Kosova Crisis Center
link to alb-net
Back to the Drawing Board; Human
Rights Should Know No Boundaries (W. Post)
By Julie Mertus
Printed in The Washington Post—Sunday, April 11, 1999—Outlook Section.
The Kosovo Albanians I got to know while working on a book on nationalism in the early
1990s had a way of bidding farewell that I shall never forget. "Next time," they
would say, "may we meet in free and independent Kosovo." Most of them, I
learned, were not interested in actually changing the borders of their province; for them,
self-determination meant choosing their own government and gaining some measure of
independence from Serbia. They talked about being part of a free Europe, where frontiers
would be fluid and permeable, and the rights of minorities would be protected.
All of this seemed like a fantasy as the fighting began in the summer of 1998. Yugoslav
President Slobodan Milosevic believes in borders--and believes in going to any lengths to
retain them. Specifically, he believes in the use of force--including mass expulsion and
paramilitary hit squads--to keep Kosovo within Serbia, within Yugoslavia. The
international community also believes in borders--and has questioned the wisdom and
legality of crossing them to settle internal disputes in a sovereign state. The legal
debate concerns a tension between two competing principles: respecting the territorial
integrity of states and guaranteeing universal human rights and self-determination. In
fact, it is a debate about nothing less than the very purpose of the United Nations. The
international community's response to the crisis in Kosovo provides a test case of these
competing views.
Those who cling to existing borders view the fundamental purpose of the U.N. as ensuring
global security by maintaining the status quo. Others--and I fall firmly into this
group--contend that to emphasize security without regard for human rights sacrifices the
core purpose of the organization--namely the promotion of peaceful and just societies.
Two weeks ago, when the American Society for International Law met in Washington, that
conflict came to the fore in a series of heated arguments. At face value, the words of the
U.N. Charter, the most fundamental document of international law, appear to favor anti-
interventionists, who believe that intervention is susceptible to misuse and that what a
state does within its own borders is largely its own business. Article 2(4) of the
charter, which was adopted in 1945, clearly declares that states "shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state . . . ." Exceptions exist where a
state acts in self-defense or where the U.N. Security Council finds a "threat to the
peace, a breach of peace or act of aggression" and authorizes the use of force.
In the case of Kosovo, each of these exceptions is problematic. The self-defense exception
has been read narrowly. States may use force against other states only to defend
themselves and their allies from actual attack (and not from mere anticipation of attack).
The neighboring states of Albania and Macedonia have not been attacked, and the
self-proclaimed Albanian Kosovo was never recognized as a state. Thus, the self-defense
exception would have to be stretched to apply to Kosovo.
Nor does the Security Council authorization exception apply. Three U.N. Security Council
resolutions on Kosovo, which Serbia has flagrantly disregarded, found the existence of a
threat to the peace and enjoined Serbia to take certain actions, such as reducing troops.
But it would be a strain to contend that those resolutions authorize the use of force.
What's more, at the bidding of Russia and China, the Security Council recently and
explicitly rejected the use of force.
Anti-interventionists further support their argument by pointing out that another article
of the U.N. Charter forbids the U.N. and individual states from intervening in
"matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state."
But this article also supports the notion of humanitarian intervention. Since at least
1945 and the post-World War II Nuremberg trials, gross violations of fundamental human
rights are not considered solely within the domestic jurisdiction of any state but matters
of concern to the entire international community.
Read on a little further in the charter, and you will find Articles 55 and 56, which
implore "all Members [to] pledge themselves to take joint and separate action"
to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all," suggesting that the U.N. Charter not only permits intervention on
humanitarian grounds, but in some cases requires it.
It's not that humanitarian intervention is a new concept. (Hugo Grotius, the father of
international law, recognized the principle as long ago as the 17th century). The broad
acceptance of human rights principles is a recent phenomenon, however. And as human rights
have gained acceptance, the notion of state sovereignty has lost ground: Where a state is
incapable of protecting human rights or is itself the perpetrator of abuses, human rights
cannot be guaranteed without eroding the ancient principle of state sovereignty.
One reason for many international lawyers' caution about applauding the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention is that, in the colonial and Cold War periods, it could be
misused by strong states as a pretext for vigilante activity and for the occupation of
weaker and politically disobedient countries (some people would include the U.S.
interventions in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989 as examples). However, the
post-Cold War era provides us with an opportunity to salvage the doctrine. Drawing from
the U.N. Charter itself, U.N. Security Council resolutions and other international
documents and decisions, we need to identify workable criteria that limit the scope of
humanitarian intervention so as to respect borders. Where human rights abuses target a
particular racial, ethnic or religious group, the argument for intervention is strong.
Meaningful humanitarian intervention does not threaten world order. Rather, it vindicates
the fundamental principles for which the United Nations was created.
Bajram Kelmendi, an ethnic Albanian from Pristina and one of Europe's leading human rights
lawyers, used to say to me, "We may not win, but the law is on our side." Two
weeks ago, he and his two sons were murdered by a Serbian hit squad. Their deaths
underline a need for a human rights vision that transcends borders.
EVIDENCE OF MILOSEVIC'S PLANS FOR
GENOCIDE IN KOSOVO (VJESNIK)
Branko Madunic, 'Dokazi za Milosevicev plan genocida na Kosovu',
Vjesnik, Croatian Newspaper, April 21, 1999
BONN, April 20, 1999 - "The name Slobodan Milosevic has been on a secret indictment
since the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (B-H)", the latest edition of the German weekly
Der Spiegel comments on the Yugoslavian president, dedicating his photograph to the entire
front page. Difficulties had arisen in legally proving that the dictatorship in Belgrade
was responsible for crimes committed in Bosnia, because at that time it proved to be
overshadowed by general Ratko Mladic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, claims Der
Spiegel.
Although now with his expulsion of Kosovo Albanians, Milosevic is no longer in the
shadows. Der Spiegel cites intelligence sources from western governments which make
mention of plans of ethnic cleansing, that is, genocide in Kosovo in Milosevic's closest
circles. "Horse shoe" ("Potkova") is the name of the systematic plan
of deportation and expulsion of the civilian population from Kosovo, although perpetrated
under the guises of a battle against the Kosovo Liberation Army.
While negotiations were being held in France, Milosevic was involved in an operation which
brought military-police forces into Kosovo - a region which he purportedly claimed to be a
military training zone - in an attempt to deceive observers from the Organisation for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), as well as NATO intelligence planes which were
filming in the area. Towards the end of March all Serbian units were ready for action.
At the same time these regular units were strengthened in numbers by criminal band
members, which are referred to as 'paramilitary units' in NATO jargon. Amongst these units
were members from the 'White eagles' as well as from the 'Black hand' organisation who
were under the direct command of Zeljko 'Arkan' Raznatovic and Vojislav Seselj, who is now
deputy prime minister within the Serbian government. Der Spiegel reminds us of the fact
that these very same masked bandits were used in Croatia and in Bosnia.
The objective of this 'Horse shoe' operation is defined as a strategy to defeat the Kosovo
Liberation Army (OVK) and to prevent the Albanian civilian population from returning to
their homes. Similar action was already put into operation following a short cease-fire
back in October of last year. Milosevic has engaged over 40,000 soldiers, 10,000
policemen, with a support battalion of 300 tanks and 700 pieces of artillery in the
realisation of this objective.
Criminal tactics that Milosevic's troops were and are involved in include: surrounding
villages with tanks, artillery and snipers. Then comes the massive bombings and mass
killings using snipers.
This is most commonly followed by the police and paramilitary units separating the men
from the women, children and elderly. The men are usually killed, while the remainder of
the civilians are expelled, following which they go onto towns or villages which are
looted and then razed to the ground. These criminal acts were perpetrated during
negotiations that were held in France, long before NATO began with its air strikes.
According to statements released by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the German government have proven to be the most co-operative with the
ICTY in The Hague. On Monday the German Minister for Defence Rudolf Scharping, officially
handed over to Arbour, Senior Prosecutor at the ICTY, recordings that German planes made
while flying over the Kosovo area. This material documents crimes perpetrated in Kosovo by
licentious Serbian soldiers.
Apart from this material, Sharping has also made available to the ICTY, materials
collected and correlated by German investigative teams located in the field at refugee
camps in Macedonia and Albania.
The German Minister for Defence especially highlighted that the German intelligence
service also has at its disposal "solid indicators" of massive shootings in
Kosovo, which Milosevic in the line of command is ultimately and directly responsible for.
In answering amongst many other things to questions put to her about the possibility of an
indictment being issued against Milosevic while in Bonn last Monday, Prosecutor Arbour
said. "I believe that weeks and months are necessary before one indictment can be
properly prepared.
On Serbian Mythology and Kosova
By Michael McAdams
May 1, 1999
It has been said that truth is the first casualty in war. In June of 1991 war broke out in
Europe for the first time since World War II as Serbia attacked Slovenia, then Croatia,
and then Bosnia. Today, Europe is again at war attempting to stop Serbia’s brand of
genocide known as ethnic cleansing. At the same time a war of propaganda and mythology is
being fought by Serbia’s supporters in the world’s press. The purpose of this
war is to mask the reasons for Serbian aggression and to blur the realities of genocide
prose-cuted solely to maintain a centralized Serbian dictatorship in what was Yugoslavia.
Over the years a great deal of Serbian propaganda has become mythology with a life of its
own, growing and changing with each retelling. These myths were not only resurrected and
embellished by propagandists, but by well-intended journalists and others as well
attempting to understand or to justify Serbian aggression.
The conflict in Kosova has produced dozens of expert and not-so-expert opinions about the
origins and background that led to hostilities and revived some very old, and created some
very new myths about the conflict. The most common include: "These people have been
killing each other for (pick a number from 100 to 2000) years." Two thousand years
would have come as quite a surprise to the Romans. In fact the genesis of current Balkan
crisis can only be traced back to Serbia’s invasion of Kosova in 1912. "Kosova
is the most recent venue for radical Islamic states that wish to establish a beachhead in
Europe." Kosova has been Muslim since 1389. "Kosova is supported by Iran and by
Saudi Arabia who send their mercenaries to fight with them." If so, they don’t
seem to be doing a very good job. "Kosova has been a province of Yugoslavia for
hundreds of years." Either in name or territory, no state known as Yugoslavia
appeared on a map of Europe prior to 1929 and the very concept of Yugoslavia only dates to
1915.
Perhaps the most widely held myth is that during World War II the Serbs led the
anti-fascist resistance and held down "dozens" (again pick a number) of elite
Axis divisions in Yugoslavia. The reality is that like virtually every country on the
European continent during World War II Serbia had a government which collaborated with the
Axis. All of the nations of Yugoslavia had elements which supported the Axis, and all had
elements that were anti-fascist. However, it was the Croatian-dominated Partizans, led by
the Croatian Josip Broz Tito which formed the only true anti-fascist fighting force in
Yugoslavia and the most formidable Allied force in occupied Europe during World War II.
The Serbs overwhelmingly supported the para-military forces known as the Chetniks which
opposed the pro-Allied Partizans during the War.
When Yugoslavia disintegrated with the German invasion in April 1941, one faction of
Chetniks swore allegiance to the new pro-Nazi Serbian government of General Milan Nedic.
Another group remained under the pre-war leader Kosta Pecanac, who openly collaborated
with the Germans. A third Chetnik faction followed the Serbian Fascist Dimitrije Ljotic.
Ljotic's units were primarily responsible for tracking down Jews, Gypsies and Partizans
for execution or deportation to concentration camps. By August 1942, the Serbian
government would proudly announce that Belgrade was the first city in the New Order to be
"Judenfrei" or "free of Jews." Only 1,115 of Belgrade's twelve
thousand Jews would survive.
The main force of Chetniks rallied around Draza Mihailovic, a 48 year-old Army officer who
had been court-martialed by Nedic and who had close ties to Britain. Early in the war,
Mihailovic offered some resistance to the German forces while collaborating with the
Italians. By July 22, 1941, the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile in Britain announced that
continued resistance was impossible. Although Mihailovic and his exiled government would
maintain a fierce propaganda campaign to convince the Allies that his Chetniks were
inflicting great damage to the Axis, they did little for the war effort and often openly
collaborated with the Germans and Italians while fighting the Partizans. At its peak,
Mihailovic's Chetniks claimed to have 300,000 troops. In fact they never numbered over
31,000. By February 1943 the Western Allies condemned the Chetniks as collaborators and
threw their support to the Partizans. Mihailovic was executed in 1946 for treason.
Ironically, his son and daughter Branko and Gordana went over to the Partizans in 1943 and
both publicly supported their father's execution after the war.
The Partizans, founded by Josip Broz Tito, a Croatian Communist, represented the only true
resistance to the Axis in Yugoslavia during World War II. On June 22, 1941, Partizans in
the Brezavica Woods near Sisak, Croatia launched what would come to be known as the War of
Liberation in Yugoslavia. The date remains a national holiday in Croatia and is celebrated
as the "Day of the Anti-Fascist Uprising." While many Croatians and Bosnians
supported the pro-Axis Croatian state of Ante Pavelic, hundreds of thousands joined the
Partizans and they represented the majority of Partizan brigades throughout the War.
On July 13, 1943, the Democratic Republic of Croatia under the leadership of Andrija
Hebrang was declared in those areas occupied by the Croatian Partizan forces. It marked
the foundation of post-War Yugoslavia. As the war progressed and Italy collapsed, more and
more Croatians, especially from Dalmatia, joined the Partizans. Serbs came over to the
Partizans in great numbers only late in the War as entire Chetnik units changed their
allegiance. By 1943 Allied support shifted to Tito and by 1944 the Partizans were the only
recognized Allied force fighting in Yugoslavia.
As in many countries after the War, the numbers and deeds of resistance fighters grew more
and more impressive as the years passed. In post-war Yugoslavia the heroics of the
Partizans took on mythical proportions as monuments to the heroes of the Liberation War
were erected in every village. As more and more benefits were announced for veterans, more
and more veterans appeared. Exiled Chetniks claimed that it was they, not the Partizans,
who held down "dozens" of Nazi divisions. Depending on which source was cited,
up to twenty "crack Nazi divisions" were tied down in Yugoslavia. The numbers
are cited frequently by politicians and even military "experts" opposing
intervention to stop Serbian aggression in Kosova and predicting another Vietnam.
Although the official Partizan history lists 32 German divisions, there were never 20 or
even twelve full German divisions in all of Yugoslavia during World War II. After the
initial invasion, Italy occupied or annexed one quarter of Yugoslavia and a few large
German units remained in occupied Croatia. None could be considered elite. Three
"German" divisions, the 369th, 373rd, and 392nd Infantry Divisions in Croatia
and Bosnia were in fact manned by Croatians and Bosnians with "Volksdeutsche"
ethnic German officers. Attempts to form a pro-Axis Bosnian Muslim division failed when
the conscripts revolted against the Germans at a training base south of Le Puy, France in
September 1943. It was the only large-scale mutiny within the German army during the War.
While it is true that during the War the Chetniks aided Allied pilots in escaping, they,
like the Partizans, were paid in gold for each one.
Despite a wealth of scholarship condemning the role of Serbian Chetniks during World War
II, Serbian mythology lives on and even grows as the genocide of the Kosovars goes on. No
amount of ancient fiction or new mythology will ever make Serbia the victim or erase
today’s crimes. Too many have seen too much through the eyes of the media. From this
war, myth will not triumph over.
ETHNIC CLEANSING OF KOSOVO IS SIXTH
WAVE OF CRIME AGAINST ALBANIANS IN 100 YEARS (V. LIST)
Zeljko Kruselj, ‘Etnicko Ciscenje Kosova sesti je val zlocina Srba nad Albancima u
stotinu godina’
Vecernji List, Croatian Newspaper, April 27, 1999, p. 17.
ZAGREB - As much as people do not like to hear it, the worst victims of NATO attacks
against FRY are the Kosovo Albanians. The reason for this is that Milosevic is taking
advantage of a state of war to finish the plan of ethnically cleansing Kosovo of
Albanians, as was planned by ‘Greater Serbian’ ideologists a long time ago.
Close to 600 thousand Albanians have already fled Kosovo over the last month, while tens
of thousands are still hiding in the mountains of Kosovo in search of safer routes toward
the southern border.
Though the Belgrade regime probably realises it will, in the end, lose the war and that it
will have to unconditionally agree to the return of refugees, as well as a probable
international protectorate in Kosovo, it still has the goal of preventing at least some of
the Albanians from returning to Kosovo.
That is how the Kosovo myth about the region being the ‘birthplace of Serbism’ -
although it stopped being just that after the failed uprising against the Turks at the end
of the 17th century - continues to be a source of inspiration in the present day.
Generations of Serbian politicians and intellectuals have created plans for the final
solution to this problem, not hiding their hegemonism and aggressive chauvinism based on
religious, cultural and even racist prejudices. Experts who deal with the history of
Kosovo have no doubts that the genocidal policies toward Kosovo Albanians have been
obvious since 1878, when Serbia and Montenegro were internationally formally recognised,
in spite of their defeat from the Turks and thanks to Russian diplomacy and the Berlin
Conference.
‘DENSE ALBANIAN VILLAGES’ CONQUERED ONE BY ONE
Seeing as the Albanians used to live in present day southern Serbia, the direct
consequence of that fact was their brutal expulsion from the wider vicinities of Nis,
Pirot, Palanka, Leskovac and Vranje. Serbian historians attempted to portray that exodus
as voluntary moving, to spite some other later writers who wrote of the authorities after
1878 secretly torching villages and Albanian quarters in cities. It is difficult to talk
about any precise numbers, primarily due to the fact the Serbian authorities back failed
to conduct a census, but it is presumed that no less than 30,000 Albanians were expelled
from Serbia. Some of them moved to Kosovo, which was not under Serbian rule at the time,
while others settled in Asia Minor and other areas of the Ottoman Empire. What was
actually happening at that time can be seen through a text by Vasa Cubrilovic - a
participant in the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne, Franjo
Ferdinand, in Sarajevo - who later became an ideologist of genocide against the Albanians.
Here is a quote from Cubrilovic from Ljubica Stefan’s book ‘Serbs and
Albanians’ (three volumes), which had to be published in Ljubljana without an
author’s name, due to the political psychosis in 1989.
"The moment the first Serbian units began their penetration toward Kursumlija,
Prokuplje and Leskovac, they came across densely grouped Albanian villages that refused to
surrender. They will be the central point of Serbian battles. Village by village had to be
taken. The Albanians retreated toward the south, hiding in refugee camps and continued to
fight. When the Serbian Army would approach refugee camps, they would retreat toward the
South Morava Valleys, Veternica, Medvedje, Pusta Reka and Laba, then further on to
Kosovo… After 1878, Serbia had to colonise the regions abandoned by the Albanians and
Turks. The border with Kosovo had to be settled with nationally loyal residents in order
for the border with the Albanians to be secure."
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ‘SERBIAN MISFORTUNE’
A new wave of crimes against the Albanians, this time in Kosovo and in western regions of
Macedonia, began in the first of the Balkan wars, when the Serbs and Montenegrins -
assisted by the Bulgarians and Greeks - expelled Turkey from the Balkans. In an analysis
of the Serbian press of the period, Ljubica Stefan noticed the leader of the murders and
expulsions of Albanians was the Serbian Orthodox Church, that sent Serbian soldiers to
battle with the slogan "avenge Kosovo!" That is how Albanians ended up bearing
the burden of blame for the "Serbian misfortune" on religious grounds, though
they were also rebelling against the Sultan for their own independence. Serbs and
Montenegrins at the time were not too interested in Kosovo, rather in the northern part of
Albania, especially the regions surrounding Skadar and Drac. Belgrade and Cetinja reached
their goal, but had to leave those regions due to the pressure of the world powers of the
time. At the 1913 London Conference an independent Albania was created with borders almost
identical to the ones existing today.
The total figures for Serbian and Montenegrin army crimes, who’s countries divided
Kosovo between themselves, were never published. Judging by individual reports from the
field, which was often written by the leader of the Serbian Social Democratic Party,
Dimitrije Tucovic, tens of thousands of Albanians were massacred, in addition to masses of
displaced persons.
"WHOEVER SURVIVES TO NIGHTFALL…"
A Tucovic text, with an indicative title - ‘Blood Revenge for Wild Soldiers’ -
includes descriptions such as the following:
"The ghost of death hung over the heads of Pec, Djakovica and Prizren Albanians day
and night. Whoever survived to nightfall was not sure to see the next sunrise… With
the fall of Kumanovo, the entire Albanian population, which was being pushed by the
Serbian Army coming in from the north, flocked to Skopje in hope of finding sanctuary.
Most found death instead."
At the time there were also a lot of forceful baptisms of Muslim Albanians to the Serbian
Orthodox faith and the Catholic priest from Djakovica warned his bishop that the
Montenegrin authorities are forcing both Albanians and Catholics to embrace the Orthodox
religion. When the world powers demanded the Belgrade authorities recognise basic civil
and religious rights for Albanians, Nikola Pasic angrily replied, "Serbia cannot
agree to that demand because it is in opposition to the right to state sovereignty."
It is interesting that the Milosevic regime today is using the same arguments to
camouflage their crimes.
After the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) was created, the Albanian position
did not get any better and that was the time when the actual colonisation of Kosovo began.
The first cycle of colonisation of Serbian ‘Salonikans’ and Montenegrins was
staged between 1922 and 1929, and the other was between 1933 and 1938. Belgrade sources
admit the arrival of 12 thousand colonial families to Kosovo, which could mean some 60
thousand people. It is presumed that some of those people shared their land or there was
no official record of any other new arrivals because in the end there were "34,528
agricultural units with land." They received land confiscated through the
agricultural reforms, as well as the majority of municipal land and private property that
was owned primarily by expelled Albanians. The confiscation of parts or all Albanian land,
according to post-war revisions of the communist authorities, 6,342 Albanian families
suffered damages.
The methods implemented in the colonisation in the field between the two world wars, is
best testified by one Serbian colonist from the Prizren area:
"There were many cases where Serbs were given land, orchards or fields, owned by
Albanians, outside of a limited complex, from the authorities. The Albanians received no
compensation in money or land. Every Serb with less than 10 hectares could receive an
additional 10 hectares from the authorities. All that had to be done was to go to the
authorities and say: "I want you to give me this or that orchard that belongs to this
or that Albanian because I have less than 10 hectares," and the authorities would
give it to the Serb requesting it."
OTHER METHODS: FINES, ARRESTS, TAXES…
It has been estimated that only up to 1921 some 40 thousand Kosovo Albanians fled to
Albania because of state terror. However, in the period between the wars, the population
in Kosovo was still 66 percent in favour of Albanians, as opposed to Serbs and Montenegrin
who could only ‘muster up’ 22 percent.
Not even the drastic methods of political and economic pressures did not satisfy Belgrade
political and intellectual circles. The Serbian Cultural Circle, the brain of
‘Greater Serbianism’ of that time, organised on March 7, 1937, a debate on the
Kosovo question. The officer in charge was the respected historian Vasa Cubrilovic and the
topic of the debate was ‘Eviction of Albanians’. The point of his deliberation
was to motivate a complete cleansing of Albanians from Kosovo, using all possible methods
ranging from the agreement with the Turks on accepting emigrants to the most brutal
methods of terrorism and crime:
"The other method would be pressure on the state authorities. They should use the
laws to their limits in order to make the survival of Albanians in our land very bitter:
fines, arrests, merciless implementation of all police regulations… merciless tax
collection and all public and private debts, confiscation of state grazing pastures…
The Albanians are the most sensitive concerning religion, hence they should be touched
where they hurt the most. This can be achieved by harassing their clergy, clearing
cemeteries, forbidding polygamy… The displacement of villages has to be a priority,
as well as in the cities. The villages are more stable, hence are more dangerous. After
that, we should not make the mistake of only expelling the poor."
The development of Cubrilovic’s theories was entrusted to Ivo Andric in 1939, who was
the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister at that time. He put the displacement of Albanians in
an international context, which was to be used in further talks with Turkey, while the
most important Yugoslav goal was to divide Albania with Mussolini, in order for the Kosovo
Albanians to be assimilated more easily.
Cubrilovic joined the communist authorities in 1944 as a minister, but did not relinquish
his theories, which he reiterated, but this time in the form of fear that the Albanian
element, "which was opposed to the old Yugoslavia, will also be opposed to the new
one." That document was kept under lock and key for decades in the Belgrade military
archive.
In the final battles to liberate Yugoslavia, tens of thousands of young Albanians were
forcefully drafted for military service and used as cannon fodder on the Srijem (Sirmium)
Front. An example was recorded and was mentioned by Aleksandar Rankovic in 1945, when an
Albanian killed his superior (Serbian) officer. 300 novice soldiers (Albanians) were
immediately massacred.
In the mid-sixties, just before the fall of Rankovic, every third employee in Kosovo was a
Montenegrin, every fourth was a Serb and every seventeenth was an Albanian. When Milosevic
cancelled Kosovo autonomy in 1989, in a very short period some 150,000 Albanians were
dismissed from work. Only "honest Albanians" - i.e. Serb obedient Albanians -
were able to keep their public and national company jobs.
In the post war period, the pressures to evict Albanians continued, especially through
economic measures, as well as political and legal persecution, in principle, against the
"Albanian irredenta." In the eighties, 3,340 Albanians were jailed for alleged
political crimes, while another 10,000 were prosecuted and convicted of criminal acts. The
former were sentenced to over seven years, or a total of 23,400 years imprisonment in
total for all of those sentenced. The latter, mostly younger people, were sentenced to a
total of 25,000 years imprisonment. According to those figures, the former Yugoslav
federation was the record holder in Europe. Furthermore, up to the beginning of the open
conflict in Kosovo, 223 Albanians were killed during police operations.