Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, President of the ICTY

H.E. Kofi Anan, Secretary General of the United Nations

The President of the Security Council

The Council of Ministers and the Commission of the European Union

Contents

I. INTRODUCTION

2. JURISDICTION OF THE ICTY

A. Applicability of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5

B. Existence of an Armed Conflict

(i) Legal Definition

(ii) The Kosovo Liberation Army as an organised armed group engaged in protracted armed violence

3. CAMPAIGN BY THE SERBIAN/FRY FORCES

A. Background

B. Method of operation of the Serbian/FRY forces in Kosovo

C. Chronological summary: March – October 1998

4. EVENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

A. Factual Description

(i) Operations in Senik, Sedlare, Rusinovce and Klecka at the end of August

(ii) Attack on the Vranic area at the end of September

(iii) Attacks in the border region in August and September

(iv) Attack near Susica at the end of August

(v) Operations in the area of Obrinje and Golubovac at the end of September

B. Applicable Law

V. INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY

VI. SUMMING UP

VII. ABOUT NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE

I. INTRODUCTION

In October 1998, No Peace Without Justice established a team of experts in international humanitarian and international criminal law to engage in a project concerning the alleged commission of violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo, in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (hereafter "FRY"), during 1998. More specifically, the project was concerned with those violations that are within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereafter "International Tribunal" or "ICTY") and the present report analyses the conflict in Kosovo from this perspective.

The team, composed of six members, travelled to Kosovo and other parts of the FRY, as well as to neighbouring Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania, in October 1998 in order to conduct the necessary field research for this report. The method of operation during the field mission largely involved meeting and interviewing various individuals and organisations on the ground, including local journalists and non-governmental organisations ("NGOs"), members of the diplomatic community, representatives of international NGOs, as well as of international governmental agencies, and personnel from the various Kosovo Diplomatic Observer Missions ("KDOM").

In November and December 1998, a second field mission was conducted to follow up on the initial contacts which had been established. A smaller team again visited Kosovo, as well as Belgrade, and gathered some new material, in addition to confirming existing information and the conclusions that had been formulated on the basis the previous visit. This aspect of the work of the project has also been supplemented by research and analysis conducted in Brussels, New York and Washington D.C. Public information which is available on the conflict in Kosovo, including news reports and those compiled by various international NGOs, has been gathered, along with military information. This has been utilised to provide the context for as well as the substance of the present report, which seeks to present the findings of the project from the perspective of the relevant norms of international humanitarian law and the jurisdictional provisions of the Statute of the ICTY.

It is not the purpose of the report to document each and every violation of international humanitarian law committed in Kosovo during the conflict. The present aim is rather to demonstrate the existence of a campaign organised from within the State structure of the FRY, which involved the widespread commission of violations of international humanitarian law. It should thus be emphasised that, while violations may have been committed by both parties to the conflict – the Serbian/FRY forces and those of the Kosovo Liberation Army – the subject of the report does not extend to the latter. Such potential violations are nonetheless worthy of further investigation, and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Tribunal ("Prosecutor") should seek to gather any and all information in this regard, along with evidence of crimes committed by the FRY/Serbian forces.

Furthermore, it should be noted that the report does not cover those most recent events which have occurred since the agreement reached between the President of the FRY, Slobodan Milosevic, and the United States Special Envoy, Richard Holbrooke, in October 1998. While the conflict in Kosovo has clearly continued since this agreement and recent events, including the massacre of numerous Kosovars in Racak and the continued shelling of towns and villages in that and other areas, fall equally within the jurisdiction of the ICTY and merit substantial investigation by the Prosecutor, the research for the current report has been limited to a specific time-period. The report thus focuses on serious violations of international humanitarian law which are rapidly fading into the past and seeks to ensure that they are fully investigated and discussed in order to assess the criminal responsibility of those who directed the violence, destruction and suffering of the whole Kosovo conflict, from the highest level.

II. JURISDICTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL

A. Applicability of Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5

The jurisdiction of the International Tribunal over potential violations of international humanitarian law in Kosovo is, on its face, apparent. Article 1 of the ICTY Statute provides that any serious violation of international humanitarian law committed within the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 may be prosecuted and punished by the Tribunal. Kosovo, which has the status of a province of the Republic of Serbia, thus falls within the spatial requirement of Article 1 and the temporal requirement is met by virtue of the open-ended term "since 1991". Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Statute then provide the framework for the types of violations with which the International Tribunal is concerned by enunciating its subject matter jurisdiction in more detail. These Articles read as follows:

Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:

(a) wilful killing;

(b) torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments;

(c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health;

(d) extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;

(e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in the forces of a hostile power;

(f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial;

(g) unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian;

(h) taking civilians as hostages.

Violations of the laws or customs of war

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not be limited to:

(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated to cause unnecessary suffering;

(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;

(c) attack, or bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings;

(d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science;

(e) plunder of public or private property.

Genocide

1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.

2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:

(a) killing members of the group;

(b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;

(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;

(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;

(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

3. The following acts shall be punishable:

(a) genocide;

(b) conspiracy to commit genocide;

(c) direct and public incitement to commit genocide;

(d) attempt to commit genocide;

(e) complicity in genocide.

Crimes against humanity

The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:

(a) murder;

(b) extermination;

(c) enslavement;

(d) deportation;

(e) imprisonment;

(f) torture;

(g) rape;

(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;

other inhumane acts.

(i) Article 2

Article 2 of the Statute is drawn from the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Geneva Conventions) and, more specifically, those provisions of the Conventions which mandate the criminal prosecution of those responsible for "grave breaches" of their terms. In 1949, this regime of universal jurisdiction and mandatory prosecution or extradition was regarded as limited to breaches of the provisions of the Conventions which concerned international armed conflicts, as opposed to conflicts which were determined to be internal in character. While article 3, common to each of the four Conventions, enunciated basic prohibitions in relation to internal armed conflicts, the mechanism for enforcement established in the "grave breaches" provisions was not considered to extend to common article 3. It must be emphasised that this did not preclude a State from prosecuting an individual for violations of common article 3, but merely rendered States under no obligation to do so.

Until relatively recently, the mechanisms for prosecuting individuals for "grave breaches" of the Geneva Conventions remained remarkably untested. By incorporating the terminology of the Conventions into the Statute of the International Tribunal, however, the debate surrounding the exact scope of the "grave breaches" regime has been reopened. Many voices have been raised in support of an extension of these provisions to incorporate internal armed conflicts as well as international armed conflicts, the former category being of far greater incidence than the latter, and developments in international law rendering any strict division along these lines wholly artificial. Within the International Tribunal itself and in the context of its particular Statute, there remains some debate on the matter. While the majority of the Appeals Chamber, in a Decision on Jurisdiction, in the case of Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (Tadic case), expressed the view that Article 2 of the Statute should only be applied in the context of a conflict determined to be international in nature, Judge Abi-Saab, in a Separate Opinion, advocated its applicability also in internal armed conflicts. Similarly, in their final Judgement in the case of Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo (Delalic et al. case), Trial Chamber II, while finding the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina to have been international throughout 1992, suggested, obiter dicta, that violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions should now be considered as "grave breaches" of the Conventions.

Despite these indications of a nascent development in the law, the current report does not consider the applicability of Article 2 of the Statute to the Kosovo conflict. As will be discussed further below, there has been some dispute about the actual existence of an "armed conflict" in Kosovo and, while it is here contended that such a view is entirely unsupported in law and fact, it is not argued that the armed conflict was or is international in nature.

(ii) Article 3

Even a cursory glance at the description of the military campaign conducted by the Serbian/FRY authorities in Kosovo, laid out below, suffices to raise the applicability of Article 3 of the Statute – particularly paragraphs (b), (c) and (e). The Appeals Chamber, in its Decision on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case, held that Article 3 is applicable in situations of armed conflict, whether international or internal. In addition, the Appeals Chamber described Article 3 as a catch-all provision designed to ensure that the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal is "watertight". In its view, therefore, violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, concerning internal armed conflicts, also fall squarely within the ambit of Article 3 of the Statute, whose enumerated provisions are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions states as follows:

In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:

(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria. To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:

(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;

(b) taking of hostages;

(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment;

(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.

(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.

An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.

The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present Convention.

The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of the Parties to the conflict.

Trial Chamber II, in its Judgement in the Delalic et al. case, further confirmed that violations of common article 3 must be considered as within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal by virtue of Article 3 of the Statute, absent the above-mentioned development which would bring violations of common article 3 within the "grave breaches" regime of the Geneva Conventions and thus within Article 2 of the Statute.

Bearing this in mind, the evidence discussed below points to violations of international humanitarian law within the scope of Article 3 of the Statute. However, in order to satisfy all of the jurisdictional prerequisites for the applicability of this Article, it is indeed necessary to confirm the actual existence of an "armed conflict" as such and the link between the acts alleged and this armed conflict. This is discussed further below.

(iii) Article 4

In addition, Article 4 of the Statute, respecting genocide, is not discussed in relation to the events in Kosovo with which the present report is concerned. Once again, a cautious approach is here adopted, which does not involve an analysis of the legal definition of genocide and the factual circumstances which may or may not fit within that definition. The developing jurisprudence of the International Tribunal, as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), will further elaborate the extent of the requirement that the acts enumerated in Article 4 be committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such, and further investigations by the Prosecutor may lead to the conclusion that such is the case in Kosovo. Nonetheless, the research conducted for the preparation of the present report does not reveal sufficient evidence of this intent requirement to construct an argument for the applicability of Article 4.

(iv) Article 5

While isolated acts in the course of an armed conflict may constitute violations of the laws or customs of war, the concept of crimes against humanity entails an added dimension. The United Nations Secretary-General, in his Report pursuant to Security Council Resolution 808 that contains the Statute of the International Tribunal, described crimes against humanity thus:

"47. Crimes against humanity were first recognized in the Charter and Judgement of the Nürnberg Tribunal, as well as in Law No. 10 of the Control Council for Germany. Crimes against humanity are aimed at any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character.

48. Crimes against humanity refer to inhumane acts of a very serious nature, such as wilful killing, torture or rape, committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds. In the conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, such inhumane acts have taken the form of so-called "ethnic cleansing" and widespread and systematic rape and other forms of sexual assault, including enforced prostitution."

Ordinarily, the concept of crimes against humanity extends to crimes committed outwith the context of an armed conflict, as was emphasised by the Appeals Chamber in its Decision on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case. However, the Statute of the International Tribunal specifically requires that, in order to incur its jurisdiction under Article 5, these crimes be committed in an armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia, although this armed conflict may be international or internal in nature.

In the Nikolic Rule 61 Decision of 20 October 1995, Trial Chamber I confirmed that an armed conflict was the first requirement for a crime to be considered a crime against humanity by the International Tribunal. In addition, the Trial Chamber considered that the requirement that crimes must be "directed against any civilian population" is specific to crimes against humanity and entails three components.

"First, the crimes must be directed at a civilian population, specifically identified as a group by the perpetrators of those acts. Secondly, the crimes must, to a certain extent, be organised and systematic. Although they need not be related to a policy established at State level, in the conventional sense of the term, they cannot be the work of isolated individuals alone. Lastly, the crimes, considered as a whole, must be of a certain scale and gravity."

Subsequently, Trial Chamber II, in a Decision on the Form of the Indictment in the Tadic case, emphasised that

"The very nature of the criminal acts in respect of which competence is conferred upon the International Tribunal by Article 5, that they be "directed against any civilian population", ensures that what is to be alleged will not be one particular act but, instead, a course of conduct."

Of further importance is the finding of the International Tribunal that crimes against humanity may be committed against persons who at one time bore arms, but who have subsequently ceased from taking part in combat activities. In its Vukovar Rule 61 Decision, rendered on 3 April 1996, Trial Chamber I stated that,

"[a]lthough according to the terms of Article 5 of the Statute of this Tribunal, the combatants in the traditional sense of the term cannot be victims of a crime against humanity, this does not apply to individuals who, at one particular point in time, carried out acts of resistance. As the Commission of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 780, noted, "it seems obvious that Article 5 applies first and foremost to civilians, meaning people who are not combatants. This, however, should not lead to any quick conclusions concerning people who at one particular point in time did bear arms. ... Information of the overall circumstances is relevant for the interpretation of the provision in a spirit consistent with its purpose." (Doc S/1994/674, para. 78). This conclusion is supported by case law, particularly the Barbie case. In that case the French Cour de Cassation said that "inhumane acts and persecution which, in the name of a State practising a policy of ideological hegemony, were committed systematically or collectively not only against individuals because of their membership in a racial or religious group but also against the adversaries of that policy whatever the form of the opposition" could be considered a crime against humanity. (Cass. Crim. 20 December 1985).

Crimes against humanity are to be distinguished from war crimes against individuals. In particular, they must be widespread or demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as there is a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could qualify as a crime against humanity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single victim or a limited number of victims might be recognised as guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the specific context identified above."

In its final Opinion and Judgment in the Tadic case, rendered on 7 May 1997, Trial Chamber II largely agreed with these findings and added that a discriminatory intent is also a requirement for any crime against humanity. When considering the definition of "civilian", the Trial Chamber held that "a wide definition of civilian population ... is justified". Indeed, in the view of the Trial Chamber,

"the targeted population must be of a predominantly civilian nature. The presence of non-civilians in their midst does not change the character of the population."

Furthermore, "those actively involved in a resistance movement can qualify as victims of crimes against humanity."

The Trial Chamber further noted that,

"the emphasis is not on the individual victim but rather on the collective, the individual being victimised not because of his individual attributes but rather because of his membership of a targeted civilian population. This has been interpreted to mean, as elaborated below, that the acts must occur on a widespread or systematic basis, that there must be some form of a governmental, organizational or group policy to commit these acts and that the perpetrator must know of the context within which his actions are taken, as well as the requirement imported by the Secretary-General and members of the Security Council that the actions be taken on discriminatory grounds."

It should be emphasised that the Trial Chamber determined that, in order to constitute crimes against humanity, the relevant crimes can occur on either a widespread basis, referring to number of victims, or in a systematic manner, indicating a pattern or methodical plan. As long as one of these two conditions is met, this is sufficient to exclude isolated or random acts. Similarly, "[e]ven an isolated act can constitute a crime against humanity if it is the product of a political system based on terror or persecution."

The Trial Chamber also stated that the concept of crimes against humanity necessarily implies a policy element, although this policy need not be explicitly formulated, nor need it be the policy of a State.

"Importantly, however, such a policy need not be formalized and can be deduced from the way in which the acts occur. Notably, if the acts occur on a widespread or systematic basis that demonstrates a policy to commit those acts, whether formalized or not."

It is with all of these considerations in mind that the report presents the campaign of the Serbian/FRY security forces and the violations of international humanitarian law which characterise it. It is the view here advocated that each of the attacks and incidents described in the following text are illustrative of a criminal policy on the part of the Serbian/FRY authorities and, as such, clearly constitute crimes against humanity within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal by virtue of Article 5 of the Statute.

It is thus the intention of the present report to analyse the events of the Kosovo conflict in the context of Articles 3 and 5 of the Statute. This reflects a caution designed to ensure that the findings of the report are stated in the strongest possible terms, without there being any possible question as to the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal over the events discussed.

Before continuing, however, it is necessary to settle the matter of the existence of an armed conflict in Kosovo in 1998, for, as has been revealed above, this is a prerequisite for the application of both Articles 3 and 5.

(i) Legal Definition

There is no convenient legal formulation of that which constitutes an "armed conflict" for the purposes of the applicability of international humanitarian law. Furthermore, the nature of modern armed conflicts is such that it is often difficult to determine when, precisely, a conflict commences. Given, however, that the basic principles of international humanitarian law seek to protect fundamental rights to humane treatment, and that the application of this body of law to a conflict is not intended to confer any legal status on the parties engaged in hostilities, it is generally accepted that the basic provisions of international humanitarian law should be applied as widely as possible.

In the most recent judicial expression of that which constitutes an armed conflict, and thus triggers the application of international humanitarian law, the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal recognised these two different forms of conflict and described them thus:

In relation to these provisions of so-called "Geneva law", the paramount concern has been to distinguish between a situation of internal armed conflict and the existence of civil strife or internal disturbance, involving isolated acts of violence. Such civil strife is often considered by States to be inappropriate for international attention, and this is indeed the position of the government of the FRY in relation to the Kosovo conflict. Thus, in 1949, during the drafting of the Geneva Conventions, different criteria were evoked to define an armed conflict of a non-international character. The Commentary to common article 3 describes certain elements which could be indicative of the existence of such an armed conflict:

"(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention.

(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the national territory.

(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or

(b) That it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or

(c) That it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes only of the present Convention; or

(d) That the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.

(4) (a) that the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State.

(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over the population within a determinate portion of the national territory.

(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of an organized authority and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.

(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the Convention."

The Commentary is also careful to emphasise that the absence of such indicators does not, however, render article 3 inapplicable, for "the scope of application of the Article must be as wide as possible."

During the Diplomatic Conference which led to the adoption of the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977, it became clear that the scope of application of the second Protocol would be more restrictive than that of common article 3, which it was intended to supplement. Nonetheless, it is useful to consider also the criteria for the applicability of Protocol II for some guidance on what is considered to be an internal armed conflict. The ICRC Commentary to the Protocol states,

"First, a non-international armed conflict is distinct from an international armed conflict because of the legal status of the parties opposing each other; the parties to the conflict are not sovereign States, but the government of a single State in conflict with one or more armed factions within its territory.

It is therefore appropriate to raise the question whether all forms of violent opposition to a government, from simple localized rioting to a general confrontation with all the characteristics of a war, can be considered as non-international armed conflicts.

The expression "armed conflict" gives an important indication in this respect since it introduces a material criterion: the existence of open hostilities between armed forces which are organized to a greater or lesser degree. Internal disturbances, characterized by isolated or sporadic acts of violence, do not therefore constitute armed conflict in a legal sense, even if the government is forced to resort to police forces or even to armed units for the purpose of restoring law and order. Within these limits, non-international armed conflict seems to be a situation in which hostilities break out between armed forces or organized armed groups within the territory of a single State. Insurgents fighting against the established order would normally seek to overthrow the government in power or alternatively to bring about a secession so as to set up a new State."

Through this explanation, the Commentary illustrates the collective character of the confrontation between forces, which cannot consist of isolated individuals without co-ordination. Moreover, a Sub-Group of the Working Group at the Conference of Government Experts, which was established in 1971 to consider the drafting of the new instruments to supplement the Geneva Conventions, adopted three criteria that had to be met on the side of the insurgents for the recognition of the existence of an internal armed conflict and these were indeed incorporated into the text of article 1 of Protocol II.

(i) a responsible command;

(ii) such control over part of the territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations; and

(iii) the ability to implement the Protocol.

These criteria evidently restrict the applicability of Protocol II to conflicts of a certain degree of intensity. Thus, not all cases of non-international armed conflict are covered, as is the case with common article 3.

(ii) The Kosovo Liberation Army as an organised armed group engaged in protracted armed violence

While reliable information on the size and organisation of the Kosovo Liberation Army throughout 1998 is difficult to gather, and a certain degree of speculation about its strength and activities has been published in the media, it is possible to establish certain basic facts by utilising press sources, NGO reports and through discussions with professed members or associated persons.

The group calling itself the Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves in Albanian, referred to as the "UCK" throughout this report) emerged in 1996 and 1997, apparently in response to the mounting repression of the Kosovar population by the Serbian/FRY authorities during the course of the preceding decade. The initial activities of the UCK were limited to isolated attacks on police vehicles and stations in Kosovo and then the targeting of Serbs and Kosovars loyal to the Serbian regime. By the end of 1997, however, it was demonstrating its ability to launch co-ordinated operations over a fairly wide area, indicating the emergence of a high degree of organisational structure, which many speculated came from members based outside of the FRY, particularly in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. The looting of Albania’s military depots in 1997 boosted the availability of large supplies of weapons and other equipment to the UCK and other groups, and the reigning anarchy in northern Albania facilitated its ability to move personnel and supplies freely.

Sources indicate that, at the beginning of 1998, the UCK had approximately 500 active members, which then swelled into the several thousand towards the summer. Some sources estimate that the number could have reached 12-20,000 during June as the Kosovar population became more and more disillusioned with the effectiveness of their struggle for increased autonomy through non-violent methods.

The American-Albanian community provides important financial and logistical backing to the UCK and its North American based organisation purchases equipment, especially army fatigues, other clothing necessities and, apparently, arms, through its contacts and then has them transported to Kosovo. Communities in Switzerland and Germany are the other two main channels of financial support and a foundation which translates as "the Motherland calls you" is utilised to raise funds. Sources allege that bank accounts in Switzerland were used to centralise donations, although there are indications that some of these were closed in August. In addition, there have been claims that the taxes imposed by the Kosovar "parallel government", both within Kosovo and abroad, have also been utilised latterly for UCK activities.

The soldiers of the UCK wear various types of uniforms, often depending on availability. These do, however, all bear the insignia of the black double-headed eagle on a red background. Through its network of support, these forces are mostly equipped with light weaponry and some sophisticated telecommunications equipment, including satellite telephones. According to a prominent fund-raiser for the UCK in New York City, the UCK has access to a variety of different weapons, including AK 47s, M 48s, 50 mm calibre guns from Pakistan and Bulgaria, anti-aircraft and anti-tank rockets, Chinese rocket launchers, and 75mm cannons. A UCK member based in Likovac further stated that they had access to kalashnikovs, sniper rifles, and 62 and 82 mm mortars, which were brought in from northern Albania, having originated in the United States or Montenegro. Furthermore, there are a number of UCK training camps and bases in northern Albania, as well as many, of a more mobile nature, throughout Kosovo.

UCK sources maintain that strict discipline is kept within the Army and that if a soldier refuses to execute an order or take part in a mission, he is jailed in camp. Furthermore, a military tribunal with an appeals chamber has been created in order to adjudicate claims of misbehaviour or any other violations of the military code. To this effect, a formal military code has reportedly been drafted.

At the end of June 1998, an experienced international monitor in Kosovo observed that the UCK appeared to have created a military structure with distinct levels of command and that UCK military police controlled roads and guarded headquarters locations. This observer assessed that the UCK had achieved a significant level of control of an area west of Pristina and were utilising the local infrastructure of small roads to great effect. In his view, a greater degree of strategy and planning had gone into the taking of territory than had previously been thought possible and the co-ordination between different UCK units was evident, particularly when required to mount a rapid response to block the road that leads west out of the Drenica region to Klina, as, in the space of two hours, a series of obstacles had been placed on the road and defensive positions dug.

Indeed, an individual associated with the UCK has asserted that its hierarchy and structure has been a preoccupation since its inception. Thus, the region for UCK activity was divided at an early stage into 5 zones, being: Zone 1- Dukagjin; Zone 2 - Drenica; Zone 3 - Pashtriku; Zone 4 - Llapi (near Pristina); Zone 5 - Moravia. According to this individual, the Supreme Command of the entire province was composed of seven people. Each zone has an operative command with around five commanders, although this number may vary from zone to zone. A UCK member has also claimed that the structure per region was defined strictly, with only one "Shtabi Suprem", and units break down into brigades, "compounds", and "togs" (apparently equivalent to platoons). The commanders head the brigades and together with their counterparts from other regions they discuss the strategies to be adopted.

As will become apparent in the chronology of events laid out below, before the Serbian/FRY offensive at the end of July 1998, the UCK controlled significant parts of the central regions of Kosovo, from the Drenica area south to Malisevo. Although the area west of the road between Djakovica and Pec was never completely under UCK control due to the strong presence of the Yugoslav Army and police forces, it nonetheless remained strong in this region, capable of relatively free movement and access to Albania. Subsequently, the UCK lost much of its gained territory, although it continued in its military operations, using its local networks and infrastructure.

Initially, the UCK had no representation amongst the plethora of political actors in Kosovo. Indeed, the leader of the biggest Kosovar political party, Ibrahim Rugova, refused to even acknowledge its existence. This position did, however, change as the conflict in Kosovo ensued and Adem Demaci, the popular leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo, met with its representatives in February 1998, and subsequently became its political spokesman. Nonetheless, it was never altogether clear who was the real "voice" of the UCK and a variety of figures claiming some position of leadership on the political level have emerged.

It would seem that the UCK was not and is not a singular, unified body, with one simple hierarchy. Instead, it appears more likely that it is formed by an interlinked system of regional centres, organised around a small, core group of individuals, who have largely been living abroad. As the conflict has progressed, various commanders have emerged, many with previous experience in the former Yugoslav People’s Army, and new recruits have received rapid training in the field. Despite these regional divisions, however, each of the groups has been fighting with a common goal and with a certain level of overarching strategy. The demonstrated level of co-ordination and structure, it is submitted, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of being an organised armed group, or groups, for the purposes of the existence of an armed conflict.

There can be no debate on the satisfaction of the second requirement of an armed conflict, that of "protracted armed violence", in the Kosovo context. Numerous press reports, government statements, United Nations resolutions and declarations from regional and international organisations have condemned the violence in Kosovo, from the beginning of the clamp-down by Serbian/FRY forces in February 1998, until the present time. The level of fighting between the UCK and the Serbian/FRY authorities has far exceeded the isolated or sporadic attacks characteristic of a civil disturbance and the massive deployment of special police forces, as well as Yugoslav Army units, utilising a sophisticated array of weaponry and equipment, indicates the truly military nature of the response to the UCK mounted by the regime in Belgrade.

Indeed, on 31 March 1998, the UN Security Council imposed an arms embargo on the FRY, utilising Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Moreover, by 23 September, the Security Council was calling for an immediate cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a cease-fire in Kosovo, indicating the widespread view that what was occurring in the province was no less than an armed conflict.

The present report does not, however, seek to make a determination of when exactly this armed conflict commenced and, in an excess of caution, avoids an extensive discussion of events which took place in the first half of 1998, concentrating instead on the campaigns of July, August and September. It must be emphasised that the purpose of this limitation is merely to ensure that there can be no question as to the jurisdiction of the ICTY at least over some of the events which occurred in Kosovo, and is not intended as a judgement that there was not an armed conflict, in the legal sense, prior to this time, or that the ICTY should not investigate, prosecute and punish any violations of international humanitarian law which might have been committed earlier in the year.

III. CAMPAIGN BY THE SERBIAN/FRY FORCES

While it is not possible to document every incident during the course of the conflict in Kosovo which might be considered to constitute a violation of international humanitarian law, the current report seeks to provide a picture of the campaign mounted by the Serbian/FRY authorities and their forces during 1998. By engaging in a systematic review of several incidents which took place in the chosen time period, in the context of the conflict as a whole, the report demonstrates that these events must be regarded as part of a wider policy on the part of the Serbian/FRY authorities. The Belgrade regime, including President Milutinovic of the Republic of Serbia and President Milosevic of the FRY, sought to crush the Kosovo Liberation Army through direct attacks on their bases and strongholds, as well as the targeting of their support network among the civilian population by instigating a campaign designed to terrorise the Kosovar population as a whole. This fundamental aim dictated all of the events which occurred in Kosovo and involved the commission of serious violations of international humanitarian law by personnel acting under the authority of the leaders of both the Republic of Serbia and the FRY.

As is demonstrated below, the course of events in Kosovo, from the spring, through the summer and into the autumn of 1998 can only be regarded as a military campaign on the part of the Serbian/FRY forces under the control of both Serbia and the leadership of the FRY. The most sensational atrocities that have characterised this campaign and which have been reported sporadically in the media, as well as the less notorious violations of international humanitarian law which have occurred on a widespread basis, cannot be regarded as the mere consequence of the excesses of "rogue elements" within the security and military personnel present in Kosovo and charged with neutralising the threat of terrorism. The following summary of events from March and April through to October instead reveals the stark reality of a sequence of attacks and operations conforming to a large degree to a pattern, which could only have been directed by a central policy and source.

Before entering into a more detailed discussion of the course of the Serbian/FRY campaign from April to October 1998, it is useful to briefly outline the more recent political and historical developments within the FRY and Kosovo, which must be understood in order to place the current conflict in context. It should be emphasised, however, that such an analysis is in no ways an attempt to explain the causes of the conflict, nor to assess the validity of the Kosovars’ claim to increased autonomy or independence. The present report is concerned solely with the methods utilised by the Serbian/FRY authorities to pursue their policies and no conclusions should be drawn beyond those that concern the existence of violations of international humanitarian law. It should also be noted that, for reasons of practicality, place names cited throughout the report are generally given in the Serbian version, although a few may appear in the Albanian.

A. Background

Under the 1974 Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) Kosovo had the status of an autonomous province within the Republic of Serbia, one of the six republics making up Yugoslavia. Despite the fact that Kosovo lacked the formal status of a republic, the 1974 Constitution granted it a large measure of autonomy and, along with Vojvodina, it was a constituent member of the federation, having its own Assembly and seat on the Federal Parliament and Presidency. Despite these measures, the Kosovar population sustained an aspiration to achieve recognition as a republic, with equal rights and privileges to the others. In the census of 1981, 77.4% of its population (1,226,735) were registered as ethnic Albanian and 13.2% (209,498) as Serbs. While more up to date figures have not yet been compiled, most estimates indicate that, due to the much higher birth rate among the Albanian population and recent migrations, around 90% of the population now are considered ethnic Albanian.

Throughout the 1980s the Kosovar population became increasingly vocal, through protests and demonstrations, in its demands for better living conditions as well as republican status. Many people were arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment during this period and prominent Kosovar members of the Communist party were removed. At the same time, towards the end of the 1980s, the Kosovo Serb population, feeling increasingly threatened by these events and being subjected to a concerted propaganda campaign from Belgrade itself, demanded the imposition of measures to prevent what they considered to be attacks upon Serbs within Kosovo. This escalation in tension resulted in a petition presented to Belgrade in 1987 and signed by 60,000 Kosovo Serbs, which called for the removal of the Albanian leadership of Kosovo. At precisely this time, Slobodan Milosevic, head of the Serbian Communist party, was consolidating his power and it was the very issue of Kosovo which he utilised to galvanise popular support. In a now infamous speech given in Kosovo Polje, on 24 April 1987, he promised the Kosovo Serbs that no-one would be allowed to "beat" them again.

Milosevic swiftly ensured the dismissal of two of Kosovo’s top officials and replaced them with persons loyal to himself. The demonstrations and riots which resulted from this were met with the imposition of a partial state of emergency in 1989 and the Kosovo Assembly was coerced into accepting a new constitution, returning their powers to Belgrade. In the unrest which followed, several demonstrators were killed on the streets of Pristina and elsewhere across the province.

Despite this abrogation of autonomy, the Kosovar population established their own parallel State structures and proclaimed their own Constitution of the independent Republic of Kosovo in 1990. The only State to recognise the Republic of Kosovo, however, was Albania, in 1991. Thereafter, the Kosovars organised elections for a parliament, the majority of seats going to the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) and its leader, Ibrahim Rugova, became their President. The parliament was, however, prevented from convening due to concerns about safety from the Serbian police.

Since 1989, the Serbian government in Belgrade, headed by now President Milosevic, imposed a series of measures which resulted in a state of apartheid with Kosovo. Serbs were prohibited from selling property to the Kosovars and were encouraged to move into the province. A uniform school curriculum was imposed which removed the teaching of Albanian culture, language and history and, subsequently, funding was cut off to Albanian language schools. Similarly, in the field of university education, Kosovar students and professors were prevented from continuing their classes and many teachers were dismissed. In addition, in the health-care system, large-scale dismissals of Kosovar professionals were inflicted. In response, the Kosovar parliament established a parallel system of education and health-care, financed largely by way of taxes imposed on the many Kosovars who live abroad, mainly in Switzerland, Germany and Scandinavia.

Furthermore, after the removal of the majority of Kosovars from the police forces within the province, the Serbian police adopted a modus operandi characterised by intimidation, arbitrary arrest and mistreatment. Trials of those considered to be "separatists" have been swift and often resulted in long terms of imprisonment. Moreover, many of those interned have described various forms of ill-treatment and torture inflicted upon them. Indeed, in December 1996, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution demanding an improvement in the human rights situation in Kosovo, the release of political prisoners and the establishment of genuine democratic institutions. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in the former Yugoslavia has also condemned the torture and mistreatment of persons in custody in Kosovo.

Despite the harshness of the Belgrade regime and the denigration of the Kosovar community, the LDK, and particularly its leader, the elected president of Kosovo, Ibrahim Rugova, have maintained a policy advocating the independence of Kosovo through non-violent methods. Until recently, the majority of Kosovars appear to have supported this stance of their leader. However, the prevailing attitude began to change by 1997, when a group calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK) claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on Serbian police officers and Albanians loyal to Belgrade. In response, the police imposed even harsher measures of restriction on the Kosovar community and arrested and imprisoned many individuals on suspicion of being members of the UCK. By the end of 1997, the UCK were launching increasingly bold and well co-ordinated attacks on police barracks and vehicles and declared themselves publicly to be fighting for the independence of Kosovo.

The crackdown on the UCK and escalation into protracted conflict came in February and March 1998, when Serbian police forces (MUP), including special units, mounted several operations within the Drenica region, between the municipalities of Srbica, Klina and Glogovac. Instead of crushing the aspirations of the UCK and their support among the civilian population, these attacks and the casualties thus inflicted served to further incense the Kosovar community and convince them of the uselessness of the non-violent approach of the LDK. More and more young men and women began to join the UCK and the majority of the population became open in its approval of the movement. In turn, large numbers of MUP infantry, as well as special forces, were sent into the province from elsewhere in Serbia, and the Yugoslav Army (VJ) was mobilised along the border with Albania.

B. Method of Operation of the Serbian/FRY forces in Kosovo

From the information gathered, it is clear that a priority for the Serbian/FRY forces in the summer of 1998 was to take control of the major roads which criss-cross Kosovo. Having done this, it was then possible to divide the area into segments which could be systematically "swept" in order to destroy any UCK bases or strongholds and terrorise the local Kosovar population into submission. These operations in each segment of the territory bear remarkable similarity, indicating a significant amount of co-ordination and planning.

Generally, the majority of troops used in each operation were from the Ministry of Interior police of the Republic of Serbia (MUP) and were simply ordinary police infantry (often referred to as the Milicija), dressed in the dark blue camouflage combat uniforms of the police. Other, more specialised, units of the MUP were also used to augment these ordinary forces, such as Special Police Units (Posebne Jedinice Policije, "PJP"), brought in from other parts of the FRY, and smaller units of Special Anti-terrorist forces (Specijalne Antiteroristicke Jedinice, "SAJ"). Within the region, the main MUP bases (SUPs) were in Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica, Pec, Djakovica, Prizren, Urosevac and Gnjilane, and there were also many stations and sub-stations in numerous smaller towns and villages, each with their own commanders.

In addition, it is clear that elements drawn from the State security branch of the Serbian Ministry of Interior were also involved in Kosovo. These "secret" police formations are more difficult to identify and trace, due to their lack of public presence or identifiable uniforms. Nonetheless, the available information suggests two groupings – the plain-clothes agents of State security (DB), who are ordinarily housed in the regular police stations throughout Serbia alongside their colleagues in the MUP and are not involved in combat-style operations, and the State security special operations units (Jedinica za Specijalne Operacije, "JSO", also sometimes referred to as the Red Berets), which are irregular formations constituted as need dictates and who wear a variety of uniforms, depending much on availability and group affiliations. These Serbian forces, as organised in the period relevant to the present report, may be simply represented on a diagram as follows:

PRESIDENT OF SERBIA

PRIME MINISTER OF SERBIA

MINISTER OF INTERIOR

Vlajko Stojkovic

PUBLIC SECURITY STATE SECURITY

DEPARTMENT (MUP) DEPARTMENT (DB)

(Chief: Vlastimir Djordevic) (Chief: Jovica Stanisic)

In overall command of the local police in Kosovo at the relevant time was General Sreten Lukic, who clearly had the formal authority to control the MUP forces on the ground and with whom international organisations, including KDOM observers, communicated concerning matters of security for themselves as well as for the local Kosovar population. The members of the PJP were generally drawn from the ranks of the ordinary police throughout the FRY and were dispatched to Kosovo for short periods on a rotation basis in order to boost the local police forces. General Lukic would thus have had nominal authority over these forces also, for the duration of their presence in the province. The SAJ, however, is a much smaller group of elite MUP personnel, established in 1995, originally under the command of Radovan Stojcic, who are utilised in specific situations in the role of "commandos". These forces generally wear dark, blackish, uniforms and balaclavas, and have sophisticated equipment and weaponry at their disposal. Once again, there is some speculation about who is in command of the SAJ forces on the ground, and it would appear unlikely that this would be a local MUP officer. The available information, however, names General Obrad Stevanovic as the present commander of all SAJ formations, including those in Kosovo. Sources have also revealed that the overall Chief of the MUP forces, Vlastimir Djordevic, was himself in Kosovo during the relevant period, ensuring the co-ordination of operations.

As stated above, public information on the JSO forces is relatively limited. The transient nature of their formations and variety of their dress appears, indeed, to be designed to obscure and confuse. Nonetheless, it is the assessment of the team that these forces were present during many of the operations described in the following sections of the report and, in particular, they appear to have maintained a strong presence in the western regions of Kosovo. Key to an understanding of the role of these forces is that "paramilitaries", as such, were not involved in the conflict, for every "soldier" operating in Kosovo was nominally incorporated into a formation of security forces within the responsibility of the Serbian authorities. Thus, unlike during the conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia, no private armies were permitted. However, there is no doubt that many of the paramilitary groups which took part in the aforementioned conflicts, were, in fact, also involved in Kosovo and provided the substance of the JSO. Additionally, there appears to have been some overlapping between members of the SAJ and members of the JSO. Thus, witnesses to many of the operations by Serbian/FRY forces in Kosovo recount the presence of soldiers with "painted faces" and others with distinctive, large knives, or with shaven heads, or red scarves. This indicates different groups of "soldiers", with their own internal structure and hierarchy, brought in under the auspices of the JSO. It would further appear likely that these groups were involved in those operations which resulted in the more notorious atrocities of the conflict and, moreover, that the choice of a particular group for a specific operation would have been sufficient to indicate the level of destruction and/or loss of life that was required by those directing the campaign, without them having to give explicit orders. The one individual whose name arises many times as being a, or the, commander of the JSO in the Kosovo conflict is Franki Simatovic, whose men were designated "Frenki’s".

While it is not possible to further elaborate on the structure of the JSO, without more sophisticated, technical methods of information gathering, it is clear that they came under the overall authority of the then Chief of State security, Jovica Stanisic, who was also the National Security Adviser to President Milosevic of the FRY. Indeed, it appears that, for a certain period of time, Stanisic was himself present in Kosovo, to maintain control over the diverse groupings within the JSO and ensure their co-ordination and co-operation with the other Serbian/FRY forces involved.

These MUP and State security forces themselves possessed considerable weaponry and equipment, but it is also the case that the Yugoslav Army ("VJ") was present in the interior of Kosovo, contrary to its constitutional role to protect the borders, and provided much in the way of support to the MUP, as well as conducting its own operations, particularly in the border regions. The VJ is a federal institution, born out of the previous Yugoslav National Army ("JNA") of the SFRY and now subject to the ultimate authority of the Supreme Defence Council, headed by the President of the FRY. At the time relevant to the present report, the VJ was comprised of 3 Armies and a Special Forces Corps, all under the formal command of the Chief of the VJ General Staff, Colonel General Momcilo Perisic. The territory of Kosovo comes within the area of responsibility of the 3rd Army, based in Nis, which was, in turn, under the command of Colonel General Dusan Samardzic. Within the 3rd Army, the units forming the Pristina Corps, which was commanded by General Nebojsa Pavkovic, were those which maintained a presence in Kosovo itself and were involved in combat operations. The organisation of these forces can be represented diagrammatically as follows:

SUPREME DEFENCE COUNCIL

|

VJ GENERAL STAFF

(Colonel General Perisic)

1^st Army 2^nd Army 3^rd Army Special forces corps Security directorate

(Col. General Samardzic) .

Pristina Corps

(52^nd Mechanised Corps)

(General Nebojsa Pavkovic)

15^th Armoured Brigade (Pristina)

125^th Motorised Infantry Brigade (Kosovska Mitrovica) (incorporating a motorised infantry battalion in Pec)

243^rd Motorised Infantry Brigade (Urosevac)

549^th Motorised Infantry Brigade (Prizren)

52^nd Mixed Artillery Brigade (Gnjilane)

52^nd MP Battalion (Pristina)

83^rd Aviation Regiment (Pristina)

52^nd Engineers Regiment (Krusevac)

52^nd Anti-Aircraft Regiment (Djakovica)

311^th Air-Defence Regiment (Djakovica)

53^rd Border Guard Battalion (Djakovica)

55^th Border Guard Battalion (Prizren)

57^th Border Guard Battalion (Urosevac)

It is generally felt that the VJ had fallen out of favour within the FRY State hierarchy, and particularly with President Milosevic, by the time of the Kosovo conflict, and preference in terms of resources and prestige was being given to the MUP and State security forces. Nonetheless, the VJ remained a well-equipped, modern army, possessing M-84 and T-55 tanks, M-80 armoured fighting vehicles, BOV-M armoured personnel carriers, BOV-3 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns and Praga armoured trucks. There was also clearly some dispute about the role of the VJ in Kosovo, with the Montenegrin President refusing to allow Montenegrin soldiers to serve in the province and a rift becoming apparent between President Milosevic and Colonel General Perisic, who was subsequently removed. Nonetheless, the VJ activity within Kosovo is undeniable.

Numerous witness accounts, as well as reports from international organisations on the ground, reveal that the pattern of attack of these combined MUP and VJ forces consisted of a process lasting three or four days. Having chosen a particular village or area for action, the MUP and VJ forces would approach with armoured vehicles, often including tanks, seal off the roads leading to the area, and set up positions around or on two sides of the area. From these, the area would then be shelled over a continuous period of time, often a day and a night. This shell-fire was not generally designed to inflict substantial damage on the village or area itself, although civilian casualties often resulted, but to encourage the local population to leave their property and homes. For this purpose, the attacking forces would generally leave a corridor open to allow the fleeing population to move in the desired direction.

After this process was largely completed, the MUP infantry "troops" would enter the village or area and move from house to house, searching for those residents who had chosen to remain in their homes. Such persons would be gathered together in a central area and the men may be separated from the women and taken to a nearby police station for further questioning and detention. The accounts of the witnesses to such events relate the threats, intimidation and physical violence to which they were subjected during this process. At the same time, the police forces in the villages would engage in large-scale looting and destruction of property. Any items of value were taken away on trucks and houses and crops were often subsequently set on fire and livestock killed. In addition, snipers would often be located throughout the relevant area and would often-times fire upon those of the local residents who had been allowed to remain in their homes, or who had been released. After this phase of the operation, the majority of the forces involved would be withdrawn and only a small police contingent left behind to patrol the area and continue the intimidation of the population over the following days.

Sometimes, the displaced Kosovar residents returned to their homes relatively swiftly following such operations, although often those who had fled were hesitant to return, fearing further attack. These preferred instead to remain with friends or relatives in other parts of Kosovo, or even camp out in the open over a prolonged period. It was observed by KDOM in mid August that the majority of destruction, throughout Kosovo, was concentrated along the main roads and that, generally, the smaller villages that were hit were virtually uninhabitable but the larger towns could be reinhabited with nominal repairs. From discussions with local displaced Kosovars, however, it appeared that security was more of an issue for them than housing availability and was the primary factor precluding return to their homes.

By 6 October 1998, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees ("UNHCR") estimated that 294,100 people had thus been displaced by the fighting: 200,000 remaining within Kosovo; 20,000 being elsewhere in Serbia; 20,500 having travelled over the border into Albania; 41,800 to Montenegro; 6,800 to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 1,000 to FYROM and 2,000 in each of Turkey and Slovenia. Many of the internally displaced have been forced to move from area to area within Kosovo, as the offensive operations of the Serbian/FRY forces progressed, carrying with them only those of their belongings which were easily transportable. By the approach of winter, however, it seems that the overwhelming majority of displaced persons were living within permanent structures, generally the homes of their extended families, rather than in the open, and it is largely due to this feature of the structure and interrelations of Kosovar society that a more massive humanitarian disaster was averted at this time.

Having thus identified the general pattern of attack and the Serbian/FRY forces involved in the campaign, there follows an outline of events from March to the beginning of October, before attention is focused on some specific examples of the serious violations of international humanitarian law which were committed by these forces. It should be noted that, while the summary seeks to chart the general progression of the campaign and mentions many towns and villages throughout Kosovo, it is in no way an exhaustive description of the damage or casualties inflicted. Instead, what is sought to be developed is a broad picture of trends and movement, as well as to leave no doubt as to the level of organisation and co-ordination required for such a campaign to have been mounted. It must also be emphasised once again that the present report does not attempt to chart the violations of international humanitarian law committed by the UCK, nor the various attacks and operations mounted by it.

3. Chronological summary: March – October 1998

The region of Drenica, in the centre of Kosovo, being a known stronghold of the UCK, was the first to be targeted by the Serb security forces. In February and March 1998, operations were mounted by large numbers of MUP troops, including special units, who attacked Kosovar families in Prekaz, Cirez and Likosane, resulting in the deaths of 83 people as well as substantial destruction of property. Witnesses and the media report the arrival of MUP reinforcements in the town of Srbica in mid-March, who were stationed at the ammunitions factory located there. Towards the end of the month, these forces were utilised in a number of further operations in Drenica, while access to the area was cut off to international monitors. Despite this restriction, the European Community Monitoring Mission (ECMM), who conducted patrols throughout the FRY, as well as in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and FYROM, noted a police convoy entering the Drenica region on the road from Pristina to Pec on 31 March, including one armoured personnel carrier (APC), accompanied by a VJ truck containing soldiers with the appearance of being conscripts.

At the beginning of April, the Drenica region was reopened to the ECMM, who reported that the police (MUP) did not appear to be in control of much of the area, although they were continuing to increase their presence and create heavily fortified bunkers and checkpoints on the major roads. All the police thus encountered were dressed in standard blue uniforms bearing the "milicija" insignia and some were clearly special units, who wore distinctive shoulder flashes with the PJP emblem. On patrol on 4 April, the ECMM noted that the village of Donje Obilic, to the south west of Srbica, in Drenica, bore the evidence of fighting and appeared deserted, local police complaining of attacks by the UCK. The ECMM further noted that the UCK seemed to have established a strong presence and concluded that by mid April they controlled a corridor from Sedlare through Lapusnik to Rezala. The VJ had also established a camp east of the road from Pristina to Kosovska Mitrovica by mid-April and, on 23 April, the ECMM observed four VJ tanks and a number of APCs about two kilometres east of Komorane. Reports of action by MUP forces on 21 April, in the area of Lausa, described the shelling of villages by armoured vehicles, possibly including tanks.

In the region bordering Albania, particularly around Djakovica, the ECMM also reported a clear build up of police and military forces. The VJ had established a semi-permanent base at a factory north of Djakovica and by the end of April there was some firing upon villages in the Decane area. Local press sources confirmed such attacks, particularly on the villages of Ponoshec and Morina.

In addition to the operations in Drenica and on the border around Decane, towards the end of April offensive operations by the Serbian/FRY forces had spread to the area of Dukagjin, around Jablanica. According to the local press, many villages were being subjected to shelling from a distance while the surrounding roads were blocked in order to prevent access to journalists, international observers and organisations and the distribution of humanitarian aid. The press further reported that the town of Klina was being targeted by Serbian/FRY forces at the end of April, along with Sicevo, to the east of Klina, and Resnik.

It seems that the UCK had a base in Glodjane, in the north-east Decane area, from which it had easy access to weapons being brought across the border from Albania. At the end of April, the ECMM noted that it appeared to be gaining in strength, particularly in the area of Lausa and south of the road from Srbica to Klina. However, at the beginning of May there were many reports that Serbian/FRY forces were conducting operations in the border area, with the apparent intent to divide the UCK strongholds around Decane from those in Drenica, as well as to separate them from Albania. Official sources maintained that all clashes in the border region were the consequence of efforts to prevent weapons from being smuggled into Kosovo by Albanian terrorists, although the Kosovar press continually reported indiscriminate attacks on civilians and their homes by police and army forces. The presence of MUP forces in Djakovica had increased greatly and many were also reported to be stationed in a health centre in Decane town. According to these same reports, combined police units engaged in the shelling of several villages along the border area, including Babaloc, Erec and Gramacel and these attacks continued and increased in intensity into May.

On 16 May, after the first meeting between President Milosevic and Ibrahim Rugova, operations intensified and moved eastwards to the area between Djakovica and Orahovac, where police forces, including special police forces with armoured vehicles, targeted several villages. The town of Zrze, on the main road and a major crossing point, was observed by the ECMM to be deserted and police to be moving between the houses, which clearly bore some shell damage as well as being burnt. Local media sources confirmed the fighting in and around Zrze, as well as around Lapusnik, Srbica, Junik and Djakovica.

At the end of May, the town of Djakovica was sealed off to outside observers and organisations for a week. From Albania, however, it could be observed by ECMM that many of the border villages were being shelled over a period of several days. Once again, the press reported several casualties among the local Kosovar population as well as the expansion of the area of offensive action. It was stated that, starting on 23 May, the Klina municipality was the focus of many attacks. Additionally, in the town of Ljubenic, between Pec and Decane, eight members of a Kosovar family were reported to have been executed. Also at the end of May, there was an apparent increase in the police forces stationed in Pec itself, locals reporting that these included special forces of both the MUP and the VJ. By this time, the zone of operations extended from Rausic down to Djakovica.

In addition to shelling and clashes between the Serbian/FRY forces and the UCK, it was becoming apparent that large-scale looting was being engaged in by the MUP. Once a village was abandoned by its inhabitants, troops would take whatever property of value they could find and it is believed that this practice was permitted as a method of supplementing the insufficient wages paid to the ordinary MUP forces. Furthermore, after such plunder of property had taken place, houses were often set on fire by these same MUP forces.

At the beginning of June, the offensive in the border region, between Decane and Djakovica, continued. Rastavica was observed by the ECMM being shelled and VJ troops were seen torching a house. Smoke was also seen coming from Prilep and reports from local sources stated that several houses in Junik were in flames. Allegations that helicopter gunships were being used in the border area to fire upon fleeing refugees and VJ planes used to attack villages, began to be made in the Kosovar media. Popovac, Smonica and Morina were being subjected to artillery fire, including from tanks, and it appeared that the UCK were returning fire to a limited extent. By 9 June, the VJ operation in this area appeared to be reducing, although fires were clearly observed to be still burning in Popovac and VJ tanks were patrolling throughout. The town of Decane itself bore the evidence of heavy fighting, many houses being destroyed. Albanian border guards reported to the ECMM that VJ forces had been firing with tanks and mortars and using illuminating devices at night to light up their targets along the border. In addition, on 15 June, ECMM monitors stationed in Albania observed the shelling of the border villages of Novo Selo, Zndrelle and Kramavik.

Despite the VJ and MUP actions, the territory under the control of the UCK had expanded by mid June and for a short period the Serbian police could not hold the main artery between Pristina and Pec. The UCK quickly established their own check-points here and on the road between Suva Reka and Orahovac. Direct clashes between the UCK and the Serbian/FRY forces increased greatly at this time, while international observers and humanitarian organisations were denied access to the main areas of conflict.

Around Stimlje, further to the east, the presence of VJ and MUP forces increased at this time. The nearby village of Crnoljevo was clearly deserted, while ECMM noted the presence of bullet case and anti-aircraft shell cases on the road, and 50% of population of Suva Reka had also fled. Among the local Kosovar population there was much concern about reports of the presence of Serbian "paramilitary forces" in Suva Reka and Dulje. While the UCK "liberated territory" had extended from Suva Reka to Malisevo, Srbica was still under the control of the Serbian/FRY forces and Glogovac had been deserted. Reports indicated that many Kosovars who had fled the Klina area had moved into those parts of Drenica within the "liberated territory".

By the end of June significant areas of central Kosovo were in UCK control, rendering the supply route for the Serbian/FRY forces precarious. These gains, while undoubtedly being somewhat exaggerated in much of the Kosovar press, served to boost the confidence of the population in the methods utilised by the UCK, rather than the so-called non-violent strategy which continued to be advocated by the LDK and Ibrahim Rugova, who would not recognise the UCK, and this resulted in the further increase in its membership.

Towards the end of June, the offensive by the VJ and MUP in the border area continued further, with the shelling of villages. The widespread looting of houses was also observed in this area and it appeared to the ECMM that the VJ were strengthening their positions. Additionally, on 28 and 29 June a significant assault was launched on Belacevac, to the west of Pristina, north of Slatina, which had been in the control of the UCK, and the press also reported a police attack, using helicopters, on Klina.

It should be noted that during a meeting in Moscow on 16 June, between President Milosevic and the Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, an agreement was reached to allow international diplomatic observers into Kosovo to monitor the situation there. These observers formed three groups – those under the auspices of the States of the European Union (EU KDOM), those coming from the United States, also incorporating Canada, (US KDOM) and those from the Russian Federation (Russian KDOM) – and became operational on 6 July 1998. EU KDOM thus replaced the role played by the ECMM in Kosovo. While these observers were, by the agreement, entitled to unimpeded access throughout Kosovo, they were often prevented from patrolling large areas of territory by MUP forces at checkpoints along the roads. The general pattern of such denial of access involved a complete block whenever the Serbian/FRY forces were engaged in an operation in a particular area, until the completion of that operation and a degree of "cleaning up".

By the beginning of July, clashes between the UCK and Serbian/FRY forces had spread further northwards, on the road from Kosovska Mitrovica and Gornje Klina. Further evidence of fighting at Crnoljevo was also observed.

The border villages continued to sustain shelling by the VJ and soldiers were observed by the ECMM monitors stationed across the border in Albania to be involved in the clearing of houses. Many houses were being torched by these same forces and a significant degree of troop movement could be seen, along with the presence of military helicopters. Additional reports of displaced persons seeking to cross the border into Albania being fired upon were being collected upon the arrival of such persons in Tropoje, and other locations. The village of Batusa was apparently targeted on 6 and 7 July and many houses set on fire. Such reports continued towards mid July of helicopters and heavy mortar and artillery fire in the area from Djakovica to Junik. In confirmation of such witness accounts, smoke was observed coming from the area of Rastavica.

The village of Lodja, south of Pec, was the location of heavy clashes on 5, 6 and 7 July and Istinic also sustained shell-fire. In addition, fighting around the location of the Trepca mine, in Stari Trg, north east of Kosovska Mitrovica, commenced and continued over many days. Also at the beginning of July, the village of Kijevo, on the road between Pristina and Pec, fell under the control of the Serbian/FRY forces after a concerted attack, although the surrounding area was still controlled by the UCK. Once again, the international community, including KDOM, was denied access to this area.

By 22 July, reports were being received that Orahovac had come under complete MUP control, after significant clashes with the UCK. It was further reported that the town had been abandoned by its residents, many of whom had fled towards Malisevo. Lurid accounts of executions and other atrocities during the fighting in Orahovac began to be received by the press and KDOM and this served only to increase the mounting panic of the local population.

After this, and towards the end of July, the Serbian/FRY forces launched significant new offensives across Kosovo, including the area west of Pristina aimed at retaking the road to Pec, the area east of Suva Reka, and in the region of Blace and Dulje, where there was a significant VJ presence. The MUP also reported fighting between themselves and the UCK for control of the road between Suva Reka and Stimlje, while they also appeared to be making progress towards the UCK stronghold of Malisevo. These operations seemed to mark a turning point in the conflict, the UCK losing much of its previously gained territory. The local press reported that the Serbian/FRY forces were operating in three fighting zones at this time – Gryka e Carraleves, Gryka e Lapushnikut and Kijevo – in order to isolate the UCK bases in the Decane, Reke e Keqe and Drenica regions.

On 27 July, EU KDOM observed that Blace and Dulje were being subjected to artillery fire by VJ forces and that these villages were deserted. Furthermore, the UCK claimed that Serbian tank crews had looted houses and then set fire to them and that special forces, milicija and VJ troops participated in the operation. Action in the area of Rudnik and south and south-west of Srbica in the direction of Lausa and Glogovac was reported and UCK sources stated that on 2 and 3 August, security forces attacked south from Srbica and Rudnik, destroying many villages, while US KDOM was denied access to these areas. As a result of these new offensives, by 31 July, MUP forces were in control of the major roads in the interior of Kosovo. Previous UCK checkpoints on the road from Pristina to Pec and Lapusnik to Zrze and Pec had been dismantled. However, the UCK apparently still held control of areas east and west of the road between Malisevo and Orahovac.

In the area on the border with Albania, troop and vehicle movements were visible at the end of July, around the villages of Panosevac and Smonica. Many smoke plumes could be seen coming from this area by both the ECMM in northern Albania and KDOM within Kosovo. The town of Junik, which was occupied by the UCK, remained under siege and was being subjected to heavy shelling. EU KDOM reported that the town, which was one of the largest UCK bases, was surrounded by MUP forces, who made an offer of safe passage for unarmed persons within the town who wished to leave, and warned that any attack on the police would result in the complete destruction of the village. In addition, MUP reinforcements could be observed entering the area from the north. On 2 August, east of the road between Decane and Djakovica, there was also clearly heavy fighting between the UCK and VJ and MUP forces, particularly in the area of Prilep.

Fighting was also reported east of Klina, on 2 August, and smoke was observed by US KDOM from this area and to the south of Kijevo. South and south-east of Klina, the villages of Dolovo, Gornje Grabinica, Novo Selo and Zaimovo were evidently being systematically burnt. The town of Malisevo, which had been a stronghold for the UCK, itself fell under the control of MUP forces by the end of July and the majority of its population, along with the many Kosovars who had arrived in the town after fleeing their homes elsewhere, abandoned the area. In the following days, the damage to the town increased rapidly as the MUP continued to loot and destroy property. KDOM reported the visible bullet pock-marking, artillery/tank round holes as well as the damage from arson. Moreover, on 4 August US KDOM observed the security forces (MUP) blatantly looting shops.

In addition, from Malisevo to Lapusnik it was apparent that more and more farms were burning and these deserted towns were becoming increasingly damaged. US KDOM observed many newly burning houses in Lapusnik and noted a group of partially uniformed MUP in the vicinity of these fires. Furthermore, Blace was reported as being severely damaged and deserted and the town of Decane, in the west, was also becoming increasingly destroyed. On 31 July, US KDOM noted that the killing of livestock by MUP forces was widespread, from Lapusnik, to Malisevo and Blace and, between Iglarevo and Lapusnik, there was also much damage to property in evidence. The area appeared to have been largely deserted, many buildings having burnt to the ground. Between Komorane and Orahovac burnt fields and unharvested crops marked the landscape, and there was quite some considerable damage to buildings and to the road, the latter seeming to have been recently caused by heavy tracked vehicles.

EU KDOM noted that, at the northern edge of Orahovac, the VJ and the MUP were apparently co-ordinating their activities and the destruction of the town appeared to be the result of damage and looting after fighting had taken place, rather than as a result of it. While some internally displaced persons (IDPs) were returning to Orahovac, male returnees had been told they must register with the security forces. In addition, locals reported that male IDPs had been taken by the MUP forces for use as labour and some of the residents of Banja claimed to have seen such men working for the MUP in Malisevo. It seems that the Serbian authorities had also air-dropped leaflets in the Banja area, urging IDPs to return home.

Both EU and US KDOM teams found it extremely difficult to exercise their functions at the beginning of August due to the denial of access to many parts of the Drenica area by the Serbian/FRY forces. Other international organisations were similarly denied free movement around Malisevo and Suva Reka. Nonetheless, it was clear that there had been a large-scale exodus of the Kosovar population from Drenica, some towards Prizren in the south, and others towards Kosovska Mitrovica, to the north. In addition, EU KDOM noted that the VJ was clearly being used within Kosovo instead of just in the border areas and it observed VJ troops looting property, as well as VJ tanks and equipment being used in support of police actions.

On 4 August, the Serbian authorities claimed to have "neutralised" heavily armed groups of Kosovars in Lausa and stated that the MUP were now in control of this entire region. However, towards the middle of August, the road between Glogovac and Srbica was in contention between the UCK and Serbian/FRY forces and towns and villages from Komorane to Srbica were clearly deserted. Smoke could also be observed coming from the Krnjice area, north east of Klina, as well as south of Klina and Kijevo. KDOM observed that many towns and villages from the area west of Kijevo, through Lapusnik, Malisevo and Stimlje had been badly damaged and that from Lapusnik to Dulje buildings continued to burn. MUP forces were observed occupying many houses and other buildings in these villages, as well as setting them on fire. In the view of EU KDOM, the village of Drenovac, on the Pristina to Pec road, had been intentionally destroyed and also the nearby village of Zaimovo, to a lesser degree. The village of Lausa, near Srbica, had clearly also been very badly destroyed. Between Malisevo, Orahovac and Blace, MUP forces dominated, Blace itself being occupied by the Serbian forces. However, the area in the vicinity of Crnoljevo appeared still to be in contention.

Between Rudnik and the vicinity of Durakovac, to the north and east of Pec, a strong MUP presence was also observed, including members standing beside some burning crops and engaged in the searching of houses. EU KDOM reported action by Serbian security forces in Rudnik itself, on 6 August. Some units of the VJ were also observed in this area, where there had been much damage to houses and shops. Further east, KDOM reported that practically every house in Lausa had been destroyed.

On 10 August, reports indicated the prolonged artillery shelling of Junik and Erec. Junik appeared to be surrounded on three fronts and the VJ was demanding that the villagers leave by 12 August. In accordance with the pattern of previous offensive actions, access to this area and around Djakovica was denied to the international community, although, from over the Albanian border, the ECMM was able to observe the final assault on Junik on 12 August. On 13 August, Junik finally fell to the Serbian forces after a ten day blockade, and the villagers who fled reported that the VJ had destroyed it.

In mid August, there were some reports that Glodjane, Rznic and Prilep had been destroyed and were occupied by MUP forces. Furthermore, south-east of Pec fighting continued and thick smoke was observed over the villages of Lodja and Brezanik. Members of EU KDOM clearly observed these villages burning fiercely in the evening of 15 August, after an attack which had commenced early in the morning and involved three helicopters, four fixed wing propeller driven aircraft, artillery and tanks. There was a significant level of activity by both MUP and JSO forces between Pec and north of Djakovica and local UCK commanders alleged that an area north east of Decane had been bombed by military aircraft. From Pec to Decane, many civilian dwellings had clearly been damaged or destroyed and MUP forces were occupying them. It appeared that the area east of this road was still in contention, while Junik itself was deserted and around 40% destroyed and Prilep around 90% destroyed. However, very quickly after the Serbian forces gained control of an area, the UCK would return and engage in sniping against the MUP personnel stationed there. Smoke was also seen coming from the village of Blace, to the north east of Suva Reka, where MUP and VJ forces were located in defensive positions.

On 16 and 17 August, significant numbers of MUP, JSO and VJ forces were observed by KDOM, departing the Pec and Junik areas on the roads to Kosovska Mitrovica and Pristina. KDOM noted the decline in the presence of the MUP and VJ in western Kosovo but also the increase in the number of checkpoints - both MUP and UCK - which continually denied them access to large areas during their patrols. On 21 August, KDOM reported that the UCK continued to be present in the Drenica area, while heavily armed VJ forces had reinforced the normal MUP checkpoint south of Srbica. The VJ had also established a new mobile checkpoint on the road to Prizren, one kilometre south of Zrze, and appeared to be conducting a search operation on both sides of the road. EU KDOM also observed a large fire blazing in the vicinity of Planeja and Gorozup, close to the Albanian border west of Prizren, as well as some evidence of fighting in and around Prizren itself.

On 21 August, residents of the village of Vrela, to the north east of Pec, spoke to KDOM and reported that they had fled the village after being issued an ultimatum by the MUP to turn over their weapons or have the village destroyed.

Local sources claimed that the villages of Zociste, Opterusa, Retimlje, Samodraza and Zojic, between Suva Reka and Orahovac, were attacked by the MUP on 20 August. At this time, reports were also received by KDOM of the harassment and threatening of villagers in Magura, to the south west of Pristina, many of whom fled their homes, as well as an attack on nearby Klecka, which had been a UCK stronghold.

From 19 August, large armoured columns of VJ were observed by US KDOM departing their base at Kosovo Polje and moving westwards. According to EU KDOM, the main aim of the Serbian/FRY forces at this time was to keep the supply lines open, keep the UCK out of the border towns and control the surrounding areas. It appeared that further attacks by the MUP in Drenica were anticipated and offensive operations around Komorane were progressing. US KDOM observed significant activity by MUP and VJ forces on the road between Komorane and Lapusnik, as well as seeing smoke and hearing mortars and small arms fire from the area north and west of Komorane on 22 August.

On 22 August, villagers from Donja Fustica and Sedlare, in the valley south of Komorane, also claimed that the MUP forces had invited them to return to their homes by dropping leaflets, and then, after they had done so, shelled the villages during the night. Consistent with this, US KDOM found two artillery craters and one unexploded artillery round in a nearby field.

On 23 August, the anticipated Serbian offensive in the valley south of Komorane commenced. KDOM observed smoke rising from this area and heard artillery reports. It also received reports of attacks on the areas west of Stimlje and west of Suva Reka, although it was denied access to these locations by a ring of MUP forces on the main roads. Nonetheless, team members could see several artillery rounds impacting in the hills near Magura. In addition, just east of Orahovac, KDOM observed MUP forces operating in conjunction with civilians carrying side arms and assault rifles and wearing red ribbons on their right sleeves. To the north east of Malisevo, a significant increase in the MUP and VJ presence was also noted.

On 24 August, KDOM observed that many VJ armoured vehicles were lined up between Komorane and Klina, with their guns pointed towards the Malisevo area and, in the Pec to Decane area, with their guns pointed towards the vicinity of Lodja. Smoke was also seen rising from the area of Stimlje, although access here was still denied. The following day, flames and smoke were clearly visible in the valley south of Komorane. EU KDOM also reported fighting in the area between Orahovac, Suva Reka and Dulje. South of the Pristina to Pec road at Komorane and Lapusnik and north towards Klina, KDOM was prevented from patrolling by MUP forces stationed at checkpoints, who stated that ongoing "security operations" rendered the area too dangerous.

Residents of Sedlare reported that an artillery barrage on the village began on 25 August and that about five tanks or armoured vehicles appeared from the north, which entered the village and began to fire into homes. Then, a large number of ground troops arrived behind the tanks and thoroughly looted and burned the majority of houses along their path. KDOM observed mortar impacts and tailfins on the road, which appeared to confirm these events. Locals also told US KDOM that the shelling of Banja, further south west from Sedlare, had begun on 25 August and KDOM noted artillery impacts and smoke rising from the area.

Towards the end of August, the VJ and MUP operations in this area of central and south-west Kosovo continued. US KDOM observed artillery impacting in the area east of Malisevo and north of Banja, as well as a group of VJ tanks and armoured vehicles moving north of Komorane towards Glogovac. VJ and MUP forces had encircled many villages in the Suva Reka and Komorane areas, including Magura, Stimlje, Dulje, Studencane and Negorvoce, and EU KDOM noted smoke and shelling from the direction of Komorane and Glogovac, Magura and Suva Reka. Reports were also received that the village of Senik, east of Malisevo, was under serious attack. In the Lapusnik to Kijevo and Malisevo triangle it appeared that fighting between Serbian/FRY forces and the UCK was continuing, along with the destruction of villages and property.

On 29 August, KDOM gained access to Senik, which had been the site of VJ and MUP offensive operations over the previous several days. US KDOM saw evidence of a mortar attack on civilians and verified eight dead - all being women and children - the attack having taken place on 27 August. From the accounts given by witnesses, it appeared that, on 26 August, a group of armoured vehicles approached the village from the direction of Malisevo and many of the women and children evacuated into the hills. The next day, mortars impacted on the village and more people fled. On 28 August, villagers hiding in a gully in the hills came under fire from snipers and mortar rounds were fired at the hills surrounding them. The villagers fled their cover, leaving behind their possessions, and moved back towards Senik. Many of their vehicles and possessions thus left were then set on fire by the Serbian/FRY forces. Villagers from nearby Klecka also claimed that VJ and MUP forces had shelled their village on 27 August, burned it on 28 August, spent 3 nights there and then withdrew. The Serbian authorities in Kosovo stated in turn that on 28 August their police forces had broken down an "Albanian extremist stronghold" in Klecka, and these forces now controlled the whole area.

In the neighbouring village of Rusinovce, residents claimed they had been shelled on 31 August and evidence of damage to houses was observed, as well as four dead and sixteen injured Kosovars. Once again, local Kosovars claimed that leaflets had been dropped urging them to return, before the attack. KDOM was also informed that in nearby Sedlare, around 171 houses had been burnt down - 50% of the town. US KDOM subsequently visited Sedlare and observed evidence of ransacking and looting of houses and shops as well as the deliberate setting of fires.