A Plan for Kosovo
By Bob Dole
Washington Post, Friday, February 5, 1999
This weekend, Kosovo Serbian government officials and ethnic Albanian leaders will be
meeting in France as part of a U.S. and European push to end the conflict in Kosovo. It is
too early to say that this effort will halt the fighting, let alone lead to genuine peace.
But it is not too early to figure out what it will take to reach and implement a fair,
democratic and lasting settlement.
First, we need to remember how we got here and who started this mess. No matter how some
of our allies try to muddy the waters, the fact is that the same man who started the wars
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina started this one: Slobodan Milosevic. It was his
brutal, decade-long repression of the 2 million Albanians in Kosovo that finally provoked
an Albanian insurgency. We have long known that Milosevic stays in power by fomenting
instability. His methods are violent and, as we recently witnessed in the massacre at
Racak, his preferred victims are not soldiers but innocent men, women and children.
Second, we need to keep in mind that no matter how much we would like to share the burden
of the Balkans with our NATO allies, without U.S. leadership and the application of U.S.
principles, there is little likelihood of a just and sustainable settlement. Our European
friends have historical prejudices that prevent them from being honest brokers. For
example, the French have had close ties with the Serbs since the end of the last century
and, even in the face of Serb- sponsored genocide, have advocated leniency in dealings
with Milosevic.
More important, America must insist on democratic practices and democratic self-government
for the Albanian majority in Kosovo. Any agreement must allow for free and fair elections
to be held, the provision of civil and political rights to all citizens of Kosovo and the
protection of minorities, including the Serbs. The Albanians must be able to exercise
genuine self-government and be represented in Yugoslav federal institutions.
Next, as the very recent lesson of Bosnia continues to demonstrate, clarity in agreement
language and obligations is essential to the smooth implementation of a settlement. The
post-Dayton problem areas in Bosnia have most often been those in which the language of
the treaties and annexes has been unclear or where responsibilities have been shared in a
vague manner. One way to ensure a better understanding is to allow the Albanians-who
unlike the Serbs are inexperienced negotiators and beset by divisions-to be assisted by
international experts.
In addition to the duties of the parties, international obligations must also be
absolutely clear. In the Dayton annex related to international force deployments, NATO-led
forces were empowered, but not required, to arrest war criminals and protect refugees or
displaced persons who wanted to return to their homes after the war. As a result, NATO
troops have not only failed to arrest the top Serbian war criminals, Ratko Mladic and
Radovan Karadzic, but have actively avoided encountering them. At the same time, more than
a million Bosnians have been unable to return to their homes, especially in the Serb
republic.
Negotiating a clear agreement may be more difficult and time-consuming, but vagueness and
avoidance of the tough, but most critical issues, guarantees problems down the road.
Another lesson of Bosnia is that it is essential to create a safe environment-safe for
American and international forces and safe for civilians. At present, there are more than
20,000 Serb police, paramilitary and army forces in Kosovo. The current draft, to be
presented at the Rambouillet talks, allows 2,500 Serb police forces to stay in Kosovo.
This means a 2,500 percent increase in risk for American and NATO forces. Furthermore,
given that the Serb police were Milosevic's main tool of violent attacks against Albanian
civilians, there is little chance that Albanians who have fled their homes in fear will
risk their lives by returning to areas where Serb police are present.
If the United States seeks to minimize its troop commitment, and to avoid obligations to
assist in refugee resettlement, it will need to make sure that the environment is as safe
as possible. The presence of Serb forces benefits no one except Milosevic. A
zero-tolerance policy for all Serb forces and Albanian paramilitary forces is the only way
to make Kosovo safe and secure.
Finally, the United States must ensure that any agreement reached in France will have
built within it a real exit strategy. If this is truly to be an interim agreement, there
must be a date certain for a referendum on Kosovo's final status. Also, the terms of the
referendum must be established in advance and the results must be binding.
A referendum should include all three options: maintaining Kosovo as an autonomous
province in federal Yugoslavia; giving it third-republic status; and independence. The
Serbian and/or Yugoslav governments must not be allowed to veto the results of this
referendum, or it will be rendered meaningless-or, even worse, will invite more violence.
The task ahead is not easy, but it is achievable if effective diplomacy is backed by the
credible threat of the use of NATO force. Dayton would not have come about without
Congress's voting overwhelmingly to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnians and NATO,
in turn, deciding instead to bomb Serb targets. U.S. leaders and NATO must now show the
same resolve. |
