Kosova Crisis Center
link to alb-net
By Sami Repishti (Illyria, 4/5/1999)
Three weeks ago in Paris, the Albanian Kosovar delegation signed the Rambouillet plan prepared by the Group of Six for Yugoslavia. The plan provided for substantial autonomy and self-government for the people of Kosova over a transitional period of three years. At the end of that period an international conference on a permanent solution of the problem of Kosova would be held, taking into consideration the freely expressed will of the population. During the transitional period, Kosova would remain under the sovereignty of Yugoslavia and Serbia, while a new administration, representing the local population proportionally, would emerge under the protection of a 28,000-strong international military force. This means that for three years, as the result of free and fair elections, the 90 percent Albanian majority in Kosova would take upon itself the responsibility of building a new administration and a free and democratic society. It would convince the world that the Kosovars are deserving of membership in the society of free nations ("deserved independence"). It was a plan of great promise for the future of Kosova. Although this arrangement fell short of what Albanians in Kosova demand -- and -- deserve, the Albanian delegation decided to sign onto it. We supported that ceremony as an act of political foresightedness, and as an expression of the Albanian leadership's confidence. The strategy of solving the problem of Kosova by stages, and as a process supported by the international community, was sound. Albanians in Kosova had chosen peace. The Albanian Kosovars' choice was made after solid guarantees given the six members of the Contact Group for Yugoslavia on the implementation of the plan. Now that Serbian aggression has reached genocidal proportions, it is a moral imperative for the Western community to lend the support promised to those who put their future into the hands of that community. NATO's intervention against Yugoslavia reflects respect for the guarantees given in the Paris plan. Parallel to the ethical aspect of the present NATO intervention, there is also a political one. A few weeks before the celebration of the 50th anniversary of NATO's creation, the alliance is faced with the vital problem of credibility. Will NATO, the most powerful military alliance in history, pass its first test after the demise of Communist rule in Russia and Eastern Europe? If yes, the message will be loud and clear: Petty dictators and rogue governments will not be allowed to disturb the peace and threaten the stability of Europe. With the recent expansion of NATO, the 19 members will demonstrate that Europe is one and indivisible, a region of peace, stability and prosperity. This is also in harmony with vital U.S. national interests. If no, NATO and its allies will have failed the 2 million Albanian victims. Indeed, NATO itself will have failed. NATO's lack of determination to punish the Serb aggressors for the horrible crimes now being committed in Kosova would reveal weakness in the alliance, and make it look like a paper tiger. Other dictators in Iraq, Libya, Cuba, Iran and North Korea -- not to mention the leaders of Russia and China -- would be encouraged to pursue aggressive policies, thus raising havoc in their respective regions. The entire structure of the international relations would suffer, as new conflicts would spring up in many parts of the world. For Albanians in Kosova, a withdrawal of NATO from the present conflict without having inflicted a resounding defeat upon the Milosevic regime would be tantamount to a death sentence. It's exactly this position that Albanian Kosovars would have found themselves in had they not signed the Rambouillet plan, i.e., virtually unarmed civilians facing the rage and the fury of Serbian criminals. Serbia's intent to expel Albanians from Kosova would have been executed systematically without any punishment, and without the fear of a military defeat by a major force such as NATO is today. The wisdom of the Albanian delegation in Paris, in these tragic days for Kosova, is now crystal clear. It is generally conceded that the Rambouillet document has been overtaken by the events of the last two weeks. The Milosevic regime has chosen war, and is engaged in a pre planned and systematic ethnic cleansing of Albanians from the land of Kosova. Reports of people killed, kidnapped, beaten and tortured, and of entire areas reportedly scorched by military expeditions have shocked the conscience of the Western world. News that the Milosevic regime is trying to kill the very identity of the Albanians in Kosova completes the picture of a savagery we have seen only a few years ago in Pol Pot's Cambodia. Albanian archives are being burned, while individuals are forced to hand to Serb police all personal documents, testifying to the Serb intentions to make the return of refugees to their homes impossible, thus eradicating all traces of Albanian presence in Kosova. For years, and especially since 1989, the Milosevic regime has deprived Albanians of Kosova of their rights to participation and representation in government. Schools in Albanian were closed, health and social services were denied unless oaths of loyalty to Serbia were taken. The judiciary and police were purged of Albanians, and Serbs, 6 per cent of the population, ruled over Albanians, 92 percent. Arrests, torture, jail sentences and executions were part of daily life in Kosova in an institutionalized policy of discrimination and apartheid. Albanians were seen and treated as less than humans whose lives were expendable and whose rights and dignity were violated with impunity. Kosova under Serbia was a wasteland, politically, economically and socially. As a result of these criminal policies, a new generation of Albanians grew up in Kosova half educated, unemployed and filled with hatred for the oppressor. Such a hungry and angry mass of people became an ideal material for social unrest, civil disobedience and ultimately armed resistance. The present day conflict in Kosova is a consequence of the pervasive oppression, and a classic example of how to provoke internal conflicts. After the abolition in 1989 by the Milosevic regime of Kosova's autonomy granted by the 1974 Yugoslav constitution, Kosovars organized their own political parties and began to operate outside the Serbian political framework. Albanian strategy was defined by a group of intellectuals led by Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, and aimed at organizing an active, but peaceful resistance. It was a brilliant political strategy that brought together all segments of the Albanian population and the revival, for the first time in the history of the region, of an Albanian independent political life in Kosova. This peaceful movement, rallying around the Democratic League of Kosova ,contributed substantially to the internationalization of the problem of Kosova and gained solid support from most Western governments. Dr. Rugova was received by many Western leaders, including presidents of the United States. As the Serbian repression in Kosova grew, and the international community remained insensitive to Albanian Kosovar complaints, frustration also grew. The 1995 Dayton peace conference, which excluded Albanians at the explicit request of Milosevic, galvanized the popular discontent in Kosova, producing the need for a more vigorous response to repression. This was the psycho logical basis for the emergence of the Kosova Liberation Army. The grounds for revolt in Kosova had been established over many long decades. The emergence of the KLA was the fuse that led to the explosion, especially among the rural population, mainly in the areas where resistance to Serbia had a long tradition, as is the case of Drenice. Azem and Shota Galica, Shaban Polluzha and others come from the same area, where the Jashari brothers grew up, an area that was also the center of the KLA movement. In February 1998, we witnessed the first Serb massacre in the village of Prekaz when over 50 Albanians, men, women and children, were killed in an attack on this KLA stronghold. For over a year Serbian attacks continued, reaching their high point after the signing of the Kosova plan in Paris.. As of today, at least 800,000 Albanians have been displaced or expelled to neighboring countries and their homes burned. The total disregard by Serbia for the sanctity of life and human dignity, brought The New York Times to ask: "After Kosova's Cleansing: Can the Two Sides Ever Coexist?" My answer is: No! The Rambouillet plan signed in Paris by the Albanian delegation was, as President Clinton put it, the only chance to keep Kosova as part of Serbia. Having rejected the plan, Serbia opted for a military solution of the problem. Thus, Serbian claims on Kosova have been irreparably jeopardized. The opportunity offered by Rambouillet has been lost. As for Albanians, the horrific crimes perpetrated against them make it impossible to accept the terms of that agreement any longer. The Yugoslav scholar Chris Cviic, now in London, stated that it was impossible to ask the Albanian Kosovars to remain under Serbia, in any shape or form. Independence is the only exit. Similar views have been expressed by many well-known political analysts and major personalities on the American political scene, including Dr. Henry Kissinger. NATO spokesman, Jamie Shea, believes that international opinion is shifting, and that the idea of independence for Kosova is now being studied by many officials in the West. Signals that the Rambouillet plan may have been overtaken by the events, especially by the reported summary executions and death and destruction caused by the Serbs in Kosova, are many. President Clinton said on March 31, "If there was ever any doubt about the stakes in Kosova, Mr. Milosevic is certainly erasing it by his actions," accusing the Serb strongman of engaging in a campaign of terror in Kosova. White House spokesman Lockhart added: "Milosevic's continuing of a campaign of atrocities has radicalized the people to such an extent that he forfeits any claim to it and loses international support for Kosova remaining part of Yugoslavia." State Department's James Rubin went further, stating that "Slobodan Milosevic has crystallized the animosity between the Albanians and Serbs." This "radicalization" is making it all the more difficult to imagine a circumstance where the two peoples can begin to live together again, said the New York Times on March 31. If a return to autonomy is a thing of the past, what then is the future of Kosova? Kosova is now under the boot of a cruel military occupation. Pre planned expulsions and reported massacres of Albanians by the Serbian army, police and the paramilitary thugs of Arkan, Voislav Sesejl and the like are emptying entire Albanian-inhabited areas in a frantic effort to complete "ethnic cleansing." Belgrade's intentions are to create a situation where large areas remain unpopulated and its controls the region. Albanian claims to Kosova could be denied based on the facts on the ground. Unless a miracle brings the Serb cleansing operations to an end immediately, there are good reasons to fear that the Milosevic regime may achieve its goal of expelling Albanians from Kosova, once and forever. Second, if the Milosevic regime's intentions and military operations do not succeed, two possibilities for a permanent solution of the problem remain open: a) the Serbian solution might be a partition of Kosova, which would be divided to leave the northern and northwestern parts of Kosova - approximately a line from Prishtine to Peje - within Serbia. This area is rich in minerals and contains most of the Serbian religious monuments. It is approximately 35 percent of the territory of Kosova. The area south of the Prishtine Peje line is approximately 65 percent of the territory, and it is mostly agricultural. Since the southern part could not survive economically, it might be allowed to rejoin Albania. b) The Albanian solution would involve an international protectorate over Kosova and the removal of Serbia's sovereignty for a period of three to five years. During this transitional period, elections would be held, and a new administration would set up the foundations of a new and democratic state under an international authority. At the end of the protectorate period, the population of Kosova would be offered a referendum on the permanent status of Kosova. The results would surely be an overwhelming vote for independence, which under those conditions would inevitably receive international recognition. Whether this new state of Kosova would join with Albania remains an open question and would be determined by the international community. The reunion of a new state of Kosova with Albania is by no means a foregone conclusion. In a free, democratic and political stable Europe, international borders will eventually lose much of the meaning presently attributed to them.
The writer is an activist and retired college professor who lives in New York.
BLURB Rambouillet was a good first step . . . . . . but now other options are needed