. But since the vast majority of Albanians in Kosovo want
independence
     (having voted massively for it in an unofficial referendum as long
ago as 1991), any
     local politician who signs up to mere autonomy now will be
discredited, and perhaps
     even targeted in the first stirrings of a potential civil war. By
insisting on a
     commitment to autonomy, Western diplomats will polarize Kosovan
politics and
     undermine precisely those moderate Kosovo Albanian politicians whose
role they
     most need to strengthen. It looks like a new application of the
principle of "divide and
     rule": the West gets to divide the Kosovo Albanians, and Milosevcic
gets to rule them.

         The way out of these immediate problems, and the way toward a
genuine,
     long-term settlement, lies in rethinking, from first principles, the
accepted
     arguments on autonomy and independence. These can be divided broadly
into two
     categories: arguments about the intrinsic justifiability of
independence, and
     arguments about its consequences. Let us take the intrinsic arguments
first.

         The main claim here is that Kosovo simply has no right, in
constitutional or
     international law, to independence. The outside world has recognized
(in, for
     examople, the wording of Security Council Resolution 1199) that
Kosovo forms part of
     the territory of a sovereign Yugoslav state; and as the diplomats
never tire of
     repeating, the West is not in favor of changes to international
borders. But these
     objections are precisely the ones that were made in 1991, when
Slovenia and
     Croatia demanded independence. Eventually Western governments
recognized those
     countries, having discovered that this involved not so much a change
of borders as a
     change in the staus of existing borders; the lines on the map
remained the same,
     but their status was upgraded from republican to national.

         Could Kosovo qualify for the same treatment? The answer, in terms
of
     consitutional and international law, is that it could -- and, indeed,
that it should
     have been offered independence when the old Yugoslavia broke up in
1991-92.
     Under the Yugoslav constitution of 1974 Kosovo was equivalent in most
ways to
     Slovenia, Croatia, and the other republics. True, its position -- as
an "autonomous
     province" -- was not identical to theirs; in theory, it had dual
status, being defined
     both as a component of the republic of Serbia and as a component of
the federal
     Yugoslavia. But in practice it exercised the same powers as a
republic, having its
     own parliament, high courts, central bank, police service, and
territorial defense
     force; it was formally defined (from 1968 onwards) as part of the
federal system, and
     it was represented directly -- not via the Republic of Serbia -- at
the federal level. By
     all normal criteria of constitutional analysis, Kosovo was primarily
a federal unit,
     and only very secondarily a component of Serbia.

         In 1991 the European Community set up a committee of jurists, the
Badminter
     Commmission, to advise it on the break-up of Yugoslavia. The
commission's key
     finding was that the whole federal system was in a process of
"dissolution." In other
     words, what happened when Slovenia and Croatia became independent was
not
     secession, not the falling away of a few branches from a continuing
trunk; rather,
     the whole federal state dissolved into its constituent units. (The
present-day
     "Yugoslavia" is not the continuation of the old Yugoslavia, but a new
state, formed by
     the coming together of two units, Serbia and Montenegro.)
Unfortunately, the
     Badminter Commission never said which units were the constituent
ones, and
     Western governments simply made a policy decision to regard only the
six republics
     as such -- thus treating Kosovo as a wholly owned subsidiary of
Serbia. Possibly they
     were influenced by the fact that, by this stage, Milosevic had
already stripped away
     Kosovo's autonomous powers. But if Serbia's right to rule Kosovo is
to be based on the
     mere fact that Milosevic had downgraded its status just efore the
break-up of
     Yugoslavia, it will rest on very shaky foundations, as the relevent
constitutional
     changes were pushed through under extreme duress, with tanks in the
streets and
     war planes roaring overhead.

         The other intrinsic argument against independence for Kosovo is
historical, not
     legal. Most Western diplomats seem to believe that Kosovo is an
essential part of
     historic Serbian state territory, so that to remove it would be as
bizarre as separating
     Yorkshire from England. This argument too is false.

         Kosovo was not, as Serbs claim, the "birthplace" or "cradle" of
the Serb nation, and
     it came under Serb rule for only the last part of the medieval
period. Since then it
     has been excluded from any Serb or Yugoslav state for more than 400
out of the last
     500 years. It was conquered (but not legally annexed) by Serbia in
1912, against the
     wishes of the local Albanian majority population, and it became part
of a Yugoslav
     kingdom (not a Serbian one) after 1918. In other words, out iof the
entire span of
     modern history, Kosovo has been ruled by Belgrade for less than a
single lifetime.

         Of course it is true that the national mythology of Serbia -- a
mythology developed
     largely by nineteenth-century ideologists -- sets great store by the
historic
     importance of Kosovo, thanks to the famous battle of 1389 and the
presence of some
     important medieval monasteries, including the Patriarchate. But
modern political
     geography cannot be determined by old battlefields, however
symbolically charged
     they may be by the defeats incurred at them; if that were so, France
would claim
     Waterloo, and Germany Stalingrad. Similarly, if modern borders had to
bow to
     religious history, Kiev would be part of Russia and Istanbul part of
Greece. Any
     independence deal for Kosovo would naturally have to include
guarantees on the
     protection of cultural and religious sites; but that is a separate
issue, and not such a
     hard one to resolve.

         Aside from those intrinsic arguments, the Western diplomats also
argue against
     independence for Kosovo on the grounds that it would set risky
precedents or have
     dangerous consequences. A common claim is that if Kosovo gained
independence,
     the Serb-ruled half of Bosnia, Republika Srpska, would also be
entitled to break away
     from Bosnia. As Warren Zimmerman recently noted in these pages, "U.S.
officials
     are particularly worried that Western acceptance of an independent
'Kosova' would
     destroy the Dayton agreement on Bosnia, which is based on
integration, not
     separation" (Summer 1998).

         But those offcials are making a completely false parallel between
the two cases.
     As explained above, Kosovo's independent statehood would be based on
the fact that
     it -- just like Bosnia -- had been a unit of the old federal
Yugoslavia; Republika
     Srpska never was such a unit, and indeed was granted legal status for
the first time
     only in 1995, on the strict condition that it remain part of the
sovereign Bosnian
     state. For most of modern history the territory of Republika Srpska
has been an
     integral part of a Bosnian entity, whereas Kosovo has been legally
attached to a
     Serbian entity only for the last fifty-three years.

         The other arguments involving precedents or consequences is about
Macedonia,
     which has its own large Albanian minority. It is said that
independence for Kosovo
     would encourage the Macedonian Albanians to carve off a territory of
their own from
     the Macedonian state. In fact, the leading Albanian politicians in
Macedonia make no
     linkage between independence for Kosovo, which they support, and a
carve-up of
     Macedonia, which they do not want. One obvious reason why they do not
want it is
     that more than 200,000 Albanians live in the capital, Skopje, which
would certainly
     be left in the Slav half of any partitioned Macedonia.

         But there is a different and real danger. A long, simmering
confict in Kosovo
     would gradually radicalize the Albanians of Macedonia, as their young
men crossed
     the mountains to fight. Some of them would return home imbued with
the wild
     rhetoric of "Greater Albania", which certainly exists in some
branches of the Kosovo
     Liberation Army. Such radicalization would undermine the responsible
political
     leadership that represents the Macedonian Albanians today;
eventually, fighting
     could develop in Macedonia too. And the cause of this radicalization
process -- a long,
     simemring conflict in Kosovo -- is precisely what Western policy
guarantees when it
     denies to the Kosovars the one thing, independence, for which they
are still
     determined to fight. Thus Western policy, which aims above all at
preventing the
     destabilization of Macedonia, will create precisely the outcome it
most fears.

         What, THEN, can be done? Independence cannot come immediately to
Kosovo;
     that would be too much of a shock to Serb pride, and would provoke a
violent
     response. In the very long term, however, Kosovo will certainly be
separated from
     Serbia; even some Serb nationalists concede this, when they compare
birth rates
     and calculate that Albanians will outnumber Serbs in the whole of
Serbia by the
     mid-twenty-first century. The solution, then, must lie in the
medium-term --
     something along the lines of the settlement that ended the war in
Chechnya, with a
     long interim period of autonomy leading finally to full
self-determination.
     Conditionality could be built into such an agreement: to qualify for
the eventual move
     to independence the autonomous Kosovo would have to satisfy key
conditions, such
     as respecting the rights of the Serb minority and abandoning any
territorial
     ambitions outside the present Kosovan borders. Such a solution would
restore
     authority to the moderate Albanian political leaders, drawing supprt
back toward
     them and away from the hardliners in the Kosovo Liberation Army. The
continuation
     of the West's present policy on the other hand, far from solving
Kosovo's problems,
     will only make them and those of the whole Balkan region -- far more
lethally
     insoluble in the future.