KLA: From
Warriors to Politicians
Janusz Bugajski
3 March 1999
The Kosova Liberation Army (KLA) is now a force to be reckoned with in the intricate
complexities of Balkan and international politics.
While only a year ago American administration officials naively dismissed the KLA as a
renegade force of terrorists, these same "renegades" are now being invited to
the corridors of power in Washington.
Moreover, while just a year ago the leadership of President Ibrahim Rugova's government
discounted the KLA as a serious political player, a KLA leader now heads Kosova's
provisional government and the organization is in a position to make or break the
internationally sponsored "interim peace accord."
So what has happened in the past twelve months to warrant such a transformation?
Nice guys with wild demands
The KLA began as an idea for active liberation and was forged in armed struggle.
Armies and states are usually born in combat.
Few outside Kosova imagined that after ten years of passive resistance against the
Milosevic regime, the Albanians were prepared to organize an insurgency movement under the
noses of their Serbian masters.
An image had been created in Allied capitals which concluded that the Albanians were
"nice guys" who behaved "responsibly" despite their "wild
demands" for independence.
Thankfully, they were not prepared to fight for their beliefs or principles.
This clearly suited Western policy makers who desperately wanted to avoid another messy
war on their doorstep.
If only a few dozen Kosovars were killed, tortured, or imprisoned each year by the Serbian
police, this was no cause for concern and the status quo could be preserved indefinitely.
These shortsighted calculations were overturned by the dramatic appearance of the KLA on
the Kosova stage.
The movement seemed to abide by the old Polish proverb that: "it is better to die on
your feet than to live on your knees."
What began as an initial rag-tag assortment of self-defense units and armed squads
targeting Serbian security forces quickly developed into a full-scale guerrilla movement
in the wake of the Drenica massacre a year ago.
Of course, some tragic mistakes were committed in the course of the armed struggle, such
as trying to hold territory and assuming that Milosevic's forces were a normal
"civilized" army rather than an organization that thrived on civilian massacres
and mass expulsions as witnessed in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina.
Despite its initial shortcomings, the KLA gained important tactical lessons, combat
experience, thousands of willing recruits, and an improved flow of weaponry.
But above all, the movement gained prominence, stature, and symbolism as the embodiment of
Albanian resistance.
A growing number of policy analysts and decision makers in the West concluded that the KLA
could no longer be ignored or dismissed; it had become a critical factor and essential to
incorporate into the political process.
The KLA proved resilient and adaptable during Milosevic's assaults and it gained a
reputation among military analysts as a credible fighting force with high morale and
endurance that would steadily improve with appropriate training, experience, and
equipment.
The US objectives
Early overtures by Washington to KLA leaders developed into more intensive contacts and
eventual inclusion in the Kosovar negotiating team at Rambouillet despite the opposition
of Belgrade and Moscow.
US objectives with regard to the KLA are now threefold.
First, the movement is needed not only to sign the Rambouillet accord but also to make
sure that it is honored under a protective NATO enforcement umbrella.
The KLA can therefore play a role as a responsible political player as well as a viable
military force.
Second, the Allies are seeking to cultivate a moderate spectrum of political leaders,
particularly among the younger KLA members, who can participate in the projected Kosova
elections and serve competently in leadership roles.
The longer-term objective is the emergence of a truly representative political elite that
can serve its country and conduct the necessary process of institution building and
economic reform.
Third,
NATO needs the KLA leadership to ensure the transformation of the guerrilla army into a
viable security force for Kosova over the next three years.
Unlike the Serbian army, the KLA has emerged from and is fed by the grass roots.
It is not an organization imposed on the population by a dictatorial ruling clique
determined to keep itself in power at all costs.
It therefore has an opportunity to become a force serving the interests of democracy.
During the upcoming trip to Washington, KLA leaders cannot be passive observers and mere
signatories to the "peace accord."
They must become active and imaginative participants in the process of transforming Kosova
from an unstable entity into a secure state.
The KLA can thereby help ensure that Kosova not only becomes independent but also stable
and democratic.
A series of priorities and objectives need to be spelled out to American officials by the
KLA delegation.
First, in return for its restructuring the KLA must demand a prolonged "arm and
train" program from NATO forces - for both policing and security duties inside
Kosova.
To be effective, the force must acquire appropriate modern weaponry, transportation
vehicles, communications equipment, and other supplies.
Second, the KLA should petition for eventual inclusion in NATO's "Partnership for
Peace" program as a territorial security force.
If this is denied in the short term, then the leadership must request police and military
training from the U.S. army, police forces, and National Guards units.
Training programs can be conducted both within Kosova and in the United States.
The heroism to be matched by responsibilities
Indeed, any cooperative arrangements with NATO forces in general and American forces in
particular will generate mutual trust, credibility, and inter-operability for future
security tasks.
Third, the KLA leaders must seek a pledge that in the event that NATO is unwilling to
enforce the "peace plan" and Milosevic escalates his attacks on the civilian
population, then the liberation movement will be recognized as the sole Kosova security
force and will be properly armed by the Allies.
This would need to happen much more rapidly and effectively than was the case with the
Bosnian army during the Serbian siege.
Over the coming months, the KLA will face one of two major tests. Either it will become an
effective guerrilla army that will eventually eliminate Belgrade's control over Kosova or
it will need to play a politically constructive role under a NATO mandate.
In order to prove Kosova's readiness for independence, a pluralist political structure
must be constructed as well as the rudiments of a civil society and market economy.
There must be no room for military muscle in Kosovar politics or the assumption of special
privileges and powers by people in or out of uniform.
The heroism of the KLA fighters will have to be matched by the responsibilities of its
leaders in helping to form a democratic civilian government while bringing all military
units under strict civilian control.
Kosova must not become a mini-Miloserbia. |
