[AKI-News] AKI NEWSLETTER/ FEB. 23, 2003

[Alice Mead]

AKI (ADVOCATES FOR KOSOVA'S INDEPENDENCE)
FEBRUARY 23, 2003



FOUR YEARS LATER,
FOLLOWING NATO'S INTERVENTION, KOSOVA REMAINS
IN AN INTERIM 'TWILIGHT ZONE" WITH AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. The Bush
administration's 2003 budget was submitted with zero dollars for rebuilding
Afghanistan. And long before that, the Bush administration made plain it had
forgotten its responsibilities in the Balkan region.

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Lessons from Kosovo -- AN ICG COMMENTARY

If there is war from Iraq, there are many lessons about post-war
reconstruction from the west's experience in Kosovo. But the current
crisis also means we risk overlooking unfinished business elsewhere, say
Val Percival and James Lyon of the International Crisis Group

Sunday February 23, 2003

As the United States and its allies prepare for possible military
intervention in Iraq, they should bear in mind the lessons of their
intervention in Kosovo - perhaps the most ambitious experiment in
post-war reconstruction that the international community has undertaken.
    Since 1999 the donor community has contributed billions of dollars
in humanitarian, reconstruction, and development assistance. Tens of
thousands of peacekeepers and thousands of civilians worked to rebuild
Kosovo into a democratic 'autonomous' society.
    Although the international community has much to be proud of in
Kosovo, two key weaknesses have hampered their efforts: failure to get
full control of the security situation, and failure to develop a
realistic exit strategy in partnership with the local actors. Both of
these are also risks for any future international intervention
elsewhere, and while Kosovo's specific circumstances are of course
unique, the situation there illustrates the problems that will arise
elsewhere.
    When the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) rolled into the province on 11
June 1999, they feared resistance from remaining Yugoslav army and
paramilitary forces, as well as retaliation attacks against KFOR from
the local Serb population.
    In fact (as should have been anticipated) the problems of those
first few months were completely different - a complete security vacuum,
with horrific crimes of revenge perpetrated against the Serb civilian
population by Albanian extremists. NATO and the UN were shown to be
impotent, and they - and Kosovo's population - are still paying for that
early failure. The international community cannot afford to make that
mistake elsewhere.
    NATO also failed to effectively neutralize its former allies from
the 1999 conflict, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In the immediate
aftermath, KLA members were able to gain control of local institutions,
involve themselves in organised crime, and engage in extortion and
intimidation. Although the international community tried to occupy
former KLA members through recruitment to a new Kosovo Protection Corps
and the Kosovo Police Service, former KLA fighters were still able to
exacerbate armed conflicts in South Serbia in 2000 and Macedonia in
2001. It is not sufficient to disarm the enemy - to get a peaceful
environment, you have to disarm your allies as well.
    Under Security Council Resolution 1244 the UN must develop
"autonomous" government institutions for Kosovo pending the resolution
of the province's final status. Kosovo is thus in a sort of
international twilight zone: a de jure part of Yugoslavia (now renamed
"Serbia and Montenegro"), yet simultaneously a de facto UN protectorate
under international administration, which may well be on the road
towards independence.
    The UN at first found it difficult to attract sufficiently skilled
international recruits to work in a difficult post-conflict setting.
Many internationals found themselves running municipal administrations,
or even government ministries, for which they had no experience or
training.
    Three and a half years down the line, Kosovo now has a President, a
Prime Minister, and a functioning government. However international
administrators are finding it hard to let go. Consultation mechanisms
with local leaders have not been institutionalized, and critical
information is kept in the hands of internationals. While local
politicians lobby the international community for more authority, it is
often a cry for inclusion in the process of governing rather than a
desire to be at the helm.
    While UNMIK has outlined "benchmarks" to assess Kosovo's
institutional development, the process has not gone much beyond
describing these objectives. There is no implementation strategy, no
assessment of how close (or far) Kosovo is from meeting these
benchmarks, what resources are needed, and what further action. At the
same time there is mission fatigue, resources are running low, and the
world's attention is focused on the Middle East. UNMIK is planning to
transfer as much responsibility as possible in the next twelve months to
minimize the costs and to minimize its responsibility for governing
Kosovo.
    Yet Kosovo is at a critical phase. Institutions are not yet fully
developed, the civil service has not yet been completely recruited, and
there is no transition strategy. Moreover, too early a transfer of power
would put the three billion dollar investment to date at risk. What is
lacking is a careful transition strategy - to build local counterparts
who will be able to take over responsibility gradually from UNMIK.
    On the ground, Serbian areas of Kosovo still function as if they
were part of Serbia, outside the framework of government established by
UNMIK, in terms of courts, schools, health care, pensions,
telecommunications and most importantly security forces. Zoran Djindjic,
the Prime Minister of Serbia, has appealed to the international
community to start talks on Kosovo's final status sooner rather than
later. Rather than repeat the traditional mantras of returning the whole
province to Belgrade rule, he takes the line that independence for
Kosovo is not a taboo topic; but he also has begun to hint about
partition of the province as part of an independence deal.
    The overwhelming majority of Albanians will accept nothing less than
the independence that they proclaimed over ten years ago, while the vast
majority of Serbs want to remain part of Serbia. Until this question is
addressed, insecurity among both populations about the future will
remain high, impeding important aspects of Kosovo's rebuilding effort,
including privatization, trade relations, economic development, and the
willingness of displaced Serbs to return to the province.
    But the UN Security Council (mindful perhaps of possible parallels
in Tibet or Chechnya) was, and is, unwilling to move in that direction.
Michael Steiner, who as UN Special Representative runs Kosovo on behalf
of the international community, has declared that any resolution of the
issue must wait until the UN's benchmarks have been met - his slogan is
"standards before status". Meanwhile there is a Kosovo parliament with
120 members, all of whom were elected because of their views on the one
subject - Kosovo's future status - which they are forbidden to discuss.
    Any partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines would raise very
uncomfortable issues elsewhere in the Balkans - not least in Bosnia, and
in neighbouring Macedonia. But if the international community continues
to stonewall on the question of final status, the existing soft
partition on the ground will become harder, and the ability of the UN or
its members to have a positive influence on the outcome will be
correspondingly less. These are indeed difficult issues - and there will
be similar difficult issues in planning the future of Iraq - but that is
no reason not to address them.
    For, while international attention will focus still more sharply on
Iraq in the coming weeks, the lengthy process of clearing up earlier
crises, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and indeed Bosnia, remains incomplete.
Rather than allow them to slip off the agenda in favour of the hot issue
of 2003, we should remember that those who do not learn from past
mistakes are doomed to repeat them.

· Val Percival is Kosovo Project Director, International Crisis Group,
and James Lyon is Serbia Project Director, International Crisis Group.

http://observer.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,901365,00.html

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