From aki at alb-net.com Wed Jan 8 15:15:53 2003 From: aki at alb-net.com (Advocates for Kosova Independence) Date: Wed, 08 Jan 2003 15:15:53 -0500 Subject: [AKI-News] AKI COMMENT- FINALLY THE ISSUE OF STATUS BEGINS TO INCH FORWARD In-Reply-To: <5.2.0.9.0.20030108184856.03da4758@mail.greekhelsinki.gr> Message-ID: AKI (ADVOCATES FOR KOSOVA'S INDEPENDENCE) January 8, 2003 AKI COMMENT- FINALLY THE ISSUE OF STATUS BEGINS TO INCH FORWARD In six months, it will be four years since the establishment of the UN mission in Kosova. Still there is no roadmap for the process to resolve the final status of Kosova, not even from Kosova's Albanians. What is the point of developing institutions needed to run a temporary protectorate that in reality has no legal future? How can an economy ever be developed in such a situation? If Kosova remains underdeveloped and unmodernized, as it was under FRY rule and continues so under UN rule, how does this contribute to stabilization in the region? These questions have been repeatedly asked by the Goldstone Commission, the US Institute of Peace, and thoughtful citizens. The trouble is--there are no answers, no solutions, no vision--which means that sooner or later the people will have to demand change. Sonja Biserko's powerful statement included here is well worth reading for all those who watch the region with concern and interest. It is our opinion that the needs of the people be of primary concern in settling the Kosova problem of final status. Included in this AKI newsletter-- 1. A NEED FOR A HISTORIC SERBIAN-ALBANIAN AGREEMENT (S. BISERKO) 2. KOHA DITORE INTERVIEW WITH PRIME MINISTER BAJRAM REXHEPI Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi 1/2/03-- "It is not the mandate of the Resolution(1244) to determine the final definition of Kosova?s status, but to prepare it for that. The Security Council is not the only mechanism that should define the status of Kosova and decide in the name of Kosova without consulting the will of Kosova citizens."-- (Koha Ditore Interview below, following the Biserko article) ******************************************** A NEED FOR A HISTORIC SERBIAN-ALBANIAN AGREEMENT by Sonja Biserko distributed by Balkan Human Rights List When it comes to the Balkans, the status of Kosovo has been turning into a key topic of international circles in the West. The issue is being referred to as crucial to the stability of the entire region. This is why the West the USA in particular has been ever more openly signaling Belgrade its expectation to see a dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina opened. Belgrade has met a U-turn as such in the West's attitude with a dose of nervousness, since national strategists take that the status for Kosovo should be solved gradually and through implementation of standards enabling the return of Serbs. In his capacity as head of the Coordinating Committee, Nebojsa Covic keeps saying, "Speeding up of a solution to the Kosovo status would further deepen political instability" and "Calls for a hasty solution are nothing but typical petty politics." However, aware of the pressure from the USA, he announced "a dialogue-oriented s"rategy"for early January 2003 and said he saw prospects for Kosovo within integration of the entire region," with Kosovska Mitrovica as "a single town including three municipalities." Over past three years Belgrade's Kosovo policy has been the one of hypocrisy and inconsistency On the one hand Belgrade has laid claim to Kosovo, while being focused on Kosovo's division and, as Covic put it, "functional ties with Serbia" on the other. This is about a well-known discourse sourcing from Branislav Krstic's plans for the division of Kosovo Terms he uses are just being adjusted to the time they come handy. The fact is that a part of the DOS coalition has never discontinued Milosevic's policy when it comes to a national program and has been looking forward to "a change in international circumstances" that would make it possible to establish a "small Greater Serbia" at least. Illusions of unified Serbian territories encompassing Republika Srpska, Montenegro, a part of Kosovo and, if possible, a part of Macedonia as well still persist. Recent Djindji's statement to Der Spiegel that if Kosovo Albanians continue to insist on the independence, Belgrade will call for the holding of a new Dayton conference because in that case borders in the region will have to be redefined is most illustrative. The same as refugees from Croatia and Bosnia, Kosovo Serbs are just tools of Belgrade's policy. Shortly after NATO intervention, historian Dusan Batakovic said Serbs had spontaneously organized themselves in cantons,a definition the official Belgrade has been insisting on over past three years. Actually, it has been insisting on Serbs' return to Kosovo and, at the same time, criticizing the international community for its incompetence in securing more favorable conditions for their return. Interestingly, Belgrade authorities have never staged a similar campaign when it came to Serb refugees from Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina. Namely, they have never given up the idea about an ethnically pure state, something that by itself stands for Serbia's major problem when one bears in mind its demographic structure. In spite of the policy of silent ethnic cleansing in Milosevic's era (e.g. Bosniaks from Sandzak were kidnapped, killed or expelled from villages bordering Bosnia; Croats were expelled from the village of Hrtkovci, as well as those bordering on Croatia; and, once NATO intervention was over, Albanians in South Serbia were pressed to leave their homes), Serbia's population still includes over 25 percent of people coming from ethnic minorities, which hardly suits the concept for an ethnically pure state. Apart from members of minority groups, Serbs have emigrated from Serbia for a variety of reasons. On the other hand, the inflow of refugees has not contributed to a more favorable ethnic structure. Speaking about the return of Kosovo refugees, in its recently published report the International Crisis Group has also noted that a major progress in the return of displaced persons to Kosovo in near future was hardly probable. The report pinpoints the fact that neither President Rugova has taken an active part in efforts aimed at the return of displaced persons. According to the report, Belgrade wants to profit from the issue of displaced persons to have Kosovo divided. Kosovo Serbs are frustrated with good reason. Firstly, they have lost power and then the rest. However, their power has been based on force, rather than democracy. This is why their today's idea about the return goes hand in hand with the return of the Yugoslav Army and the police. And yet, some circles in Serbia are fully aware of the fact that Kosovo is a lost cause. According to Miodrag Mitic, former legal adviser in the Foreign Ministry, "Serbia has missed the opportunity to win a legal battle for its south province. Even should Kosovo be a constituent part of the federation," says Mitic, "one million and five hundred thousand Albanians would oppose a state as such. The option of keeping the entire Kosovo within Serbia is not a good choice. We have made a mistake for not having kept the part inhabited by Serbs, along with industries and holy places, while giving up the rest. We could have spared ourselves the trouble of Rambouillet, NATO, Haekkerup or Steiner. Actually, this is what Cosic has been advocating for long, along with the notion that Serbia would be getting a better part in return Vojvodina." Recently, Ceda Antic, young historian and former student leader, has gone public with the thesis about a necessity to make "an epochal agreement with Albanian population in Kosovo and Metohija," i.e. a "territory for peace" agreement of sorts. In his view, Serbia should thoroughly consider its possible relationship with "the territory marked by deep internal instability and demographic progression it simply cannot match." For Serbian public, the Kosovo question is an emotional issue, an issue that is being skillfully manipulated with. Few are those who genuinely see Kosovo as a part of Serbia. However, while still insisting on its division, national strategists keep ignoring that the latter would open the problem of South Serbia. Daniel Server of the Institute for Peace says, "In my view, Serbs and Albanians would hardly reach an agreement on the division, given that Albanians would want a part of the Presevo Valley in return for Kosovska Mitrovica, which would be a dangerous precedent." As for the Yugoslav Army, giving up the Presevo Valley would stand for a strategic loss, since access to the Vardar Valley is thus being denied. Professor Milorad Ekmecic calls the Vardar Valley "a key to the Balkans" and says, "Whoever controls the Vardar Valley is a Balkan hegemonist." All these theses associate the 19th century logic. Nevertheless, guided by this very logic Serbia has suffered a historic defeat, the one with an epilogue in The Hague Tribunal. A solution to the Kosovo status also affects the Serbian-Montenegrin Constitutional Charter, should the latter ever come into effect. The Kosovo government has already turned down the Constitutional Charter defining Kosovo as a constituent part of Serbia. Besides, a new constitution of Serbia on horizon, probably will have to solve the same, what-about-Kosovo problem. Since the UN Resolution 1244 defines Kosovo as a part of the FRY, the disintegration of the latter would open the question of the status for Kosovo as well. A variety of solutions may derive from such context, independence included. To all appearances, the problem of the status for Kosovo will open as soon as early 2003. This is why the official visit of a Serbian delegation to Tirana does not come as a surprise, even though no delegation as such has ever been to Pristina. A thorough analysis will show that Serbia has never stopped looking for a counterpart in the Greater Serbia (nowadays small Greater Serbia) project for its Greater Albania partner. But, the fact is, regardless of what true motives might be that Belgrade is late: it is about a historic delay. Belgrade has definitely missed the opportunity to make a historic agreement with Albanians, an expanding nation that displayed vitality and aspiration to get emancipated. Serbs have demonized and belittled Albanians instead. Today, this is an almost insurmountable obstacle to confidence-building between the two communities and to the return of Serbs for that matter. Bearing in mind the actual situation and Albanians, bitter experience when it comes to Serbs, I am afraid there is only one chance for Serbs to make a historic agreement with Albanians. This solitary chance, I deeply believe, is to be tracked down in a support to their independence. A gesture as such would create conditions for these two nations to become partners and, after a century long intolerance, neighbors with shared interests: a democracy focused on adequate position for minorities, anti-crime struggle and association with the European Union. Balkan Human Rights List Subscribe: balkanhr-subscribe at yahoogroups.com ******************************************************* Interview With Kosova Prime Minister Bajram Rexhepi B. Sylejmani 02 Jan (Koha Ditore) ? Q: You are saying that the status should be defined within several years, but could Kosova fulfill the standards until then? Rexhepi: Standards! This is a very current topic. We have another position, which is not much in contradiction with Steiner?s, but it is the issue of the timing when these standards should be fulfilled. We have included a good part of them in our government program. We should mark progress in all fields, democracy, security, law and order, freedom and movement? this is in our interest. However, some things, some standards could be accomplished even after the definition of the status. Our ambitions are to be part of EU in the near future, maybe within five, ten or fifteen years and advance these standards to become EU members. The saying ?standards before the status? is unacceptable for us. These are several undefined issues, which are similar to an elastic band that could be pulled as much as they want. At the moment when you come close to several achievements, respectively near the status, then the elastic band could be stretched more, depending on the situation and political will. Then they say that the standards are not fulfilled. With reservations I am saying that by doing so, the issue of the definition of the status could be prolonged infinitely. We are interested in the standards, but Kosova?s status cannot depend on them and another important issue exists here. Most of the standards are a reserved part of UNMIK chief; therefore in order to accomplish them maybe we should request from UNMIK to realize them together with us and not make us responsible for that when it is known that we do not have the authority. It is here that the hypocrisy of UNMIK and many other internationals lie. In reality, we do not have enough authority to prove that we can make progress, whereas the results are required from us. If something shows progress then that is attributed to UNMIK and if something goes wrong then we are a reserve staff to blame. Q: Is this being done to delay the final definition of the status of Kosova? Rexhepi: I do not have a paranoid idea, but this is moving to that direction: to diminish the issue of the final status of Kosova and to create an opinion to the citizens that we are yet not ready for this. Now, the request of Serbia and many other neighboring countries, which do not want an independent Kosova, is known on this case and many international countries participate in this as well. These countries implement these requests through different ways; they delay the status of Kosova even through the standards. Q: How do you see the procedure for the final definition of the status and creation of the state of Kosova? Rexhepi: There are many alternatives. The saying that this is the right of the UN Security Council and Resolution 1244 does not stand. The mandate of 1244 is to prepare functional institutions and within a determined time to define the status of Kosova, which means that this is an open issue. It is not the mandate of the Resolution to determine the final definition of Kosova?s status, but to prepare it for that. The Security Council is not the only mechanism that should define the status of Kosova and decide in the name of Kosova without consulting the will of Kosova citizens. There are different mechanisms but they could be changed depending on the approach of the issue. Q: What approach? Rexhepi: To my opinion we should gradually create our constitution and set several time limits for the work that should be accomplished. It is important that we make this constitution in the parliament and take the responsibility on what we should accomplish through a certain timeframe. We should also prepare the referendum, which is one of the basic human rights. On this occasion I want to express my belief that Kosova?s status cannot be solved without the assistance of the US. Therefore, the US, together with EU is needed. I think that this should be accomplished through the Contact Group that they should create or G8. These are the mechanisms that should be involved in the realization of the status, which should organize a conference, but the Americans and EU should have the leading role. Q: Where is the role of Belgrade in all this issue. Rexhepi: Belgrade and other neighbors can participate in discussions, but they cannot use the veto or obstruct the process. We cannot bypass Belgrade completely, but the decision is not made over there and it would be a product of Kosovars and internationals. Belgrade could be an interested country as well as Macedonia, Albania and all other neighbors. We should have good relations with all of our neighbors, because it is not in our interest to remain isolated. Q: This means that the direct dialogue with Belgrade is out of question? Rexhepi: I have expressed my opinion that such a dialogue is needed very much. If it were possible to solve this issue through a direct dialogue then we would not have caused trouble to international community. The time in the past has showed that we could not accomplish anything in that way, especially after the last war where our requests are polarized much more. We could talk for 20 years and still not solve the problems without the active mediation of internationals. Q: How much could the issue of Mitrovica influence the final status of Kosova? Rexhepi: It is true that many issues including the status of Kosova are related to Mitrovica and the northern part. It is clear that the tendencies of many Serb leaders in Kosova and Serbia are to divide Kosova, its northern part. They have ambitions for other parts as well, such as Peja and Dardan? regions. As soon as the issue of Mitrovica is solved and falls under the administration of UNMIK and Kosova institutions, the easier would be the definition of Kosova status. Q: But, Steiner united Mitrovica? Rexhepi: Formally yes. However, to put this into practice much work is needed and we should not be euphoric on this. It is a positive step that Steiner really did carry out. He created a perspective for reintegration, but we are far from saying that everything is accomplished. Visits of these leaders made each time to Belgrade, new ideas, other ways, not for integration but for separation of Kosova or its enclavisation are a proof that this is not an easy process. Q: When you mention enclavisation do you think of the proposed decentralization? Rexhepi: Decentralization is a process, but the way it was proposed by them, to create new enclaves and mono-ethnic municipalities, is unacceptable to us. We said this very clearly. We declared that it should be applied all over Kosova and not based on ethnic backgrounds. The stipulations of decentralization should be discussed more between our institutions, let the experts give their opinions, organize public debates and address the issue at the parliament. However, there are two issues: a priority for us is to transfer the authorities from the regulation 2000/45 to the municipal level. It is much more a priority to transfer the authorities to local institutions than transferring them from the central to lower levels. Q: Will you request authority for KPS and TMK too? Rexhepi: Firstly we are interested in transferring economic authorities. Here is the greatest confusion, where the monopoly imposed by internationals to stay in the situation that we are at right now has no perspective. The greatest confrontation would take place in this field. There is no political reason on this issue, but this takes place because of the bureaucracy that wants to stay here as long as possible. As for the KPS, we will continue to request authorities. This is being developed through a predicted dynamics, but it should happen much more quickly because KPS has proved itself. Even with these few authorities KPS in many cases proved to be more efficient than the international police. So, concerning KPS I do not expect any major problems in transfer of authority. The major problem is the TMK issue. I have received a project presented by Mr. ?eku, for transformation of TMK to Kosova?s Defense Forces. I support this, because it is a healthy concept that does not put anyone at risk, but adds to the security of the citizens of Kosova. They could also take many responsibilities in the fight against crime. It is good that this project is predicted to be integrated while the internationals are here, so it could gradually be improved in accordance with the regulations and standards in NATO. Q: There is another project for TMK, that of the American Peace Institute. Rexhepi: As much as I am informed, the Peace Institute has prepared such strategy. I do not agree at all with that concept. However, I do not believe that this is the official position of the Americans. Q: Is the transfer of authorities being carried out as it was announced? Rexhepi: It is much more slowly. We used to have ambitions that there would be an increase in transfer of authority. I agreed that it should be accomplished step by step, but with what dynamics? Several times I said, not only to satisfy Steiner, who declared that he is ready for this, but the structures under him, the Legal Office and the IV Pillar are the part of that bureaucracy that are obstructing this transfer. They are interested in holding the entire political as well as the economic monopoly as long as it is possible. Therefore I am saying that in the year 2003 we would have huge contradictions. From aki at alb-net.com Thu Jan 9 15:45:40 2003 From: aki at alb-net.com (Advocates for Kosova Independence) Date: Thu, 09 Jan 2003 15:45:40 -0500 Subject: [AKI-News] AKI NEWSLETTER-- 1/9/03 Message-ID: AKI (ADVOCATES FOR KOSOVA'S INDEPENDENCE) JANUARY 9, 2003 PM Zoran Djindjic, "independence will no longer be a taboo subject". Der Speigel: Djindic Interview Kosovo: Serbs bet on pressure from Brussels For the first time Belgrade is ready to to talk with the Kosovo Albanians about the independence of the Yugoslav province. The Serbian government even wishes for a quick start for talks about the future status of the region, which is still a part of Yugoslavia according to UN Resolution 1244. At those talks, according to PM Zoran Djindjic, "independence will no longer be a taboo subject". In the first round of talks the different positions should be clarified, then a solution should be found with the help of international mediators. Here Djindjic is counting above all on pressure from the EU, which lately has wanted to prevent the complete independence of Kosovo. If, despite the exhortations of the Europeans, the Albanians were to push through their statehood, says the Serbian PM, then Brussels would also have to bear the consequences. Djindjic: "That would be a dangerous precedent for other peoples in the Balkans and would perhaps endanger peace in the multi-ethnic state of Bosnia." As a solution Djindjic proposes an arrangement of relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo which would resemble the Muslim-Croat Federation in Bosnia. There each community has jurisdiction over its own institutions.But it is hardly to be expected that the Albanians will agree to such proposals and abandon their independence demands. In this case Djindjic threatens to demand a new Dayton conference. Bosnia was divided up in that US city in 1995. Djindjic: "Then the borders in the region would have to be compltetely redefined." The New Year promises of Albanian politicians showed how much the Albanians are pressing for independence. By the end of 2003, thir message said, we will be an independent state. translation by Nicholas Whyte Balkans Program Director, International Crisis Group