From aki at alb-net.com Sat Feb 15 00:03:17 2003 From: aki at alb-net.com (AKI News) Date: Fri, 14 Feb 2003 21:03:17 -0800 Subject: [AKI-News] Kosova's ongoing struggles. Have you forgotten your promises? Message-ID: Advocates for Kosova's Independence (AKI) February 12, 2003 ================================== ** AKI Newsletter, Issue 13 ** ================================== AKI STATEMENT The recent IWPR Balkan Crisis Report focuses entirely on the ongoing struggles over the final status of Kosova, which the Bush administration with its proclivity to aggression and its aversion to nation-building, has washed its hands of. Politicians: Djindic, Rugova, Steiner, have wedded themselves to different positions. Djindic to partition, Steiner to a UN protectorate. All the while, Kosova's political parties clamor for independence and a transfer of powers from UNMIK to the Kosova Parliament. Meanwhile, those who suffer are the poor and disenfranchised - elderly Serb women in rural Kosova, displaced Roma, Kosovo-Serb refugees outside Belgrade, anyone who is ill in Kosova, and those struggling to live on a $28/month pension. How is this a just peace? -AKI Group =============================== * A R T I C L E * =============================== IWPR'S BALKAN CRISIS REPORT February 10, 2003 Report No. 405 KOSOVO SPECIAL: UN UNDER PRESSURE TO CEDE MORE POWERS. Kosovars complain that UNMIK is taking too long to hand over authority. Arben Qirezi reports from Pristina. FURY AT UN FINAL STATUS CONDITIONS. Tough pre-conditions dash Kosovo's hopes of early discussion on independence. Artan Mustafa reports from Pristina. DJINDJIC LAUNCHES BATTLE FOR KOSOVO. Premier's demand for Yugoslav forces to return to Kosovo is unlikely to be heeded abroad, but may win him nationalist votes in forthcoming elections. Jan Briza reports from Novi Sad, Zoran Culafic reports from Pristina and Tatjana Matic reports from London. INVISIBLE SERB REFUGEES. Thousands of displaced Serbs are struggling to survive in unregistered camps across Serbia - seemingly beyond the reach or the help of the authorities. Boris Drenca reports from Belgrade. -- DJINDJIC LAUNCHES BATTLE FOR KOSOVO Premier's demand for Yugoslav forces to return to Kosovo is unlikely to be heeded abroad, but may win him nationalist votes in forthcoming elections By Jan Briza in Novi Sad, Zoran Culafic in Pristina and Tatjana Matic in London Serbia's Prime Minister has launched a surprise offensive on the future on Kosovo to forestall Albanian moves towards independence and bolster his patriotic image ahead of early elections. Zoran Djindjic wrote to NATO's commander in south-east Europe, Admiral Gregory Johnson, earlier this month requesting permission for Serbian police and military forces to return to the province, which was followed by a similar letter to the UN Security Council. Djindjic told Javier Solana, the EU foreign policy coordinator, during his visit to Belgrade last week, that he wants the international community to launch talks on the final status of Kosovo by June. It was the latest in the series of initiatives with which Djindjic, much to the surprise of domestic and international opinion, has brought the issue of Kosovo back on to the agenda. The moves are seen as a response to ever more frequent calls from ethnic Albanians for Kosovo to gain independence. At the same time, the campaign sounds a patriotic note in the run-up to inevitable early elections in Serbia. Kosovo's status has remained unresolved following the retreat of Yugoslav forces from the province in June 1999. Since then Kosovo has remained formally part of Yugoslavia under UN Security Council Resolution 1244. In practice, it is an international protectorate under the administration of the UN Mission for Kosovo, UNMIK. The Albanian majority in the province strongly advocates independence, while the Serb minority has demanded reintegration into Serbia. Djindjic's insistence on the protection of Serb interests marks the start of a counter-offensive against the growing pressure of Kosovo Albanians and their sympathisers. In May 2002, the Albanian majority in Kosovo's parliament passed a resolution demanding independence. The international administration declared the motion void on the grounds that it violated Resolution 1244. But the annulment of the Kosovo resolution only partially calmed the authorities in Belgrade, as the independence issue was not only championed by local Albanians but by well-known international organisations. The International Crisis Group, ICG, in March 2002 drew up a blueprint called "Guidelines for future of Kosovo", which proposed "conditional independence" for the region if certain criteria were fulfilled. A draft proposal based on this report was submitted to the US Congress in June that year, urging Washington to support a sovereign entity. The proposal was re-submitted this January. Congressmen Tom Lantosh and Henry Hide have since presented a new resolution on Kosovo to the House of Representatives, while another local initiative will be presented to the Pristina parliament on February 13. Djindjic appears to have taken over policy - making from Kosovo from Nebojsa Covic, deputy prime minister and head of the government's coordination centre for the region. The new policy was first aired last December, when Djindjic told the German magazine Der Spiegel that if Albanians organised a referendum on Kosovo's independence, Serbs in Bosnia might do the same, in which case the 1995 Dayton peace accord would have to be revised. On January 16 this year, Djindjic returned to the topic, warning that the province was "turning before our very eyes into a state" and saying silence was no longer an option. "Now is the time to start discussions about the status of Kosovo and Metohija," he said. "It is better to react now than when it is too late". Meanwhile, representatives of Serbs from northern Kosovo on January 20 founded a new local government group, the Association of Serb Municipalities, with the goal of strengthening contacts with Serbia. Oliver Ivanovic, a member of the Kosovo parliament presidency, said it was set up in response to fears that Kosovo was moving fast towards independence. The association has said it will hold its own referendum in Serbian districts if this takes place, demanding the separation of northern Serbian districts of Kosovo, around Leposavic, and their union with Serbia. Djindjic?s support for this strategy was underlined on January 28 when he convened a session of Serb representatives from Kosovo to draw up a joint plan of action. Members of the Serb National Council of North and Central Kosovo and the Povratak (Return) coalition attended the meeting, which gained the blessing of the newly formed Movement for Kosovo and Metohija, under Momcilo Trajkovic, a day later. While the fine details of their strategy have been kept from public scrutiny, leaks from the meeting suggest they intend to build a new network of local councils in Serb-populated areas. Ivanovic told IWPR this network would encourage displaced Serbs to return home as well as create the groundwork for northern Kosovo to request special status, similar to that of Republic Srpska in Bosnia, should the Albanians succeed in their drive for independence. Partition is increasingly discussed as a way out of the Kosovo imbroglio, said Professor Dusan Janjic, of the Belgrade Forum for Ethnic Relations. "If it came to Kosovo's separation from Serbia, Leposavic would have every legal right to request unification with Serbia, as it was only joined to Kosovo in the 1960s," he said. Djindjic may have chosen this moment to act, as the global political situation has shifted in Serbia's favour. America, the traditional ally of the ethnic Albanians, is preoccupied with Iraq. The EU is more inclined to hear the Serb side, which is why Djindjic has requested EU help in resolving the problem. Last May, Michael Steiner, the UNMIK administrator in Kosovo, said in Berlin that at the end of this year the EU should replace the UN mission in Kosovo. Western diplomats remain cautious about the Serbian premier's initiative. There are reports that Djindjic received discreet backing from Serbia?s old ally, Greece, which holds the EU presidency and wants the Kosovo issue settled before the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. Others believe the premier counts on support from Germany, which holds the presidency of the UN Security Council this year. Berlin is no traditional ally of Serbia, but Djindjic has developed numerous connections with German politicians. Djindjic has a strong political incentive to launch his "Kosovo offensive". Early elections in Serbia are expected later this year and the premier needs to improve his patriotic ratings if he is to best his nationalist rival, Vojislav Kostunica. Officials in Kostunica's Democratic Party of Serbia, DSS, are clearly annoyed by the premier's attempt to claim the nationalist vote. Dusan Prorokovic and Dragan Jocic denounced Djindjic's call for the Yugoslav army to return to Kosovo as "cheap demagogy and preparation for the upcoming elections". In an equally cynical vein, radio Deutsche Welle commented that Djindjic's demand was designed for domestic consumption. It said in its commentary that the premier had deliberately chosen a "populist national tune that suits the Serbs". But at a time when The Hague is putting pressure on the Serbia to extradite suspected war criminals - and when cooperation with the war crimes court remains unpopular in Serbia - Djindjic has every motive to try to neutralise his unpatriotic image over the tribunal with a patriotic achievement, such as rescuing Kosovo from ethnic Albanian separatism. Djindjic's moves to curry nationalist support have also seen him recently developing ties with the Serbian Orthodox Church, which was formerly Kostunica's field of activity. On February 4, amid a blaze of media publicity, the premier publicly presented diplomas of gratitude to people who've donated funds for the new St Sava cathedral in Belgrade. Either way, Djindjic is likely to profit from his Kosovo campaign. At home, he will collect patriotic points. And although his demands are not taken very seriously abroad, they may speed up the start of a dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade, at least on economic and other practical issues. Once more, Djindjic has displayed his strong political instincts for survival. Jan Briza is a journalist with the daily Novi Sad paper Dnevnik; Zoran Culafic is a Serbian journalist in Kosovo; and Tatjana Matic is a correspondent for Deutche Welle in Pristina and an IWPR associate. -- UN UNDER PRESSURE TO CEDE MORE POWERS Kosovars complain that UNMIK is taking too long to hand over authority. By Arben Qirezi in Pristina Relations between Kosovar leaders and United Nations officials are deteriorating as the former becoming increasingly exasperated with the latter's reluctance to ease their grip on power. Now enjoying their first experience of democratically elected government, Kosovars are showing a growing appetite for self-rule. As a result, they are beginning to chafe at the continued firm control of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, over foreign relations, justice, law and order, finance and regulation of former guerrillas in the Kosovo Protection Corps, KPC. UNMIK dismisses the complaints as a ruse to cover up the Kosovan government's own failures. In a speech in January, the UN chief in Kosovo, Michael Steiner, said he was tired of being blamed for the government's poor performance. The UN Security Council established UNMIK in June 1999, following the withdrawal of Serb military and police forces from Kosovo. The objective was to create democratic institutions to take over "substantial autonomy" during an interim period until the final status of Kosovo is resolved. Since then, UNMIK has organised elections each year, enabling Kosovars to develop advanced electoral processes. After a parliamentary ballot in 2001, they had their first democratically elected assembly. But the parties became deadlocked over how to share out cabinet seats. UNMIK stepped in and provided a framework enabling Kosovars to elect a president, a prime minister and an inclusive cabinet composed of both majority and minority representatives. But the government resented UNMIK's continued refusal to hand over its reserved powers. Kosovars began to look on the international authority with suspicion when Steiner's predecessor, Hans Haekkerup, agreed with the Serbian government in November 2001 to work together on issues such as return of refugees, police cooperation and justice. Soon after he was appointed in January 2002, Steiner appeared to overcome much of the distrust that had been a feature of his predecessor's term in office. The new UN boss took a tough position on Belgrade, warning it not to try and interfere in Kosovo affairs, and encouraged the development of the local assembly. But the honeymoon period soon came to an end when Kosovars realised that he would not be prepared to hand over substantial powers over to the legislature. The mood was summed up by Ramush Tahiri, principal political adviser to the President of the Kosovo Assembly, Nexhat Daci. "The UN's mission aim from the beginning was to build institutions, transfer responsibilities and create substantial autonomy," Tahiri told IWPR. " In view of this, an overlong process of transferring power must rank as a mission failure." An example of this exasperation came in December, when members of Kosovo's assembly criticised UNMIK for disregarding their opinion on the 2003 budget. Sabri Hamiti, head of the Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK, said the international authority was depriving parliament of an elementary democratic self-rule principle - controlling its own revenues. The UN has taken a different view on such matters. During last week's meeting of the Security Council, Secretary General Kofi Annan accused Kosovars of continuous attempts to exceed their authority and of an "increased desire to grab UNMIK's reserved powers instead of concentrating on the urgent issues over which they have responsibility". Kosovars challenged Annan's assessments. Ernest Luma, the spokesman of the Alliance for the Future of Kosovo, AAK, told IWPR that UNMIK had chosen paternalism over partnership in its approach to the region. He said the conflict between Kosovars and UNMIK is "a natural articulation of the necessity for an accelerated transfer of powers". For his party, justice and police should have priority in this process. For others, the economy remains important. Sahit Berisha, a former political prisoner and a history teacher in a Pristina secondary school, told IWPR that increasing poverty in Kosovo could lead to politically-oriented protests which would further damage relations between Kosovars and the international community. Analysts say that relations between UNMIK and local Albanians are beginning to take the absurd shape of a ruling party facing an opposition. But in spite of all the pushing and squabbling, both are careful not to split too far, as this would jeopardise Kosovo's development. Speaking for many ordinary Kosovars, Shpetim Memshi, a student of chemistry at the University of Pristina, told IWPR, "People want politician to have a greater say, but not at the risk of open confrontation with the international community." Arben Qirezi is a regular IWPR contributor -- FURY AT UN FINAL STATUS CONDITIONS Tough pre-conditions dash Kosovo's hopes of early discussion on independence. By Artan Mustafa in Pristina Kosovar Albanians, yearning for independence, have been enraged by a raft of UN conditions which must be met before they can even talk about sovereignty. It follows three years of the UN Mission in Kosovo, UNMIK, persistently sidestepping the subject of Kosovo's future. The eight standards were introduced by the UNMIK a year ago to set a course for the region's development. But in the second week of January, the international authority insisted that they had to be met in advance of final status talks. Kosovans angrily accused the UN of approaching matters the wrong way round - they want status discussed before standards are set. Tensions over the issue escalated last week following the creation of new EU-backed union between Montenegro and Serbia, under which Kosovo unequivocally remains in the latter. Forty-two deputies in the Kosovo parliament threatened to declare independence. Some newspaper columnists said while they had a right to be angry, such unilateral action would be ill-advised as it got the region's nowhere in the past. The territory's Albanian majority has been campaigning for independence ever since 1989 when they were ruled from Belgrade. After NATO forces prised loose Serbia's grip in 1999, Kosovo became a UN protectorate governed under Security Council resolution 1244. The resolution obliged UNMIK to "facilitate a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future". But the authority's head Michael Steiner has lately been playing down this aspect of his mission. In messages to the public in Pristina, Belgrade and on February 6 before the Security Council, he stressed that 2003 was still too early to talk about Kosovo's final status. The checklist of challenging standards that must be fulfilled before final status can be discussed include the return of Serb refugees, freedom of movement for the minority, dialogue with Belgrade, the formation of democratic institutions and the establishment of the rule of law. Ethnic Albanians, who make up 95 per cent of the Kosovo population, reject the UNMIK principle of "standards before status". Their leaders also worry about the lack of any time frame for these conditions to be reached. Bajram Rexhepi, the prime minister of Kosovo, told IWPR that making the question of status a hostage to standards was unacceptable. "There must be, at least, a set deadline for these standards to be achieved'," he said. But Oliver Ivanovic, the Serbian member of the presidency of the Kosovo parliament, told IWPR that Serbs fully agree the "standards should be met before (final) status (talks)". This reflected the view of minority Serbs that Kosovo is still part of Yugoslavia. They are in no hurry to see an Albanian-dominated Kosovo state. For the Albanians, the return of Serbian refugees is probably one of the most difficult and painful issues on UNMIK's checklist. According to UNMIK sources, only 6,000 out of about 200,000 refugees, mainly Serbs, who left their houses after the NATO bombing, have returned to Kosovo. The International Crisis Group, ICG, in Pristina argues that the lack of a defined final status for Kosovo discourages refugees from returning home. Serbs do not know whether they will be coming back to an independent Kosovo or a territory that still has links with Serbia. UNMIK says it can assist in the return process but it could not provide indefinite security for those who do come back. The second painful issue on the list is the suggestion that dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade must be established Most Kosovo Albanians do not support such talks and consider that ties with Belgrade ended with the ethnic cleansing campaign during which more than half a million Albanians were driven out of their homes and thousands left dead or missing. Enver Hasani, an international law professor at the University of Pristina, said this dialogue would have to start sooner or later. But he thought it should not begin now, at a time when the Greeks are heading the EU presidency for the next six months to be followed by the Italians. "Both (these countries) are known for their sympathy towards Serbia, and I think we would suffer from this," Hasani said. The most recent blow to Albanian politicians in Pristina was the new union between Serbia and Montenegro, as they have been trying to convince themselves and the public that as each day goes by Kosovo has less and less to with Belgrade. There is a sense that the debate on independence is moving backwards to the underground age of 1990s Kosovan politics when Ibrahim Rugova unsuccessfully tried to persuade western governments to recognise the virtually self-declared Republic of Kosovo. But then as now, Rugova and his allies are unlikely to meet with any success. Steiner has already insisted the UN will not allow unilateral decisions by Belgrade and Pristina to prejudice the independence issue - which would be for the Security Council alone to decide. Meanwhile, the UN is emphasising the importance of its preconditions for final status talks. Mason Whitney, a UNMIK official, said, "These standards can neither be lowered nor negotiated, they should be met so that we can start building a normal society." UNMIK is trying to promote the standards through short video clips shown by local TV stations. The videos produced some sardonic responses. One journalist wrote to Steiner on December 31 asking him whether Kosovars "meet the standards for celebrating New Year". Artan Mustafa is a journalist of the daily Epoka e re in Kosovo. -- INVISIBLE SERB REFUGEES Thousands of displaced Serbs are struggling to survive in unregistered camps across Serbia - seemingly beyond the reach or the help of the authorities. By Boris Drenca in Belgrade The old, run-down barracks lie next to a dirt road some ten km from Belgrade, on the outskirts of the village of Resnik. Abandoned some time ago by their original occupants, these ten or so buildings now house 95 Serb families who fled their homes after the war ended in Kosovo in 1999. Most of their possessions were left behind in the rush. When Serbian forces pulled out of Kosovo, they were followed by around 218,000 Serbs, fearful of possible Albanian reprisals. At the time, refugees were directed toward camps in various locations in south Serbia. But many of these were already full of those Serbs who had fled Croatia and Bosnia. This forced the Kosovo Serbs further north. As the existing camps were not big enough to accept all who made the long journey, thousands of displaced persons broke into empty factory premises and warehouses and made their homes there - unaware that by doing so, they would make themselves "invisible" in Serbia. Vesna Petkovic, a public information assistant with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, told IWPR that there are 62 unregistered camps, with more than 3,500 inhabitants, in a number of municipalities. There are nearly 300 recognised refugee centers, which are home to around 22,000 people. While those living in unofficial camps are getting some form of help, it is minor when compared to the aid given in the official ones, where UNHCR covers the residents' living costs. For those who live in the latter, food and other assistance is available - but more importantly, the refugees are given an identity card which allows them to seek employment and qualify for health insurance. The inhabitants of the Resnik camp - like many others dotted across Serbia - legally do not exist. They have no address, no identity card and thus are completely unable to support their families. Resident Predrag Zdravkovic, who is originally from the Istok region of Kosovo, told IWPR that he and his fellow refugees sometimes do unskilled labour work for black marketeers to earn some money. "Sometimes we feel as if we are in this country illegally," he said. Goran Pitulic came to Resnik with his wife Stanka and their four-year-old son in 1999, and his daughter was born in the camp some 14 months ago. Like all other camp residents, Goran's family lives in two unsanitary rooms. One barrack has twenty such accommodation units, their doors facing each other across a narrow corridor. "See what it's like here. When I open my door I literally walk into my neighbours' room," he said. Their furniture and kitchen equipment have been salvaged from scrap-yards, repaired and pressed into service. "This is junk for someone, but I took it and fixed it - and for me it is good," said Stanka. The rooms are divided by thin, damp chipboard. Stanka worries constantly that the old electrical wiring could lead to a fire in the building - especially during the winter months, when the residents burn wood in stoves to keep warm. Their bathroom is a run-down unheated building some 50 metres from the barracks. It has ten squat toilets and solitary washbasin. The water in the basin is as frozen as the puddles on the floor. The shower units, however, are supplied from three hot-water tanks bought by residents with help from their neighbours in Resnik. This helps to keep the children clean and healthy, even if the temperature of the building is scarely warmer than it is outside. "We are toughening the kids up," said Goran ironically as he showed IWPR around the bathroom. The camp residents believe that it is a miracle that none of the children have come down with a serious illness, given the conditions they are forced to live in. They do, nevertheless, point out that two of the camp residents have been diagnosed with the Koksaki virus, which attacks the heart. Beyond the basic considerations - washing, keeping warm, eating regularly - the Resnik families have many other worries to contend with, none of which are helped by their illegal status. At one point last year, they feared that their electricity supply would be cut off because of unpaid bills amounting to 16,000 euro - a debt disputed by the families, who claim that the bulk of the power was used before they arrived. Thanks to the intervention of Nebojsa Covic, head of the Yugoslav coordination centre for Kosovo, the power was not cut off. But the bills have still not been paid. Camp residents have instead been given a new deadline to settle the debt, which is growing all the time. In spite of the poverty and hardship, the majority of Resnik's displaced persons told IWPR that they would not go back home now. "Our houses have either been burned down, or are being occupied by strangers. Even if we were to go back, what would await us there?" asked Goran. Predrag also believes that he can never return to Istok. He feels strongly that Kosovo's Serbs were misled by the previous Serbian regime, which kept telling them that they could stay in their villages - and then gave them just a few hours to pack and leave. "I don't think we can ever go back there," he said, preparing for another long, cold day as one of Serbia's hidden refugees. Boris Drenca is a freelance journalist based in Serbia. IWPR ON-LINE: www.iwpr.net -- ### Questions/Comments, email AKI-NEWS at aki at alb-net.com AKI Website: www.alb-net.com/aki/ From amead at maine.rr.com Sun Feb 23 16:42:40 2003 From: amead at maine.rr.com (Alice Mead) Date: Sun, 23 Feb 2003 16:42:40 -0500 Subject: [AKI-News] AKI NEWSLETTER/ FEB. 23, 2003 Message-ID: AKI (ADVOCATES FOR KOSOVA'S INDEPENDENCE) FEBRUARY 23, 2003 FOUR YEARS LATER, FOLLOWING NATO'S INTERVENTION, KOSOVA REMAINS IN AN INTERIM 'TWILIGHT ZONE" WITH AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE. The Bush administration's 2003 budget was submitted with zero dollars for rebuilding Afghanistan. And long before that, the Bush administration made plain it had forgotten its responsibilities in the Balkan region. *************************************************************** Lessons from Kosovo -- AN ICG COMMENTARY If there is war from Iraq, there are many lessons about post-war reconstruction from the west's experience in Kosovo. But the current crisis also means we risk overlooking unfinished business elsewhere, say Val Percival and James Lyon of the International Crisis Group Sunday February 23, 2003 As the United States and its allies prepare for possible military intervention in Iraq, they should bear in mind the lessons of their intervention in Kosovo - perhaps the most ambitious experiment in post-war reconstruction that the international community has undertaken. Since 1999 the donor community has contributed billions of dollars in humanitarian, reconstruction, and development assistance. Tens of thousands of peacekeepers and thousands of civilians worked to rebuild Kosovo into a democratic 'autonomous' society. Although the international community has much to be proud of in Kosovo, two key weaknesses have hampered their efforts: failure to get full control of the security situation, and failure to develop a realistic exit strategy in partnership with the local actors. Both of these are also risks for any future international intervention elsewhere, and while Kosovo's specific circumstances are of course unique, the situation there illustrates the problems that will arise elsewhere. When the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) rolled into the province on 11 June 1999, they feared resistance from remaining Yugoslav army and paramilitary forces, as well as retaliation attacks against KFOR from the local Serb population. In fact (as should have been anticipated) the problems of those first few months were completely different - a complete security vacuum, with horrific crimes of revenge perpetrated against the Serb civilian population by Albanian extremists. NATO and the UN were shown to be impotent, and they - and Kosovo's population - are still paying for that early failure. The international community cannot afford to make that mistake elsewhere. NATO also failed to effectively neutralize its former allies from the 1999 conflict, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In the immediate aftermath, KLA members were able to gain control of local institutions, involve themselves in organised crime, and engage in extortion and intimidation. Although the international community tried to occupy former KLA members through recruitment to a new Kosovo Protection Corps and the Kosovo Police Service, former KLA fighters were still able to exacerbate armed conflicts in South Serbia in 2000 and Macedonia in 2001. It is not sufficient to disarm the enemy - to get a peaceful environment, you have to disarm your allies as well. Under Security Council Resolution 1244 the UN must develop "autonomous" government institutions for Kosovo pending the resolution of the province's final status. Kosovo is thus in a sort of international twilight zone: a de jure part of Yugoslavia (now renamed "Serbia and Montenegro"), yet simultaneously a de facto UN protectorate under international administration, which may well be on the road towards independence. The UN at first found it difficult to attract sufficiently skilled international recruits to work in a difficult post-conflict setting. Many internationals found themselves running municipal administrations, or even government ministries, for which they had no experience or training. Three and a half years down the line, Kosovo now has a President, a Prime Minister, and a functioning government. However international administrators are finding it hard to let go. Consultation mechanisms with local leaders have not been institutionalized, and critical information is kept in the hands of internationals. While local politicians lobby the international community for more authority, it is often a cry for inclusion in the process of governing rather than a desire to be at the helm. While UNMIK has outlined "benchmarks" to assess Kosovo's institutional development, the process has not gone much beyond describing these objectives. There is no implementation strategy, no assessment of how close (or far) Kosovo is from meeting these benchmarks, what resources are needed, and what further action. At the same time there is mission fatigue, resources are running low, and the world's attention is focused on the Middle East. UNMIK is planning to transfer as much responsibility as possible in the next twelve months to minimize the costs and to minimize its responsibility for governing Kosovo. Yet Kosovo is at a critical phase. Institutions are not yet fully developed, the civil service has not yet been completely recruited, and there is no transition strategy. Moreover, too early a transfer of power would put the three billion dollar investment to date at risk. What is lacking is a careful transition strategy - to build local counterparts who will be able to take over responsibility gradually from UNMIK. On the ground, Serbian areas of Kosovo still function as if they were part of Serbia, outside the framework of government established by UNMIK, in terms of courts, schools, health care, pensions, telecommunications and most importantly security forces. Zoran Djindjic, the Prime Minister of Serbia, has appealed to the international community to start talks on Kosovo's final status sooner rather than later. Rather than repeat the traditional mantras of returning the whole province to Belgrade rule, he takes the line that independence for Kosovo is not a taboo topic; but he also has begun to hint about partition of the province as part of an independence deal. The overwhelming majority of Albanians will accept nothing less than the independence that they proclaimed over ten years ago, while the vast majority of Serbs want to remain part of Serbia. Until this question is addressed, insecurity among both populations about the future will remain high, impeding important aspects of Kosovo's rebuilding effort, including privatization, trade relations, economic development, and the willingness of displaced Serbs to return to the province. But the UN Security Council (mindful perhaps of possible parallels in Tibet or Chechnya) was, and is, unwilling to move in that direction. Michael Steiner, who as UN Special Representative runs Kosovo on behalf of the international community, has declared that any resolution of the issue must wait until the UN's benchmarks have been met - his slogan is "standards before status". Meanwhile there is a Kosovo parliament with 120 members, all of whom were elected because of their views on the one subject - Kosovo's future status - which they are forbidden to discuss. Any partition of Kosovo along ethnic lines would raise very uncomfortable issues elsewhere in the Balkans - not least in Bosnia, and in neighbouring Macedonia. But if the international community continues to stonewall on the question of final status, the existing soft partition on the ground will become harder, and the ability of the UN or its members to have a positive influence on the outcome will be correspondingly less. These are indeed difficult issues - and there will be similar difficult issues in planning the future of Iraq - but that is no reason not to address them. For, while international attention will focus still more sharply on Iraq in the coming weeks, the lengthy process of clearing up earlier crises, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and indeed Bosnia, remains incomplete. Rather than allow them to slip off the agenda in favour of the hot issue of 2003, we should remember that those who do not learn from past mistakes are doomed to repeat them. ? Val Percival is Kosovo Project Director, International Crisis Group, and James Lyon is Serbia Project Director, International Crisis Group. http://observer.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,901365,00.html Guardian Unlimited ? Guardian Newspapers Limited 2003 _______________________________________________________________________