Kosova Crisis Center
link to alb-net
R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Foreign Service Tuesday, April 13, 1999; Page A1
SKOPJE, Macedonia, April 12 – She told her story in a darkened tent that had been cleared of family members ignorant of her secret. Her long brown hair was tied in back, and her body remained exceptionally still, as if she were afraid to let her limbs express emotion. Her tone was flat and unhesitating.
Less than two weeks ago, the 21-year-old woman was living with her family in a comfortable home in a hillside neighborhood of Pristina, the capital of Kosovo. Today, her world has been reduced to a tent in a refugee camp, and she asked two reporters to protect her privacy by contracting her name to the single initial B.
While fleeing Pristina on April 1 – during a mass expulsion of ethnic Albanians by Serb-led Yugoslav forces – she said she was torn away from her family and raped in a garage by four masked soldiers. They then freed her in time to board a packed refugee train that took her and her family into exile.
Similar stories are starting to emerge from ethnic Albanian refugees who have crossed from Kosovo into Albania and Macedonia in recent weeks. Western officials and human rights groups say that scores of women have reported being raped since the Belgrade government started waging all-out war in Kosovo against separatist rebels and ethnic Albanian civilians supporting rebel demands for independence.
Last week, Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon said that U.S. officials had received unconfirmed but "very disturbing reports" that ethnic Albanian women had been raped at an army training camp near the southern Kosovo town of Djakovica. "This is a very eerie and disturbing echo of documented instances of rape and killing of women in Bosnia during the Bosnian war," he said.
During that conflict, Bosnian Serb forces carried out a systematic campaign of rape against Bosnian Muslim and Croat women, resulting in several indictments by the international war crimes tribunal at The Hague.
So far, the Kosovo violence has produced far fewer such reports, and rape has not yet become a major focus by human rights interviewers at refugee camps here and in northern Albania. But some officials say this may be due to the great reluctance of ethnic Albanian women – most of them Muslims and members of a highly conservative culture – to disclose that they have been raped.
"It's not the best time to be doing in-depth interviewing on this subject," said a woman here with long experience interviewing rape victims. "But I'm sure we will find it, because . . . I don't think there's any conflict where it hasn't happened."
B. was reluctant to talk about her experience and did so only after being promised she would not be identified. Her account was corroborated independently by other refugees, including a sister and two strangers.
She said that at 11 a.m. on April 1, a soldier appeared on the street outside her home and ordered all ethnic Albanians to leave Pristina – and Kosovo itself. "This is our land; go to Albania," the soldier shouted. Other soldiers were firing guns into the air. B.'s family filed into the narrow streets with hundreds of neighbors, where soldiers and militiamen waited to herd them toward Pristina's rail station.
Before leaving their house, B.'s 58-year-old father had asked her, her two sisters, mother and three brothers – aged 12, 19 and 23 – to hide cash in their pockets. But once outside, two soldiers quickly stopped the family, seized the two older brothers and demanded $3,000 to spare their lives. Their father said he did not have that much, explaining that he worked for a state-run company and offering to show them a document to prove that he earned only 200 dinars a month – about $120.
"You have to get the money," B. recalled the soldiers saying. Her father began to shout on the street, "Does someone please have some money, because they are holding my sons?" But no one was willing to part with money they might need to buy their own lives or the lives of their families. Finally, the soldiers agreed to free the boys for about 300 dinars.
Farther down the street, a soldier motioned to B. to step out of the crowd. He was wearing a green face mask, a blue flak jacket, a green T-shirt and green trousers.
Her father asked, "Could you please let her go?" He tried to reassure his daughter that the man only wanted more cash. "Don't worry," he said. But her sister sensed something worse was coming and together with her brother's wife began to protest as the soldier started to lead B. toward a nearby garage.
"I thought that they were going to keep her," the sister said. The soldier demanded that the family walk farther down the street, but her youngest brother refused. He dared the soldier to shoot him before his father dragged him away and walked on ahead with the boy's other sisters. She said she told the soldier: "I emptied my pockets earlier; I have only this ring." But he said "Keep the ring and come here."
Although she doubts now that she could identify her attackers, B. recounted every aspect of the rape in meticulous, searing detail.
The garage had a metal door and concrete walls, and there was an expensive foreign car in it, she said. At one end was a smaller room filled with gardening tools. B. said she was terrified to see four or five other men inside, some wearing black masks and others green masks.
Once the door was shut, the man who had seized her started to take off his mask, but another man warned him not to do so. That man, too, said he wanted money, prompting B. to plead that she had already given up all she had. But he pulled down her pants and pushed her to the back of the garage. She grabbed the handle of a shovel to steady herself, and he struck her. Then he and three other men raped her.
All the men kept their masks on, and B., who speaks Albanian but not Serbian, said she could understand little of what they said. The soldiers then pushed her back onto the street without allowing her to dress; she said one of their officers told them to let her "go to Albania."
When she caught up to her parents and siblings, her face bloody, they told her they had begun to fear she was dead. Her sister remembers her replying: "I would rather be dead. I would rather they killed me than what they did to me. . . . I believe God will punish them."
After arriving at the refugee camp in Macedonia, B. submitted to a doctor's examination so she could obtain a written report explaining the loss of her virginity – for the sake of a future spouse, she said. For now she said, she is worried she might be pregnant.
45 albanians massacred in Kaçanik
(KosovaPress)
Kaçanik, April 13th (Kosovapress)
In an attack in the city of Kaçaniku, serbian forces on Aprl 9th, have massacred 45
albanians, where most of them were civilians, then 6 others are being wounded and 6 are
being taken as hostages. Among these people were present 12 KLA soldiers who died
heroically defending civil population and their country. Also 6 other people are missing.
These are the soldiers of KLA being killed:
Name, Surname, Age, Village
01. Fadil Izahir Çaka, Bobë,
02. Mehat Izahir Çaka, Bobë, brother of Fadil
03. Muhamet Nuredin Zeneli, Bobë
04. Ilir Ejup Zharku, Kaçanik
05. Negjmush Qamil Elezi, Kaçanik
06. Negjmush Rexhep Fera, Kaçanik
07. Shefket Nazim Fera, Kaçanik
08. Jehona Sabit Raka Kaçanik
09. Lumnie Sherif Raka Kaçanik
10. Mukadeze Lika – Muhaxheri Kaçanik
11. Faruk Vesel Dogani Kaçanik
12. Pjani Mendull Bela Kaçanik
These the soldiers of KLA cosidered as disappeared:
1. Izahir Gani Troni, Kobaqec
02. Mynyr Bedri Thaqi, Kobaqec
03. Fatmir Avdyl Horuni, Biqec
04. Blerim Ramadan Raka, Kaçanik
05. Remzi Shaqir Zharku, Kaçanik
06. Habit Dullovi, Biqec
These are the civilians being killed:
01. Izahir Qaka (67), Bobë
02. Elfete Qaka (65), Bobë, Izahir`s wife
03. Zijadin Prangu (55), Kaçanik
04. Ensale Ziadin Prangu (20), daughter of Ziadin
05. Tefik Mendu Nallbani (45)
06. Merzike Vesel Dogani
07. Zekie Brahim Dogani (70)
08. Hamide Brahim Rexha (60)
09. Nevzat Mehmet Qollaku (30)
10. Abdurrahim Daut Shehu (40)
11. Reshat Sherif Shehu (38)
12. Jonuz Bajrush Bajra (64)
13. Murat Sakip Raka (55)
14. Daut Selim Rakoci (40)
15. Emine Ymer Gashi (60)
16. Rufki Mulaku (68)
17. Afet Bushi (90)
18. Ramadan Spahiu (74)
19. Rizah Kuraqi (67)
20. Aziz Axhani (70)
21. Adnan Gula (45)
22. Maliq Halit Zharku (48), mentally sick
23. Bedri Zharku (64)
24. Adem Rakoci (39)
25. Raif Azem Krivanjeva (19)
26. Nebih Topojani (75)
27. Fadil Bunjaku,
These are the wounded people:
Rrustem Dema, Besnik Bajra, Xhemajl Sopa, Nexhmedin Bruti, Shefki Guri, Jashar
Selimi.
These people are taken as hostages:
Gjyli Raka (70), Gjyli Rexha (65), Ilaz Rakoci, old age, Xhemail Brodi (70), Hamit Shehu
(58) and Ekrem Raka (70).
NATO must get serious about war
with Serbia (Toronto Sun)
By ERIC MARGOLIS
Toronto Sun
Contributing Foreign Editor
NEW YORK -- Slobodan Milosevic's Final Solution for the Muslims and Catholics of Kosovo is
50% accomplished. In a crime of monstrous proportion, a million Kosovars have been
slaughtered, robbed, raped and driven like animals from their burning homes by Serbs, then
treated like human garbage by the government of Macedonia. NATO's response, a war by
committee, has been half-hearted, half-witted and wholly inept. It took NATO's
"massive air campaign" a full 16 days to deliver the same number of strikes as
did the U.S. on a single day of the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq. Only 15% of aircraft
launched carry war loads; the rest fly support. On Wednesday, after two weeks of
theatrical but ineffective bombing, British Harriers finally managed for the first time to
attack a Serb armoured column in Kosovo - the whole point of the operation.
If NATO can't defeat a mere 7 million Serbs, what can it do? Any buck private could have
told NATO's civilian masters air attacks alone wouldn't stop Serb ethnic warfare. The
failure to mass ground troops around Serbia before air attacks began was an act of
military, diplomatic and political idiocy. So is NATO's repeated insistence ground forces
won't be sent, signaling Serbia would not be invaded and could keep its tanks and guns
hidden from air attack instead of deploying them to repel a NATO assault. Serb forces in
Kosovo are now using Albanians as human shields and hostages against air attack. The
inept, irresolute Bill Clinton must bear a lot of the blame for this bloody fiasco, which
would never have happened if war veteran Bob Dole had been U.S. commander-in-chief.
NATO has launched another intense diplomatic effort to end the war it plainly cannot win
without ground troops. In yet another act of folly, the Clinton administration is pleading
with Russia to make the Serbs back off, even proposing Russian troops be sent to Kosovo.
After struggling for 50 years to oust the Russians from Eastern Europe, Clinton is now
inviting them back. Moscow is delighted. Russia is skillfully using its ally, Serbia, to
reassert influence in the Balkans, and to confront the West. Iraq, whose air defences and
air force are supported by Serb advisers, is crowing. Serb leader Milosevic's strategy is
to ride out the bombing, dig in - he and the war criminals around him have nowhere, save
Russia, to go - wait for NATO to splinter, and make "peace" after completing
what even UN chief Kofi Annan now terms "genocide." He must not be allowed to do
so.
NATO should immediately begin the overdue massing of land forces around Serbia: - Deploy
part or all of the powerful U.S. 5th Corps in Germany to the Hungarian border with Serbia;
- Get Croatia to mass troops on Serbia's northwest border; - Airlift the French Foreign
Legion to northern Albania, backed by NATO armoured units; - Order Macedonia, which lives
on western aid money, to cease facilitating Serb ethnic crimes, and immediately accept
deployment of NATO units on its border with Kosovo. These units will have to stage through
the Greek port of Salonika, as in World Wars I and II. Greece, which has strong sympathy
for Serbia's anti-Muslim crusade, will resist. Athens must be convinced to afford passage
of NATO troops or face being kicked out of the alliance and the European Union. This must
include units from the largest NATO army in Europe, Turkey.
Many would welcome seeing Serb forces terrorizing and murdering unarmed civilians finally
face regular troops. NATO must get serious about this war. Milosevic's crimes have made
any other solution unacceptable. NATO must also sink Serbia's untouched navy; finish off
its air force; destroy Yugoslav TV and radio; confiscate Serbia's secret bank accounts in
Cyprus; freeze all assets abroad and indict Milosevic for war crimes. This latest
Nazi-style genocide is the result of the failure to prosecute war criminals from Bosnia
like Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic - and, of course, their boss, Milosevic - or to
punish the horrifying massacre of 9,000 Muslims at Srebrenica, the prelude to Kosovo. But,
most important, NATO must quickly get ground troops into Kosovo.
Why, at a minimum, have safe havens covered by NATO long-range artillery and aircraft not
been set up in southern Kosovo to save its tortured civilians? NATO quietly pre-positioned
36 metric tons of food rations before bombing began: it knew Serbia would unleash ethnic
warfare against the Kosovars. Yet NATO, for all its bluster, still won't even name
Milosevic a war criminal, and still keeps hoping to make deal with this brutal, cunning
thug. Which recalls the words of the Roman historian Tacitus: "They make a desert,
and call it peace." The one million Kosovars driven from their homes must be returned
under long-term protection of NATO troops. If not, they will likely become the
Palestinians of Europe. Serbia's crimes have negated its claims to Kosovo.
Belgrade must be forced to pay for rebuilding all the burned villages and towns. NATO
should march into Belgrade, arrest Milosevic and his band of Nazi criminals - who have by
now caused four wars, over 250,000 deaths, and 3.6 million refugees - try them for war
crimes and end, for good, this Balkan nightmare.
Grave situation in Peja and Rugovë
Pejë, April 13th (Kosovapress) The situation in the city of Peja and in Rugovë is very
grave. Occupator serbian forces are being placed in some key points around Rugovo, such as
Brestovik, Lëbushë and in Maja Zezë, upon Pejë. Even those few inhabitants that have
been left in Peja, now the are in grave conditions. The movements of the citizens are
followed by serbian sharp-shooters who are placed in the most higher buildings of the
city. A great pert of the civil population of Peja and villages of Dukagjin are being
placed in the hills of Rugova and now they are facing big difficulties.
Tanks bases nearby Golesh
Komoran, April 13th (Kosovapress) In the village Zabel i Epërm, along the road
Sllatinë-Sankoc, 3 Km near the Hill of Golesh, serbian forces have placed a big tank base
and other armoured military vehicles are put there too. They are being placed there since
April 3rd. KLA observers have seen many movements of these military automobiles.
Big serbian offensive over Drenica
Gllogoc, April 13th (Kosovapress) Since three days before , serbian forces have undertaken
an extend offensive against albanian villages and against KLA units in Drenica. Fierce
combations took place yesterday and even villages around Qyqavica were bombarded. Villages
of Drenica are completely burnt, starting from mountainside of Qyqavica to Tërrnac,
including villages of the commune of Skenderaj and Gllogoc. Fierce combations,
hand-to-hand, between the special units of the 111 Brigade of the Operative Zone of
Drenica and the enemy forces are held continually, particularly yesterday. The resistance
of our units was very strong. There informations that there are wounded and killed people
in both sides but the exact number is yet unknown.
More than 10.000 displaced people
have been taken by serbian police and used as human shields
Gllogoc, April 13th (Kosovapress) Fierce confrontations have took place yesterday between
KLA units and serbian forces. The combations took place in the mountains of Vuçaku,
Tërdec and Baica, along the mountains of Kozmaçi, as well as in Negroc and Gjergjicë.
After the serbian entrance with heavy military machinery and artillery in these regions,
they have take all the displaced people from these villages that were placed in the valley
of the mountains between Vuçakut and Tërdecit and they`ve used them as a living
protection while they were moving. All the displaced people, more than 10.000 in the
direction of Gllogoc and there are no reports about their fate.
A 44 year old woman and a 1 year old girl were buried in the graves of Tetova,
Macedonia
April, (Fakti) Going through difficult conditions casus ed by bad weather, before three
days in the mountain of Luboten, in a group of 50 people, as result of the cold weather,
Mihrije Selim Koxha from Ferizaj, 44 years old was dead and sh is being buried in the
Tetova graves. Also another small girl was buried also but we could not learn about her
name, but she is the daughter of Haziz Sadri Aqifit from the village Biti e Vogël from
Shtërpca.
Albanian civilian deportation by serbian criminals,
goes on
Prizren, April 13th (Kosovapress) As we informed, yesterday in the afternoon, long columns
with civil automobiles, under the serbian police escort have gone in the direction of the
cross-border with Albania. Our sources precise that they were from the villages of Fushë
Kosovës. Last night in the cross-border line near Prizren, over than 10. 000 albanians
are being deported, they were with cars, tractors and other means of transportation.Except
people from villages of Fushë Kosova, there were deported people from Prizren and its
environs. It is informed that all the deported people were taken out from their houses by
force under the threat of execution and during the way they were maltreated and stolen by
serbian police. When they came in the border they were deadly tired and the sign of
maltreating in their face and body, could be easy seen.
BBC Analysis: Is Nato winning?
By Jonathan Eyal
The confrontation between Yugoslavia and Nato is entering its third week. Ostensibly,
nothing has changed: the Alliance will continue the air campaign until President Milosevic
accepts its conditions.
In practice, however, the aims of the war have been in a constant state of flux and soon
the West will witness the biggest battle so far, at least on the diplomatic front.
Nato claims that its strategy is working, and that Milosevic's war machine is bleeding
under its repeated blows.
There is considerable evidence that the Yugoslav military is now running short of fuel
because most of the refineries have been damaged.
The destruction of four bridges over the Danube has also created a logistical nightmare
for the government in Belgrade.
But almost all the other indications suggest that Yugoslavia will be able to withstand air
strikes for quite some time yet, and the weather above the Balkans will get worse in the
days to come.
In short, Nato's military strategy cannot be translated into a political outcome. And Mr
Milosevic, always the resourceful leader, has muddied the waters even more in recent days.
Assumptions proved wrong
It is now clear that Nato went into the war hobbled by three major assumptions, all of
which have been proven wrong:
The Alliance believed that the Yugoslav military will never risk a confrontation with the
West and that Milosevic will back down at the very last moment. The result of this
assumption was that Nato hyped-up its threats but curiously did not undertake the
necessary preparations for carrying them through.
Secondly, there was the vaguely racist belief that the "little people" in the
Balkans are no match for Nato air power: drop a few bombs on these "natives" in
Yugoslavia and they will sue for peace. The idea that Milosevic would simply refuse to
compromise and absorb the air strikes was not seriously considered.
Finally, Nato was addressing two audiences at the same time. While threatening Milosevic
with a military Armageddon, the same Alliance commanders were reassuring public opinion in
the West that their operation would be "surgical" and limited in scope.
The outcome was that the Yugoslav dictator knew from the start the risks he was
undertaking and concluded that they were worth taking.
The story of the last two weeks is, essentially, one of Nato trying to disentangle the
knots which were of its own making.
Air campaign 'phases' merged
The Alliance planned on three distinct phases in the air campaigns, gingerly tailored to
the political circumstances. The first phase entailed the destruction of Yugoslavia's air
defences, to be followed by strikes on Serb forces in Kosovo and, finally, by a more
generalised bombardment of military targets throughout the country.
The plan looked good on paper but was basically irrelevant. Contrary to the calculations
of Western planners Milosevic did not activate his air defence systems, thereby depriving
Nato of its ability to target radar and missile installations.
Meanwhile Milosevic not only refused to negotiate, but actually unleashed his biggest
offensive in Kosovo.
As a consequence, the three phases of the air campaign were quickly merged; a strategy
which was meant to allow for a careful escalation of pressure on Yugoslavia in order to
produce a peace settlement became an aim in itself.
In the process, the list of targets was progressively enlarged and the distinction between
civilian and military objectives increasingly blurred.
Bridges and oil refineries joined airports and ammunition dumps. And the temptation to
enlarge the military objectives even further grows every day, as the recent dispute over
the possible destruction of the Yugoslav television stations indicates.
Shifting objectives
Meanwhile, Western politicians scrambled to adjust their political aims to these shifting
targets.
The operation was originally justified as an attempt to prevent a humanitarian disaster in
Europe.
When precisely this disaster took place Nato feigned surprise (despite the fact that all
the military intelligence agencies predicted this outcome months ago), and committed
itself to the return of the Albanian refugees.
In other words, the purpose of the operation shifted from one of preventing a disaster to
one of reversing its consequences.
The Alliance remained committed to the original peace plan offered earlier this year,
which promised the Albanians a mere autonomy within Yugoslavia.
It knew that once the fighting started this plan was dead, but Nato still cannot commit
itself to outright independence for Kosovo, since this will annoy other Balkan countries.
So the West is stuck somewhere in the middle: Kosovo will not necessarily be independent,
but it will have something more than just an autonomy.
Furthermore, it quickly became clear that air power alone will not dislodge the Yugoslav
forces from Kosovo. But no Western government is yet willing to commit forces for a ground
offensive.
Yet again, the Alliance fudged the issue: it is now bolstering its ground forces under the
guise of protecting refugees in the neighbouring states.
Two weeks after the "precise" and "surgical" air operation began we
are witnessing a war which is partly on the ground and partly in the air, conducted by an
alliance which is complaining when Mr Milosevic evicts his people but is also uneasy when
he prevents the departure of refugees.
What Nato wants
Nevertheless, the fog of war will be dispelled soon, for the confrontation is now
switching yet again to the diplomatic front.
The question is what precisely Nato wants, and what offer from Milosevic will be
considered genuine and substantial enough in order to warrant even a temporary cessation
of hostilities.
The simple answer is that Nato does not have an answer; much will depend on when the offer
for a settlement comes, but also how it is packaged.
The Alliance has to take into account a whole host of political and strategic constraints.
The horrific pictures from Kosovo have increased public demands to identify Milosevic as a
suspected war criminal.
Governments have resisted this temptation partly because they have doubts about the legal
basis for identifying a head of state which is still a member of the United Nations as a
war criminal, and partly because they suspect that they may yet have to deal with
Milosevic across a negotiating table.
However, if the violence continues the pressure to indict the Yugoslav leader may become
irresistible.
Just as importantly, the Alliance has to bear in mind the fact that, the moment air
strikes are suspended, even on a temporary basis, it would be very difficult to restart
them.
The doubts about the efficiency of air strikes will intensify and Nato will not be able to
avoid a debate in the UN Security Council about the mandate for the operation.
In presentational terms, therefore, the Alliance must be sure that when it does consent to
sit down for talks with Milosevic these talks will result in a settlement which can be
safely presented as a Western triumph, and which can offer reasonable guarantees that air
strikes will no longer be needed.
Original demands 'irrelevant'
But, even assuming that these political hurdles are met, what precisely will the Alliance
demand from Yugoslavia?
Officially, the conditions for a settlement have not changed:
Milosevic must accept a complete withdrawal of his forces from the province
The return of all refugees
An autonomy for the province of Kosovo and the presence of an international force designed
to police the deal for a number of years.
In practice, however, all Nato military planners know that these claims are basically
irrelevant. There is no chance that Milosevic will simply accept all these conditions at
the same time; this is tantamount to asking him to commit suicide.
And the idea that the Kosovo Albanians would ever consent to return home in exchange for a
promise of autonomy within the country whose government has tried to murder them wholesale
is plainly idiotic.
But the Alliance is stuck with this package mainly because it cannot admit openly that the
final outcome is an independent Kosovo, since this could upset most of the other countries
in the Balkans.
Nato's new negotiating tactics
In order to avoid a stalemate, Nato is now tilting towards a new negotiating stance.
It is based on what may be called "front-loading": demanding from Milosevic
acceptance of enough conditions even before the serious peace negotiations begin, in order
to make sure that, whatever happens, the Alliance will gain a foothold with its ground
troops in Kosovo, and therefore retain the initiative.
The shift in Brussels is unmistakable. The return of refugees under the protection of
Western forces is now the minimum precondition. According to Alliance spokesmen this can
take place irrespective of whether a peace treaty has been signed.
The essential element is that this return of refugees will take place under Western
military supervision, a nicer way of saying that Milosevic has to agree to the
introduction of Nato troops on his territory even before the negotiations begin.
If Yugoslavia agrees, the air strikes will stop the moment the first convoys of Western
forces cross the frontier. If not, almost anything else Milosevic may offer will be
rejected as mere window-dressing.
Milosevic's strategy
Milosevic also has a strategy which he has started to unveil. The Yugoslav ruler has
basically achieved his most immediate aims.
The Kosovo Liberation Army is destroyed, and at least a quarter of the local Albanian
population has been ejected.
His tactic now is to remove the justification for continuing air attacks without having to
attend any peace conference. The closure of the frontiers, coupled with the unilateral
ceasefire and the offer to return the captured US soldiers are all part of this charm
offensive.
Milosevic knows that if Nato stops the air strikes these will not be restarted.
For the moment, Nato is continuing its operations unabated. But Western governments know
that this is not a long-term solution either, because Milosevic still has a few tricks up
his sleeve.
The hundreds of thousands of internally displaced Albanians, currently trapped in Kosovo,
require food and assistance. Public pressure will soon mount to introduce aid workers into
the province in order to render this assistance.
Milosevic will be very happy to accept these humanitarian workers, in the sure knowledge
that the West will be faced with a horrible dilemma of either ignoring the plight of the
Albanians, or stopping the bombing, probably permanently.
There is still the remote possibility that Milosevic's regime will collapse from within.
But, one way or another, the next week will witness the start of a very different
situation, one in which Nato either moves to an all-out war against the Yugoslav state, or
tacitly accepts that it was check-mated, yet again, by the Balkan arch-manipulator.
All wars begin with clear intentions, carefully-planned strategies and widespread public
support. And all end with quite different outcomes.
Jonathan Eyal is Director of Studies at the Royal United Services Institute in London
Nato urged to target Serbs on
border (BBC)
The Albanian government has called for Nato military strikes against Serb artillery
positions within range of its border with Kosovo.
The calls comes amid increasingly heavy cross-border shelling between separatist Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) fighters and Serb forces.
The Albanian Interior Minister, Petro Koci, who made the appeal, accused Yugoslavia of
trying to widen the conflict in Kosovo.