[ALBSA-Info] LA Times

[Agron Alibali]

Los Angeles Times 

December 17, 2000, Sunday, Home Edition 

Opinion; Part M; Page 2; Opinion Desk 


THE PERILS OF STIFLING SELF-DETERMINATION 

Susan Blaustein, Susan Blaustein is a freelance writer
and senior consultant for the, International Crisis
Group  


WASHINGTON 


In its understandable rush to embrace Belgrade after
the ouster of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic in
October, the West has all but abandoned its friends in
Montenegro and Kosovo as they attempt to redefine
their respective relationships to Serbia and the new
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 

Western governments' and international organizations'
rapid recognition of and promises of aid to Yugoslavia
reflect their desire to bolster Serb democratic forces
in anticipation of Serbian elections on Dec. 23. But
after supporting the democratic Montenegrin government
in its struggle against Milosevic and after mobilizing
NATO forces to reverse the expulsion of Albanians from
Kosovo, the international community now seems prepared
to block the long-sought goal of each province:
independence. Chris Patten, a top European Union
official, has categorically dismissed the possibility
of full independence for Kosovo, and the Clinton
administration briefly threatened to suspend aid to
Montenegro because its president planned an early
referendum on the question of independence. 

There are, to be sure, good reasons for the West's
approach. Most crucial, should Montenegro secede,
Yugoslavia--and Vojislav Kostunica's job as
president--would cease to exist. This, in turn, would
effectively mean independence for Kosovo, since, under
the 1999 U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing
the international presence there, the province must
remain within Yugoslavia, but not necessarily within
Serbia. 

But other dominoes could fall. Independence drives in
either Montenegro or Kosovo could encourage
hard-liners in Bosnia's Republika Srpska--the half of
Bosnia-Herzegovina from which virtually all non-Serbs
were "cleansed" during the Bosnian war--to hold out
for their own independence. This could spark efforts
for reunification with Serbia, a move that would quash
all hope for an ethnically reintegrated
Bosnia-Herzegovina and would risk renewed conflict. 

While these are important arguments for holding Humpty
Dumpty together, the reality is, "the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia" is a Milosevic-forged fiction that,
like the rest of his regime, should be junked. Kosovo
Albanians have sworn never to return to Serbian rule;
the message of their local elections in November was
independence, independence, independence.
Montenegrins, for their part, know well that their
interests, aspirations and elected representatives are
taken far less seriously than those of the Serbs. 

Serbia certainly needs Western support to consolidate
its democracy and strengthen its civil society. But
leaders of Western democracies must acknowledge that
neither Yugoslavia nor Serbia can be truly democratic
as long as their leaders insist on holding onto
territories whose populations seek independence.
Governing nearly 2 million hostile Albanians, some of
whom refuse to renounce violence to achieve their end,
imperils the Serbs' priorities to rebuild their
economy and become a "normal" European country.
Montenegro will continue to chafe under the domination
of its far larger, more chauvinistic neighbor. And
Kostunica's high-profile support for the extreme
nationalist Bosnian Serb party of Radovan Karadzic
encourages such nationalists to ply their separatist
agenda. 

Continued Western denial of these realities can only
result in renewed instability and outbreaks of
violence in Yugoslavia, Bosnia and throughout the
region. Already, a shadowy group of Kosovo Albanian
guerrillas has staged a series of cross-border attacks
on Serbian police in southern Serbia; Kostunica and
other Serbian leaders have responded with threats of
"a new war," and Serbian tanks and paramilitary units
have reportedly moved into the area. 

Instead of attempting to orchestrate the ultimate
shape of and relations among Serbia, Montenegro and
Kosovo, the West should step back and allow leaders of
these entities to negotiate their own futures. Once
this month's Serbian legislative elections are over,
Montenegrin and Serbian leaders plan to work out
details of a more fruitful association. Western allies
should be grateful and not interfere. They should
continue to focus on helping Montenegrins strengthen
their democratic institutions and implement
much-needed economic reform. 

In Kosovo, a date must be set now for parliamentary
elections, so its elected officials can similarly
engage the new Serbian leadership. Since Serb
politicians appear unwilling to yield Kosovo to
Kosovars, these negotiations are likely to be
contentious and may thus require international
interlocutors. Yet, the West should not attempt to
forestall the process of self-determination. Rather,
by allowing Kosovars to elect their own leaders and by
establishing a clear set of prerequisites--respect for
minority rights and the rule of law--it should create
the conditions for self-determination to unfold
peacefully. 

Finally, the new Serb leaders must be reminded of
their international obligations. As part of the Dayton
peace accord that ended the Bosnian war in 1995,
Yugoslavia agreed to respect international borders,
facilitate the voluntary return of refugees to their
homes and cooperate fully with the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in The
Hague by turning over all indictees and evidence of
war crimes. 

The U.S. has been more vigilant on these issues than
have its European allies and lead international
organizations. Congress rightly conditioned future
assistance to Serbia on compliance with The Hague
tribunal. This week, President Bill Clinton is
expected to sign an executive order freezing the
assets of all indicted war criminals and close
Milosevic associates. In contrast, the EU, in
deference to a request by the Kostunica government,
has removed a number of Milosevic henchmen and alleged
war criminals from its visa-ban list. Europe's offer
of assistance to the new Yugoslavia was unconditional,
as was Yugoslavia's lightning-paced admission to the
United Nations and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. Such preferential treatment has
aroused resentment in neighboring countries, which
enjoyed no such honeymoon or pledges of cash as they
navigated their own difficult transitions out of
communism or authoritarianism. 

Yugoslavia's failure to comply with The Hague tribunal
risks undermining that court's credibility at this
critical juncture. It lends credence to Kostunica's
often-repeated claim that the tribunal is an
instrument of U.S. foreign policy that proved useful
in marginalizing Milosevic but can be jettisoned
without consequence. The West's failure to insist on
the authority of the U.N.-mandated judicial body would
not only represent a catastrophic setback for
international humanitarian law after the remarkable
advances made within the past decade. It would also
ensure that "the new Serbia" would look much like the
old: a safe haven for indicted war criminals and a
place where Serbs can avoid confronting the multitude
of crimes committed against non-Serbs in their name. *



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