[AKI-News] AKI COMMENT- FINALLY THE ISSUE OF STATUS BEGINS TO INCH FORWARD

[Advocates for Kosova Independence]

AKI (ADVOCATES FOR KOSOVA'S INDEPENDENCE)
January 8, 2003


         AKI COMMENT- FINALLY THE ISSUE OF STATUS BEGINS TO INCH FORWARD

In six months, it will be four years since the establishment of the UN
mission in Kosova. Still there is no roadmap for the process to resolve the
final status of Kosova, not even from Kosova's Albanians. What is the point
of developing institutions needed to run a temporary protectorate that in
reality has no legal future? How can an economy ever be developed in such a
situation? If Kosova remains underdeveloped and unmodernized, as it was
under FRY rule and continues so under UN rule, how does this contribute to
stabilization in the region? These questions have been repeatedly asked by
the Goldstone Commission, the US Institute of Peace, and thoughtful
citizens. The trouble is--there are no answers, no solutions, no
vision--which means that sooner or later the people will have to demand
change. Sonja Biserko's powerful statement included here is well worth
reading for all those who watch the region with concern and interest. It is
our opinion that the needs of the people be of primary concern in settling
the Kosova problem of final status.

Included in this AKI newsletter--
   1. A NEED FOR A HISTORIC SERBIAN-ALBANIAN AGREEMENT (S. BISERKO)
   2. KOHA DITORE INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER BAJRAM REXHEPI


Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi    1/2/03--

"It is not the mandate of the Resolution(1244) to determine the final
definition of Kosova¹s status, but to prepare it for that. The Security
Council is not the only mechanism that should define the status of Kosova
and decide in the name of Kosova without consulting the will of Kosova
citizens."-- 

(Koha Ditore Interview below, following the Biserko article)


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            A NEED FOR A HISTORIC SERBIAN-ALBANIAN AGREEMENT

by Sonja Biserko
distributed by Balkan Human Rights List


When it comes to the Balkans, the status of Kosovo has been turning into a
key topic of international circles in the West. The issue is being referred
to as crucial to the stability of the entire region. This is why the West
the USA in particular has been ever more openly signaling Belgrade its
expectation to see a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina opened.

Belgrade has met a U-turn as such in the West's attitude with a dose of
nervousness, since national strategists take that the status for Kosovo
should be solved gradually and through implementation of standards enabling
the return of Serbs. In his capacity as head of the Coordinating Committee,
Nebojsa Covic keeps saying, "Speeding up of a solution to the Kosovo status
would further deepen political instability" and "Calls for a hasty solution
are nothing but typical petty politics." However, aware of the pressure from
the USA, he announced "a dialogue-oriented s"rategy"for early January 2003
and said he saw prospects for Kosovo within 
integration of the entire
region," with Kosovska Mitrovica as "a single town including three
municipalities."

Over past three years Belgrade's Kosovo policy has been the one of
hypocrisy and inconsistency On the one hand Belgrade has laid claim to
Kosovo, while being focused on Kosovo's division and, as Covic put it,
"functional ties with Serbia" on the other. This is about a well-known
discourse sourcing from Branislav Krstic's plans for the division of Kosovo
Terms he uses are just being adjusted to the time they come handy. The
fact is that a part of the DOS coalition has never discontinued Milosevic's
policy when it comes to a national program and has been looking forward to
"a change in international circumstances" that would make it possible to
establish a "small Greater Serbia" at least. Illusions of unified Serbian
territories encompassing Republika Srpska, Montenegro, a part of Kosovo
and, if possible, a part of Macedonia as well still persist.  Recent
Djindji's statement  to Der Spiegel that if Kosovo Albanians continue to
insist on the independence, Belgrade will call for the holding of a new
Dayton conference because in that case borders in the region will have to
be redefined is most illustrative.

The same as refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo Serbs are just tools
of Belgrade's policy. Shortly after NATO intervention, historian Dusan
Batakovic said Serbs had spontaneously organized themselves in cantons,a
definition the official Belgrade has been insisting on over past three
years. Actually, it has been insisting on Serbs' return to Kosovo and, at
the same time, criticizing the international community for its incompetence
in securing more favorable conditions for their return. Interestingly,
Belgrade authorities have never staged a similar campaign when it came to
Serb refugees from Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Namely, they have never
given up the idea about an ethnically pure state, something that by itself
stands for Serbia's major problem when one bears in mind its demographic
structure. In spite of the policy of silent ethnic cleansing in Milosevic's
era (e.g. Bosniaks from Sandzak were kidnapped, killed or expelled from
villages bordering Bosnia; Croats were expelled from the village of
Hrtkovci, as well as those bordering on Croatia; and, once NATO
intervention was over, Albanians in South Serbia were pressed to leave
their homes), Serbia's population still includes over 25 percent of people
coming from ethnic minorities, which hardly suits the concept for an
ethnically pure state. Apart from members of minority groups, Serbs have
emigrated from Serbia for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, the
inflow of refugees has not contributed to a more favorable ethnic structure.

Speaking about the return of Kosovo refugees, in its recently published
report the International Crisis Group has also noted that a major progress
in the return of displaced persons to Kosovo in near future was hardly
probable. The report pinpoints the fact that neither President Rugova has
taken an active part in efforts aimed at the return of displaced
persons. According to the report, Belgrade wants to profit from the issue
of displaced persons to have Kosovo divided. Kosovo Serbs are frustrated
with good reason. Firstly, they have lost power and then the rest. However,
their power has been based on force, rather than democracy. This is why
their today's idea about the return goes hand in hand with the return of
the Yugoslav Army and the police.

And yet, some circles in Serbia are fully aware of the fact that Kosovo is
a lost cause. According to Miodrag Mitic, former legal adviser in the
Foreign Ministry, "Serbia has missed the opportunity to win a legal battle
for its south province. Even should Kosovo be a constituent part of the
federation," says Mitic, "one million and five hundred thousand Albanians
would oppose a state as such. The option of keeping the entire Kosovo
within Serbia is not a good choice. We have made a mistake for not having
kept the part inhabited by Serbs, along with industries and holy places,
while giving up the rest. We could have spared ourselves the trouble of
Rambouillet, NATO, Haekkerup or Steiner. Actually, this is what Cosic has
been advocating for long, along with the notion that Serbia would be
getting a better part in return Vojvodina." Recently, Ceda Antic, young
historian and former student leader, has gone public with the thesis about
a necessity to make "an epochal agreement with Albanian population in
Kosovo and Metohija," i.e. a "territory for peace" agreement of sorts. In
his view, Serbia should thoroughly consider its possible relationship with
"the territory marked by deep internal instability and demographic
progression it simply cannot match."

For Serbian public, the Kosovo question is an emotional issue, an issue that
is being skillfully manipulated with. Few are those who genuinely see
Kosovo as a part of Serbia. However, while still insisting on its division,
national strategists keep ignoring that the latter would open the problem
of South Serbia. Daniel Server of the Institute for Peace says, "In my
view, Serbs and Albanians would hardly reach an agreement on the division,
given that Albanians would want a part of the Presevo Valley in return for
Kosovska Mitrovica, which would be a dangerous precedent." As for the
Yugoslav Army, giving up the Presevo Valley would stand for a strategic
loss, since access to the Vardar Valley is thus being denied. Professor
Milorad Ekmecic calls the Vardar Valley "a key to the Balkans" and says,
"Whoever controls the Vardar Valley is a Balkan hegemonist." All these
theses associate the 19th century logic. Nevertheless, guided by this very
logic Serbia has suffered a historic defeat, the one with an epilogue in
The Hague Tribunal.

A solution to the Kosovo status also affects the Serbian-Montenegrin
Constitutional Charter, should the latter ever come into effect. The Kosovo
government has already turned down the Constitutional Charter defining
Kosovo as a constituent part of Serbia. Besides, a new constitution of
Serbia on horizon, probably will have to solve the same,
what-about-Kosovo problem. Since the UN Resolution 1244 defines Kosovo as a
part of the FRY, the disintegration of the latter would open the question
of the status for Kosovo as well. A variety of solutions may derive from
such context, independence included.

To all appearances, the problem of the status for Kosovo will open as soon
as early 2003. This is why the official visit of a Serbian delegation to
Tirana does not come as a surprise, even though no delegation as such has
ever been to Pristina. A thorough analysis will show that Serbia has never
stopped looking for a counterpart in the Greater Serbia (nowadays small
Greater Serbia) project for its Greater Albania partner. But, the fact is,
regardless of what true motives might be that Belgrade is late: it is
about a historic delay. Belgrade has definitely missed the opportunity to
make a historic agreement with Albanians, an expanding nation that
displayed vitality and aspiration to get emancipated. Serbs have demonized
and belittled Albanians instead. Today, this is an almost insurmountable
obstacle to confidence-building between the two communities and to the
return of Serbs for that matter.

Bearing in mind the actual situation and Albanians, bitter experience when
it comes to Serbs, I am afraid there is only one chance for Serbs to make a
historic agreement with Albanians. This solitary chance, I deeply believe,
is to be tracked down in a support to their independence. A gesture as such
would create conditions for these two nations to become partners and, after
a century long intolerance, neighbors with shared interests: a democracy
focused on adequate position for minorities, anti-crime struggle and
association with the European Union.


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                  Interview With Kosova Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi
B. Sylejmani
02 Jan (Koha Ditore) ­ Q: You are saying that the status should be defined
within several years, but could Kosova fulfill the standards until then?

Rexhepi: Standards! This is a very current topic. We have another position,
which is not much in contradiction with Steiner¹s, but it is the issue of
the timing when these standards should be fulfilled. We have included a good
part of them in our government program. We should mark progress in all
fields, democracy, security, law and order, freedom and movementŠ this is in
our interest. However, some things, some standards could be accomplished
even after the definition of the status. Our ambitions are to be part of EU
in the near future, maybe within five, ten or fifteen years and advance
these standards to become EU members. The saying ³standards before the
status² is unacceptable for us. These are several undefined issues, which
are similar to an elastic band that could be pulled as much as they want. At
the moment when you come close to several achievements, respectively near
the status, then the elastic band could be stretched more, depending on the
situation and political will. Then they say that the standards are not
fulfilled. With reservations I am saying that by doing so, the issue of the
definition of the status could be prolonged infinitely. We are interested in
the standards, but Kosova¹s status cannot depend on them and another
important issue exists here. Most of the standards are a reserved part of
UNMIK chief; therefore in order to accomplish them maybe we should request
from UNMIK to realize them together with us and not make us responsible for
that when it is known that we do not have the authority. It is here that the
hypocrisy of UNMIK and many other internationals lie. In reality, we do not
have enough authority to prove that we can make progress, whereas the
results are required from us. If something shows progress then that is
attributed to UNMIK and if something goes wrong then we are a reserve staff
to blame. 

Q: Is this being done to delay the final definition of the status of Kosova?

Rexhepi: I do not have a paranoid idea, but this is moving to that
direction: to diminish the issue of the final status of Kosova and to create
an opinion to the citizens that we are yet not ready for this. Now, the
request of Serbia and many other neighboring countries, which do not want an
independent Kosova, is known on this case and many international countries
participate in this as well. These countries implement these requests
through different ways; they delay the status of Kosova even through the
standards. 

Q: How do you see the procedure for the final definition of the status and
creation of the state of Kosova?

Rexhepi: There are many alternatives. The saying that this is the right of
the UN Security Council and Resolution 1244 does not stand. The mandate of
1244 is to prepare functional institutions and within a determined time to
define the status of Kosova, which means that this is an open issue. It is
not the mandate of the Resolution to determine the final definition of
Kosova¹s status, but to prepare it for that. The Security Council is not the
only mechanism that should define the status of Kosova and decide in the
name of Kosova without consulting the will of Kosova citizens. There are
different mechanisms but they could be changed depending on the approach of
the issue. 

Q: What approach? 

Rexhepi: To my opinion we should gradually create our constitution and set
several time limits for the work that should be accomplished. It is
important that we make this constitution in the parliament and take the
responsibility on what we should accomplish through a certain timeframe. We
should also prepare the referendum, which is one of the basic human rights.
On this occasion I want to express my belief that Kosova¹s status cannot be
solved without the assistance of the US. Therefore, the US, together with EU
is needed. I think that this should be accomplished through the Contact
Group that they should create or G8. These are the mechanisms that should be
involved in the realization of the status, which should organize a
conference, but the Americans and EU should have the leading role.

Q: Where is the role of Belgrade in all this issue.

Rexhepi: Belgrade and other neighbors can participate in discussions, but
they cannot use the veto or obstruct the process. We cannot bypass Belgrade
completely, but the decision is not made over there and it would be a
product of Kosovars and internationals. Belgrade could be an interested
country as well as Macedonia, Albania and all other neighbors. We should
have good relations with all of our neighbors, because it is not in our
interest to remain isolated.

Q: This means that the direct dialogue with Belgrade is out of question?

Rexhepi: I have expressed my opinion that such a dialogue is needed very
much. If it were possible to solve this issue through a direct dialogue then
we would not have caused trouble to international community. The time in the
past has showed that we could not accomplish anything in that way,
especially after the last war where our requests are polarized much more. We
could talk for 20 years and still not solve the problems without the active
mediation of internationals.

Q: How much could the issue of Mitrovica influence the final status of
Kosova? 

Rexhepi: It is true that many issues including the status of Kosova are
related to Mitrovica and the northern part. It is clear that the tendencies
of many Serb leaders in Kosova and Serbia are to divide Kosova, its northern
part. They have ambitions for other parts as well, such as Peja and Dardanë
regions. As soon as the issue of Mitrovica is solved and falls under the
administration of UNMIK and Kosova institutions, the easier would be the
definition of Kosova status.

Q: But, Steiner united Mitrovica?

Rexhepi: Formally yes. However, to put this into practice much work is
needed and we should not be euphoric on this. It is a positive step that
Steiner really did carry out. He created a perspective for reintegration,
but we are far from saying that everything is accomplished. Visits of these
leaders made each time to Belgrade, new ideas, other ways, not for
integration but for separation of Kosova or its enclavisation are a proof
that this is not an easy process.

Q: When you mention enclavisation do you think of the proposed
decentralization? 

Rexhepi: Decentralization is a process, but the way it was proposed by them,
to create new enclaves and mono-ethnic municipalities, is unacceptable to
us. We said this very clearly. We declared that it should be applied all
over Kosova and not based on ethnic backgrounds. The stipulations of
decentralization should be discussed more between our institutions, let the
experts give their opinions, organize public debates and address the issue
at the parliament. However, there are two issues: a priority for us is to
transfer the authorities from the regulation 2000/45 to the municipal level.
It is much more a priority to transfer the authorities to local institutions
than transferring them from the central to lower levels.

Q: Will you request authority for KPS and TMK too?

Rexhepi: Firstly we are interested in transferring economic authorities.
Here is the greatest confusion, where the monopoly imposed by internationals
to stay in the situation that we are at right now has no perspective. The
greatest confrontation would take place in this field. There is no political
reason on this issue, but this takes place because of the bureaucracy that
wants to stay here as long as possible. As for the KPS, we will continue to
request authorities. This is being developed through a predicted dynamics,
but it should happen much more quickly because KPS has proved itself. Even
with these few authorities KPS in many cases proved to be more efficient
than the international police. So, concerning KPS I do not expect any major
problems in transfer of authority. The major problem is the TMK issue. I
have received a project presented by Mr. Çeku, for transformation of TMK to
Kosova¹s Defense Forces. I support this, because it is a healthy concept
that does not put anyone at risk, but adds to the security of the citizens
of Kosova. They could also take many responsibilities in the fight against
crime. It is good that this project is predicted to be integrated while the
internationals are here, so it could gradually be improved in accordance
with the regulations and standards in NATO.

Q: There is another project for TMK, that of the American Peace Institute.

Rexhepi: As much as I am informed, the Peace Institute has prepared such
strategy. I do not agree at all with that concept. However, I do not believe
that this is the official position of the Americans.

Q: Is the transfer of authorities being carried out as it was announced?

Rexhepi: It is much more slowly. We used to have ambitions that there would
be an increase in transfer of authority. I agreed that it should be
accomplished step by step, but with what dynamics? Several times I said, not
only to satisfy Steiner, who declared that he is ready for this, but the
structures under him, the Legal Office and the IV Pillar are the part of
that bureaucracy that are obstructing this transfer. They are interested in
holding the entire political as well as the economic monopoly as long as it
is possible. Therefore I am saying that in the year 2003 we would have huge
contradictions.