Kosovo has become the West's second tar baby in the former Yugoslavia, the result of policies that were too little or too late. Once again we witness death and destruction, though mercifully not on the scale of Bosnia. Any solution to the continuing crisis will require a long-term Western commitment, the dimensions of which are not yet clear and the domestic political support for which is dubious.

American diplomacy last October helped avert a humanitarian crisis in Kosovo-a crisis the Clinton administration had helped create-from turning into a greater disaster. With Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for the first time under a serious bombing threat, more than 200,000 displaced Albanians returned to shelter for the winter. But despite a sustained diplomatic effort over the past six months, the U.S. and its allies have not been able to bring peace to Kosovo.

Some 800 brave foreigners from the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe have arrived in Kosovo to "verify" the October agreement with Mr. Milosevic; NATO's commander declares the Yugoslav president continues to violate it. The violence also continues, held in check more by the winter and the military disparity between the Serbian and Albanian sides than by any movement toward peace. And once again NATO makes threatening noises against Mr. Milosevic, which once again he ignores.

The Western approach to peace is to get the two vastly unequal sides into serious negotiations and produce an interim settlement that puts off the question of independence. Much like the diplomacy of the Bosnian war until the Dayton Accord, the effort has neither carrot nor stick. Rather, Western negotiators try hard to persuade, cajole or threaten the two sides to agree on some form of local self-rule, one that keeps Kosovo tethered to Serbia.

But neither threats nor enticements nor the intimidation of Mr. Milosevic's police have been enough to get the parties to agree on what degree of autonomy the Kosovars will receive. Even if some desperate Albanian leaders were to sign to an agreement, it would not likely last, because of the rise of the Kosovo Liberation Army, which is committed to independence and prepared to use violence to achieve it. And as the goal of keeping Kosovo in Mr. Milosevic's Serbia recedes, the West, particularly the Europeans, redouble their dedication to that goal and more and more blame the KLA for the continued troubles. The Western consensus against Mr. Milosevic last autumn has been dissipated by the October agreements, the influx of the verifiers, and the lack of progress in the negotiations.

When the weather improves, we can expect more fighting, whatever the presence of outside verifiers. That in turn most likely means that Serb forces will repeat the destruction of Albanian villages last summer-but this time at greater cost in lives because of the improved military capabilities of the KLA. Indeed if our goal-keeping Kosovo under Serbian control-remains the same, either the KLA will have to change or we will see Mr. Milosevic wreak havoc on their countrymen. Ironically a Kosovo crisis could occur at the same time that NATO is celebrating its 50th anniversary, demonstrating the organization's hollowness not its vigor.

In these circumstances, what can the West do? Our options are not attractive. We can intensify our efforts to fashion an "autonomy" agreement with the hope that something turns up-such as a political change in Serbia. This approach has not shown much promise. We can probably improve the prospects for a limited autonomy settlement by warning the Albanians that if they do not sign up we will wash our hands of the province. But this will be politically and morally difficult for the Clinton administration, and could well result in a long-term guerrilla war with very harmful effects for Macedonia.

Alternately, we can change our political objective in Kosovo and pursue real autonomy-autonomy with the Serb police gone and with the ultimate aim of independence. This would require at least one of the following: NATO would station forces in Kosovo, making it a virtual protectorate.

This approach would create a major internal dispute within NATO and could well lead to Serb-NATO hostilities. It also would be a domestic political headache in the U.S.

The U.S. could try to change the Serbian political situation in the hope of working out a satisfactory autonomy agreement with Mr. Milosevic's successor. That would mean bombing Serb military targets in retaliation for Mr. Milosevic's violation of the October agreements and undermining him politically, including seriously pursuing him as a war criminal. But we do not know how to get rid of him. Nor do we know who would succeed him and what his successor would do. The U.S. could take a longer-term perspective as well as increase its leverage on Mr. Milosevic by arming and training the KLA and accepting independence as a goal. This could require direct Western military support of some kind. Such a proposal would raise hackles in NATO.

None of these options are particularly attractive-but then neither is the status quo. The West is now in the bizarre position of sending civilians to do dangerous work maintaining an agreement that, Washington's protestations to the contrary, is clearly breaking down.

Two or three people are being killed every day, and there is the imminent threat of much greater violence. A small and rapidly shrinking Kosovo Serb population, and Mr. Milosevic's murderous rule in Albanian Kosovo, has made it difficult if not impossible to keep Kosovo Albanians attached to Serbia on any stable basis.

We can support Mr. Milosevic, we can support the Kosovo Albanians, or we can stay on the fence. If history is any guide, we will stay on the fence as long as possible-but this will only result in more violence, more cost and more commitment later. It's time to accept the idea of independence for Kosovo, and determine how it can be achieved at the lowest possible cost.