[AKI-News] Post Elections : Kosova and Representation

[AKI News]

Advocates for Kosova Independence (AKI)
December 23, 2001

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  ** AKI Newsletter, Issue 4 **
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Post Elections: Kosova and Representation


KOSOVO'S LANDMARK ELECTION
A New Report by the International Crisis Group

Pristina/Brussels, 21 November 2001: The 17 November election in Kosovo was
a landmark in the post-conflict development of the province. The new
institutions will have only limited powers, and in particular will have no
authority on the issue of independence. The powers of the UN administration
(UNMIK) remain undiminished. Nevertheless, the establishment of an elected
Assembly with a democratic mandate will irrevocably transform the political
landscape in Kosovo.

A new ICG report, Kosovo: Landmark Election, a copy of which is attached,
considers the impact that limited self-government will have on relations
between UNMIK and Kosovo's leaders. It also examines the participation of
Kosovo's Serbs in the new institutions, and the role of Belgrade in matters
concerning the province's Serbs.

ICG's Balkans Program Director Mark Thompson said: "Any attempt by Kosovo
Albanian parties to use the Assembly to move towards independence would be
premature at this point. A declaration by the Assembly on independence would
only irritate the international community and if anything harden
international opposition."

The main challenges will be to make the new structures work and for Kosovo's
political leaders to show that they can govern responsibly. The Special
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who retains ultimate
authority, should allow Kosovo's new leaders as free a rein as possible
within the competencies of the new institutions.

Yet it is unrealistic to expect Kosovo Albanian leaders or voters to shelve
the one overriding issue that really matters to them. ICG's Kosovo Project
Director Peter Palmer said: "The newly elected officials will be unlikely to
accept for long the tight control of the unelected international
administration. Impatience with slow progress to independence may lead to
more strained relations between UNMIK and the Albanian parties."

--
ICG MEDIA CONTACTS

ICG Brussels: Katy Cronin or Sascha Pichler,
+32 2 536 00 64 or 70;
email: media at crisisweb.org

ICG Washington: Heather Hurlburt,
+1 202 408 80 12

	So. Kosova's perfectly run, multi-ethnic elections are over. Hooray! And
now the wrangling for power begins. Thaci, Haradinaj and Rugova--arguing
over positions of power. Or maybe just positions. Because Hans Haekkerup is
the only one with real power in Kosova. And that other guy has power
too---who voted for Covic?

	Fair elections. That's good. Then what's wrong with this picture?
Politicians are elected--or appointed- to serve the people they represent.
At the moment, the elected Albanian leadership believes they represent
themselves, not their constituents. And Haekkerup? He wasn't appointed by
the Kosovar citizens, but by the UN Security Council 4,000 miles away in New
York to carry out the mandates of UN Resolution 1244.

	Who represents Kosova in the UN, then? Surely if Kosova is to be governed
by the UN directly, the people should have some representation there. How
can they possibly trust Yugoslav diplomats to step in and represent their
interests? Or Russia? Or China? The Yugoslav policy in Kosova was to suspend
autonomy, brutalize the population for years, and then to expel them by
force.

	The European position is to claim that Kosova is part of the former
Yugoslavia. But then who represents Kosova in the Yugoslav parliament? Where
is Kosova's share of the Yugoslav army hardware? And who represents Kosova
in the European Parliament? With the US State Department? Djindic has an
office in Washington, DC. Do the Albanians even know this? Having been
unrepresented throughout history (Albanians made up 1.5% of the Yugoslav
Communist Party), the population seems not fully aware of how crucial a
visible presence in Brussels, New York, and Washington is.

	Lack of transparency and unclear representation then translate directly
into unclear policy regarding the difficult issue of Kosova's future.

	These questions of access and representation also surfaced this November,
with the public announcement of the Covic/Haekkerup "document." Suddenly, it
seemed that the Serbs had much more representation in Kosova than the local
citizens themselves, that the Serb leadership was involved in processes that
happened behind closed doors. The OSCE recently met with regional Balkan
leaders to talk about current issues, precisely the kind of talks that
policy suggestions emerge from. There was no Albanian representation at the
meeting. Same thing with the most recent Project on Ethnic Relations (based
in Princeton University) meeting.

	And now, there is the high-level UNMIK/FRY working group. This group will
begin to work out other jurisdiction issues and presumably discuss final
status. But where did this process come from?

	Why, finally, should Serbia/FRY have any say over what happens in Kosova?
The last remains of Yugoslavia is itself in long-term moral, economic, and
political chaos. It does not share a vision of a multi-ethnic society, nor
has it ever advanced one single action towards democratization regarding
Kosova or Montenegro. It has not apologized for killing nearly 250,000 of
its own citizens, allows Mladic to run free, ignores international norms,
created millions of refugees, and criminalized its police and courts. Serbia
has not even released 203 Albanians, many of whom are ill, wounded, or
mentally and psychiatrically handicapped. Any political power play it can
leverage at the expense of ordinary civilians is fair game. The justice
system carries out the political orders of Serb leaders. Rabid nationalists,
who would not be tolerated in any other part of Europe, are still an
integral part of the political landscape. Where are the consequences to such
intractable behavior?

	All efforts to negotiate a diplomatic solution to Kosova failed.
Repeatedly. Holbrooke even gave the Serb military four months to stamp out
the KLA in 1998. That failed as well. Then the FRY cost the USA $2 to $3
billion dollars to restore order and basic human rights in Kosova, with the
full cost of the war being $5 billion. What will the cost be of forcing the
shreds of Yugoslavia to stay together against the will of the people in
Montenegro and Kosova? Who will enforce that troubled peace, pay for it,
commit to the long-term needs of a Euro-vision that has not yet established
justice for war crimes nor equal representation as basic trust-building
steps in the region?

	A democracy rests on several safeguards--equal rights for all citizens,
checks and balances (an internal balance of power) and transparency. Access
to meaningful representation is a crucial first step in creating this
balance. With a highly distracted Bush/Rumsfeld (where the heck is Cheney?)
administration chasing Bin Laden through the mountains, the Balkans are in
danger of drifting off the administration's radar screen. As this happens,
representation and transparent processes for change will become even more
crucial.

	To achieve stability and an enduring peace, Kosova's citizens must have
access to meaningful representation at all levels of government. Or what
little power they have can be snatched from them overnight.

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